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China is undergoing rapid economic growth and, in tandem, experiencing social transformations 
and rising social unrest. Growing inequalities among its citizens, the provision of jobs and job 
security, and the reform of state owned enterprises intersect with questions of governance and the 
expectations of ordinary citizens. Important stresses therefore arise for China’s systems to ensure 
job security and the protection of workers. China’s trade unions are not well prepared for these 
stresses. It has been designed to function in a typical Marxist socialist state and is struggling to 
adapt to the changed economic and social circumstances in China after decades of change and 
reform. The system faces conflicts that entwine to create a dilemma in its functions and render it 
unable to satisfy its members’ urgent and legitimate needs. Labor related problems that were 
thought to have long disappeared under socialism -- such as forced labor and child labor -- have 
resurfaced. At the same time, a special social group has emerged: the “farmer workers” created 
by the dramatic influx of migrants from China’s rural areas to the cities. Serious discrimination 
problems in employment in the urban areas have arisen that China’s legal system, especially 
those that deal with labor rights, must adapt and respond to. What can and should China do? Even 
if the political need to deal with the issue has increased, questions remain on the approach that 
China should take. In this context, there is an urgent need to re-examine China’s labor laws and 
the underlying institutions with a view of reforming them. In the effort to re-examine and reform, 
we would benefit from considering model laws that can guide China’s legislative reform. Only 
then can the costs to the Chinese people be reduced in this time of great social transformations. 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that the international core labor standards -- as crystallized by 
eight fundamental conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) that cover four 
fundamental aspects of labor rights -- can and should serve to guide China’s legislative reform. 
Although ILO fundamental conventions never force a signatory party to obey their standards, its 
xiii 
influential power is beyond doubt. So too, in this writer’s opinion, is its usefulness in helping 
China’s labor laws and system change and evolve in tandem with the larger economic and social 
transformations. Accordingly, in this thesis, the writer conducts a comprehensive study on the 
Chinese labor legislation from the perspective of eight ILO fundamental conventions, to find out 
the gap between them and provide feasible gap-filling solutions, including but not limited to 
legislative reforms. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
As China is undergoing rapid economic growth and social transformations, there are increasing 
concerns regarding the costs to its people. When China is moving from a centrally-planned 
economy towards a market economy with Chinese characteristics, its legal system, including 
those that deal with labor rights also needs to adapt to the change. In this context, this thesis 
argues that the international core labor standards crystallized by eight International Labor 
Organization (ILO) fundamental conventions can be of great help to China, to both its 
government and especially to its people. The core conventions have the potential to smooth the 
ongoing transition and minimize dissatisfaction and social unrest.  
 
In this thesis, the writer will closely analyze the Chinese labor law from the perspective of 
international core labor standards. In so doing, the thesis seeks to examine the gap between these 
Chinese national legislation and international standards and to identify the gap-filling solutions, 
which not only take into account the international core labor standards but are adapted to the 
realities that China faces.  
 
1.1  The Value of This Research 
Why is it important for China to progressively adopt the core labor standards of the key ILO 
conventions? This thesis makes six arguments as follows: 
 
First, with a remarkably rapid economic growth over the last two and a half decades, nowadays, 
nobody will deny the economic miracle that China has created. However, at the same time, China 
“is also experiencing rising social unrest, including protests, demonstrations, picketing, and group 
petitioning”.1 Chinese official statistics have shown that “public order disturbance” have grown 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Lum, “Social Unrest in China”, CRS Report for Congress”, online: 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33416.pdf> (date accessed: April 24, 2007). For more information, 
2 
dramatically during recent years, with the number of incidents in year 2003 being 58,000 to 
87,000 in 2005.2 It is observed by political observers that recent protests activities in China “have 
been broader in scope, larger in average size, greater in frequency, and more brash than those of a 
decade ago”.3 The growing income gap, together with the rise of a new class of wealthy officials 
and entrepreneurs, has stirred resentment among the poor which could lead to “all types of social 
instability”.4 As is pointed out by several experts both from China and overseas, a key dilemma 
for the Chinese Communist leadership is how to redistribute national wealth and opportunities so 
that the fruits of economic development can be shared among the majority of the Chinese 
population instead of the minority.5 In response to the rising social unrest and the key dilemmas 
that they face, the Chinese top leaders have made a series of announcements indicating the need 
for a new ideological campaign, i.e., shifting “the focus of official rhetorical from ‘economic 
growth’ to ‘social harmony’”.6 This means, “the development of ‘democracy, the rule of law, 
justice, sincerity, amity and vitality’ as well as a better relationship between the people and the 
government and ‘between man and nature’”.7 In order to implement this new ideological 
campaign, one of the most important actions the Chinese government should take is to protect 
labor rights, since labor rights protection, as closely linking with an ordinary people’s daily life, is 
one of the leverages for safeguarding a just distribution of wealth and diminishing social 
inequality.  
                                                                                                                                                 
please also see generally in Murray Scot Tanner, “Chinese Government Response to Rising social Unrest”, 
online: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT240.pdf> (date accessed: April 27, 2007); 
John Chan, “Chinese President Preaches the Need for ‘A Harmonious Society’”, online: 
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/chin-m12.shtml> (date accessed: April 27, 2007); Francesco 
Sisci, “Is China headed for A Social ‘Red Alert’?”, China Business, Oct 20, 2005, online: 










 Please see generally in online: <http://ceoroundtable.chinadaily.com.cn/cdrt/cdrt27/cdrt27.html> (date 
accessed: April 13, 2009); online: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6606195.html> 
(date accessed: April 13, 2009); online: <http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t301664.htm> (date 
accessed: April 13, 2009).  
7
 John Chan, “Chinese President Preaches the Need for ‘A Harmonious Society’”, 
online:<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/chin-m12.shtml> (date accessed: April 27, 2007). 
3 
 
Second, the international core labor standards set admirable goals and provide the framework, 
with principles and rights incorporated as means towards that end -- “sound and equitable 
economic development to improve the lives of all men and women”.8 These are principles and 
rights that enable the growth of human potential and the building of vibrant social institutions to 
help eradicate poverty.9 Evidence shows that countries that have both eliminated forced labor 
together with the worst forms of child labor and made substantial inroads against discrimination 
in employment are thriving economically.10 It is observed that respect for freedom of association 
reinforces popular participation and buttresses democratic institutions and system of collective 
bargaining.11 Also social dialogue creates room for negotiations that have the potential to address 
an uneven distribution of the gains from economic growth, which is one of the key problems to be 
addressed in contemporary Chinese society as it is undergoing dramatic social transformations.12  
 
Third, more than four fifths of the Fortune 500 companies have entered the Chinese market,13 
and China has become one of the world’s largest foreign direct investment (FDI) recipients. As 
more and more labor-intensive products labeled “made in China” have appeared in the 
international market, China has become world’s factory. In order to attract more qualified FDI to 
come to China so that the Chinese workers can benefit more from FDI and avoid being exploited, 
it is necessary for China to improve its labor standards.  
 
                                                 
8
 Roger Blanpain & Chris Engels, eds., The ILO and the Social Challenges of the 21st Century: The 










 He Yuxin, “Ninety Percent the Fortune 500 Companies Have Entered China”, online: 
<http://www.chinafdi.org.cn/chinese/news_view.asp?id=803> (date accessed: April 16, 2006). 
4 
Fourth, in order to improve China’s international image, a positive labor rights record plays a 
critical role. As discussed below, the ILO has publicly criticized the Chinese Trade Union law 
due to its conflicts with the fundamental principles of freedom of association.14 In addition, 
several countries, represented by USA, have consistently criticized China for denying 
internationally recognized worker rights, especially forced labor practices.15 The recent exposure 
of forced labor scandals in brick kilns in central and northern China once again aroused not only 
domestic public outcry, but also strong international criticism.16 Thus, it is high time for China to 
take actions to improve its national labor standards and finally erase the negative image caused by 
these complaints. 
 
Fifth, an ongoing debate on whether to introduce a Social Clause17 to the WTO regime also 
requires China, as a relatively new member state of the WTO, to take its internal labor rights 
                                                 
14
 For more information, see text below accompanying note from 292 to 294. 
15
 “Human Rights Abuses Systematic Problem for China”, 
 Online: <http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2005/Apr/15-919613.html> (date accessed: April 22, 2005).  
16
 It was discovered sometime in June 2007 that hundreds of people was forced to work under slave-like 
conditions in the brick kilns of Shanxi Province, China. Some workers there are found below age 16. The 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has ordered a thorough probe and punishment of kilns owners and officials 
who abetted their activities. The governor of Shanxi Province issued an extraordinary apology to victims 
and the public. The recent development of the case is that the death sentence is imposed on a supervisor of 
a kiln in Hongtong County for beating a worker to death with a shovel. There are 29 men sentenced in 
Shanxi Courts, 2 of them are convicted of hiring a child laborer. Besides, verdicts for other 12 kilns owners 
and managers are due soon. 95 local officials have been punished for failure in crisis management, or lack 
of speedy action in the aftermath of the exposure of forced labor in illegal brick kilns -- probably one of the 
largest scale punishments of officials in communist China’s history. In sum, this forced labor scandal 
involves not only “grave illegal employment problems, but forced abducting, restricting personal freedom, 
using coerced labor, employing children and maliciously wounding to the point of death”. For more 
information, please see generally in “China Orders Crackdown on Labor Abuse”, China Daily, online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/19/content_897777.htm> (date accessed: July 10, 2007); 
“Brick Kilns: Where Were Authorities?”, China Daily, online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn.cndy/2007-06/20/content_897957.htm> (date accessed: July 10, 2007); 
“China Strikes at Root of Brick Kiln Slavery”, China Daily, online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/21/content_898742.htm> (date accessed: July 10, 2007); 
“Premier Wen Vows to Stamp Out Slave Abuses”, China Daily, online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/20/content_898701.htm> (date accessed: July 10, 2007); 
“Governor Makes Self-Criticism”, China Daily, online: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-06/21/content_898836.htm> (date accessed: July 10, 2007); 
online:<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/tag/shanxi+brick+kiln> (date accessed: August 21, 2007).  
17
 “Social dumping” is “the process whereby manufacturers close down factories in high-wage areas and 
set them up in areas where labor is cheap”. (From online: 
5 
issue seriously. This can help reduce that criticism of “social dumping” and avoid the threat of 
sanctions imposed18 from some WTO member states -- mainly developed ones.  
 
Sixth, the cooling Chinese economy immediately following the global meltdown and the credit 
crunch, “which saw growth slow to 9 percent in 2008 (down from 13 percent in 2007), is having a 
profound effect” on the Chinese society.19 As consumer demand for Chinese products dropped 
worldwide and factories all over southern part of China began to close down, massive layoff 
unfortunately becomes a fact of life.20 As such, the issue of labor rights protection is becoming 
even more important when it is totally a buyer’s market for labor.21  
 
1.2  Methodologies Adopted in The Study 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://europa.eu.int/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm> date accessed: June 23, 2005). This concept is built on 
the assumption that countries with lower labor standards have artificially lower their labor costs in order to 
attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In order to compete with low labor cost countries, mainly 
those countries from the South where labor supply is plentiful, industrialized countries would have to 
decrease their high labor standards, i.e., harmonizing down--“race to the bottom”. Based on this 
hypothetical social dumping thesis, a social clause is proposed to be included into trade agreement so that 
the unfair advantage in international trade caused by social dumping could be avoided. The rationale is that 
a social clause could promote fair competition between exporters in developing countries by guaranteeing 
that those who respect minimum labor standards are not penalized for their efforts to promote social 
development. Besides, it also could enable people to benefit from increased world trade. It is argued by 
some scholars that without such a clause, increased international competition might lead to a “destructive 
downward spiral in the condition of work and life of working people all over the world.” Naturally, WTO 
becomes the focus on this debate at the international level. There is a heated debate between the developed 
states and the developing ones on whether to introduce a social clause into GATT, so that a link between 
trade and labor rights could be established. So far, this debate is inconclusive. It is observed that according 
to some scholars, such as Professor Sornarajah M., there would never be a social clause in WTO, but the 
writer would like to argue that this view might be too extreme to be right. (For more information, please see 
generally in Adelle Blacket, “Without Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty 
Interpretation”, 1999, 31 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 & Van Liemt, Bilbert “Minimum Labor Standards 




 Please see generally in Andy Scott, “Opportunities within China’s Economic Stimulus Plan”, online: 
<http://www.china-briefing.com/article/opportunities-with-china%E2%80%99s-economic-stimulus-plan-5
61.html> (Date Accessed: April 13, 2009); online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7665515.stm> 
(date access: April 13, 2009); Jaime FlorCruz, “Chinese Leaders Confront Economic Crisis”, online: 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/03/china.meeting.economy/index.html> (date accessed: 




 Ren Ke, “Global financial crisis spills over China's labor market”, online: 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/01/content_10293305.htm> (date accessed: April 13, 2009).  
6 
The main methodologies adopted in this thesis are as follows: 
 
1) A way of comprehensive analysis: The writer begins her thesis with analyzing related ILO 
fundamental conventions, international and regional treaties in detail, and then links them to the 
relevant Chinese labor legislation by identifying the gaps between them. In addition, she tries to 
discover the deep reasons behind for the Chinese Communist Party’s purposefully maintaining, 
sometimes even praising, certain domestic legislation in spite of its obvious inconsistency with 
the said conventions and treaties. Furthermore, the root causes of some labor related problems 
that were thought to have long disappeared under socialism – such as forced labor and child labor 
are highlighted and critically reviewed with a view of linking them with the proposed 
comprehensive gap-filling solutions, including but not only limited to domestic legislative 
reforms. 
 
2) A comparative legal approach: In this thesis, the comparative legal approach is adopted in 
almost each chapter. A few examples are discussed as follows. In the case of the Chinese 
legislation regarding freedom of association, it is discovered that though the domestic law in 
general guarantees the Chinese citizens’ freedom of association by emphasizing that all laborers 
shall have the right to participate in and form trade union organizations, and no organization or 
individual may hinder them from doing so or restrict them, certain problematic clauses which 
justify ACFTU’s leading power of all local trade union federations and all national organizations 
of industrial unions are highlighted and reviewed. In so doing, it is concluded that the de facto 
trade union monopoly practice protected by the domestic law is indeed inconsistent with the ILO 
Convention No.87, which prohibits the situation where the relevant laws of the land 
institutionalize a factual monopoly and deny the workers’ right to choose to set up unions outside 
7 
the established structure as they so wish.22 When it comes to the proper regulation of right to 
strike in the contemporary Chinese context, a three-step approach, including ① to define strike, 
② to confine strike, and ③ to protect the participants of a lawful strike, is discussed based on 
some other countries’ (both developing and developed ones’) legislative experience.23 In chapter 
4, when evaluating the legality of the Chinese Convicted Labor Reform System (a.k.a. Chinese 
Laogai System) under the relevant international core labor standards, the writer compares the said 
system with the four tests of prison labor exception provided by Convention No.29 in connection 
with Convention No.105 one by one,24 and then reaches her conclusion that the Chinese Laogai 
System is qualified to be regarded as a legitimate exception to the prohibited forced labor under 
the core labor standards. In the case of the Chinese Reeducation Through Labor System (the 
“RTL System”), a similar approach is adopted. By comparing the RTL system with the said four 
tests, it is discovered that the RTL system fails to be qualified as a legitimate exception, and 
therefore an absolute abolition of the said system is proposed and justified.25 In Chapter 5, as far 
as the domestic legislation against child labor is concerned, by evaluating the relevant clauses 
under the Constitution, Labor Law, Compulsory Education Law, Minor Protection Law and 
Criminal Law etc. from the perspective of the Convention No.138 and No.182, it is argued that 
the relevant Chinese legislation is generally competent. In Chapter 6, when analyzing the legality 
of the Chinese Household Registration System (a.k.a. the Chinese Hukou System) under the 
international law on freedom of internal movement, a comparative approach is once again 
adopted by comparing the Chinese Hukou System with the permissible restrictions on freedom of 
internal movement under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the 
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 For more information, please see text below accompanying note 246 to 255. 
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 For more information, please refer to text below under Section 3.3 (C) (iii) (c) (2) – “How to Regulate 
Right to Strike in the Context of the Contemporary Chinese Society”.  
24
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Labor: Convicted Labor Reform System (Laogai)”. 
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of International Core Labor Standards”. 
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“ICCPR”).26 Put concretely, an in-depth analysis as to whether the Chinese Hukou System can 
satisfy the three criteria provided by ICCPR simultaneously is conducted. In so doing, the writer 
concludes that the Hukou System fails to satisfy any of the said criteria, and therefore its illegality 
under the international law on freedom of internal movement is beyond doubt.  
 
3) A social legal approach: As labor law is directly and closely related to people’s daily life, the 
writer thereby adopts a social legal approach in her thesis. Through all-round on-site 
investigations, surveys and interviews with union leaders, child laborers, prison management 
officers, consumers, ordinary workers as well as farmer workers conducted mainly in Shanghai, 
the industrial and commercial centre of China, the writer has collected valuable first hand 
materials that are able to strengthen the argument and the theories proposed in this thesis. 
 
1.3  Main Research Questions and Thesis in Summary 
A. Four Main Research Questions 
In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the writer will try to provide substantial answers to 
several main research questions as follows: 
 
1. Why international core labor standards (the “Core”) can be of great help to China to 
reduce the social costs to its people during the transitional period? 
2. How does the Core influence China? 
3. What is the gap between Chinese labor legislation and the Core? 
4. What are the feasible gap-filling solutions that are not only taking into consideration the 
Core, but also adapted to the transformations that China is experiencing? 
 
                                                 
26
 For more information, please refer to text below under Section 6.3 (C) (i) (a) (2) – “Examining the 
Legality of the Chinese Hukou System under International Law on Freedom of Internal Movement”. 
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B. Contents of the Volume 
In addition to this introduction, the thesis consists six other chapters to answer the 
abovementioned research questions.  
 
In the second chapter, the major question that the writer addresses is about the reasons why 
international core labor standards are valuable to contemporary China. It is worthy to be 
emphasized that the eight ILO fundamental conventions do not have “teeth” to enforce the 
obligations they create. This is quite unlike the WTO dispute settlement rules where a victim state 
member can be authorized to take retaliatory trade measures against the state member in default.  
 
However, notwithstanding this, the influential power of the ILO on its member states should not 
be underestimated. The author draws upon a literature in international law scholarship which 
suggests that, even without sanctions or “teeth”, states can be influenced so that compliance with 
international norms and practices can be fostered.27  
 
If and when, as this author hopes, China ratifies all the core conventions, a growing interaction is 
created between the fundamental conventions and relevant domestic legislation, interpretation 
provided by Chinese labor rights experts and other interested social groups. Such processes tend 
towards the internalization of the transnational legal process. As such, institutional habits of 
leading nations into default patterns of compliance of the fundamental conventions are expected 
to be cultivated gradually. As time goes on, the international core labor standards acquire its 
“stickiness”, and domestic decision-making structure will become “enmeshed” with international 
core labor standards. Consequently, China is likely to “obey” the core labor standards out of 
perceived self-interests rather than out of threat of sanction. In this sense, though ILO 
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 Professor Harold Hongju Koh argues that through “interaction”, “interpretation” and “participation”, 
international law could be brought home. For more information, please refer to text below accompanying 
note 128 to 131.  
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fundamental convention never forces its member states to obey its provisions, it nevertheless 
creates sparks for its members to follow its standards.  
 
The third chapter discusses the issue of freedom of association and collective bargaining in China. 
This discussion is carried out from the perspective of ILO fundamental Convention No. 87 and 
No. 98. The writer discusses the trade union monopoly situation in China and casts doubt on the 
feasibility of its union’s dual role practice during this transitional period. The legislative 
assumption in China is that the interests of the state and employees are always consistent with 
each other. Evidence however suggests that this may not always be true, especially under the 
circumstances of market economy. It is observed that workers in China “feel economically 
disadvantaged, socially disenfranchised and politically excluded”28, whereas the state has shown 
its unwillingness to look after their interests. Consequently, the Chinese trade union’s role as 
workers’ protector, rather than its role as a government assistant, becomes more and more 
important. Therefore, the writer argues that to deal with the dilemma faced by the contemporary 
Chinese trade union, an independent trade union system shall be adopted. Taking into 
consideration the contemporary economic and political environment in China, there are numerous 
and various advantages and legal justifications for an independent trade union system, in the 
author’s view.  
 
However, the writer observes that the chances for the Chinese government to implement this ideal 
model via legislative reform are slim at present considering the Chinese government’s serious 
apprehension on social instability. A more realistic model is thereby proposed in this thesis, with 
means such as direct democratic election, financial system reform in grass root trade unions and 
strengthening the legal protection on union leaders’ rights. In chapter 3, an analysis is also given 
of the inefficacy of the Chinese collective bargaining system and several legal solutions are 
                                                 
28
 Infra 335. 
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offered. A critical issue regarding the value of right to strike to the collective bargaining system is 
discussed. Although right to bargain collectively does not automatically entail the right to strike, 
its efficacy nevertheless will be seriously impaired without this strike weapon. Under the market 
economy, one of the critical reasons for workers and employers to reach a final collective 
agreement is that both sides have their trumps, i.e., employers can close the factory and workers 
can strike. The competition of these two resorts guarantees the bargaining power of both sides. In 
contrast, the present prohibition creates an unequal position. “A general prohibition of strikes 
constitutes a considerable restriction of the opportunities opened to trade unions for furthering 
and defending the interests of their members.”29 According to the writer’s observation, the 
current Chinese legislation has adopted a “no support, no direct prohibition” approach towards 
strikes in China. Considering the dramatic economic, social and political changes in China, the 
vulnerable Chinese working class needs the right to strike as a safeguard for themselves. 
Therefore, the chapter considers several countries’ experience on strike legislation (including but 
not limited to UK, US, New Zealand, Japan, Argentina, Finland), and also takes into 
consideration China’s special circumstances. From this, the writer proposes certain legislative 
suggestions to create the right to strike within the framework of the current Chinese legal system. 
 
In chapter four, the writer categorizes the forced labor situation in China into three types and 
analyses them accordingly. First, are the cases in which subjects are normal citizens. Here, the 
Chinese legislation against it is generally competent. The problem mainly lies in the 
implementation of the law. A second type of forced labor is the Convicted Labor Reform System. 
Although, this is often the target of heated criticism from many human rights NGOs and 
developed countries, represented by the USA, the author conducts a comparative study between 
the current Chinese Convicted Labor Reform System and ILO fundamental conventions against 
forced labor, to find that the Chinese prison labor system is indeed a permissible exception under 
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 Infra 58. 
12 
the Core. It is undeniable that some current practices and certain former practices and policies 
relating to the Chinese Convicted Labor Reform System are conflicting with the criteria provided 
by ILO convention No. 29 and No. 105. In addition, some of the products made by inmates even 
entered into foreign market. However, no evidence shows that practices as such are systematic 
and with institutional support. The existence of certain illegal practices does not necessarily 
negate the value of the Convicted Labor Reform System as a whole. Indeed, it is proved that the 
Chinese legislation on its Convicted Labor Reform System is generally consistent with the 
relevant ILO fundamental conventions.  
 
The third type of forced labor -- the Chinese Reeducation Through Labor System (the “RTL 
System”) -- creates the most problems. In the context of the international core standards, this may 
be argued to be an institutionalized forced labor system that deserves absolute abolition. Only via 
a complete abolition of the RTL System, can the labor legislation of China become more 
consistent with the international core labor standards against forced labor as well as the basic 
principles of Rule of Law (ROL), to which the Chinese government has made a serious 
commitment.   
 
The fifth chapter is about the child labor in China. Generally speaking, the legislation against 
child labor in China is competent and consistent with ILO Convention No. 138 and No. 182 
except for some leeway and relatively small controversies. It is observed that during Mao 
Zedong’s time, the socialist government made a decision to eradicate child labor. With rigorously 
enforced compulsory education system, strict governmental control on its State Owned 
Enterprises (the “SOEs”) coupled with its party’s determined guiding policies against child labor, 
there were few cases of child labor involved in the industries. However, this evil started to 
reemerge together with China’s rapid economic development. It is argued that poverty is no 
longer the primary reason for child labor in China. Instead, the degradation of public morality, 
13 
together with the changed belief system plays a vital role. The absence of publicly accepted set of 
moral values to define proper behavior that resulted from the steady decline of Maoism and 
Communism and its concomitant rise of commercialism has marked the intellectual and spiritual 
crisis, which might be China’s core problem presently. As such, certain suggestions (beyond 
legislative reform) in curbing child labor that take account of the primary cause of child labor in 
China are discussed and critically reviewed. They are relating to issues of proper governmental 
role, social clause under the World Trade Organization (WTO), Code of Conduct (COC) 
movement and social labeling programs. 
 
The sixth chapter explores issue of the employment discrimination in China. After a preliminary 
comparison between Convention No. 100, No. 111 and the related standards under the Chinese 
domestic law, the writer finds that these two standards are generally consistent. However, the 
Chinese labor law keeps silent about the issue of employment discrimination based on social 
origin. With an unprecedented pace of urbanization, a special social group -- farmer workers -- is 
created in China. During the busy season in farming, they are likely to return to their hometown 
to work in the field, and when the busy season ends, they will rush into the cities and become 
workers in enterprises located there. It is observed that most of them will end up with “3D”30 
jobs where discriminative treatment due to their rural origin is quite common. Thus, a relatively 
comprehensive case study on the employment discrimination that is faced by more than 130 
million Chinese farmer workers and is based on the empirical evidence collected during the 
writer’s field study in Shanghai, China is conducted. It covers aspects on how farmer workers are 
discriminated, why they are discriminated and how to reform the relevant legal system to 
eradicate employment discrimination as such.  
 
Chapter seven is the conclusion of the study. 
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14 
 
Chapter 2: Why are International Core Labor Standards Valuable to Contemporary 
China? 
 
2.1 Overview on International Core Labor Standards 
A. Declaring the Core 
It is observed that a host of scholars and experts take for granted the existence of international 
core labor standards. For instance, according to the former Director-General of ILO Michel 
Hansenne’s 1997 report to the International Labor Conference, the existence of a set of core labor 
rights is beyond doubt.31 Labor rights scholar Sarah J. Adams Lien considers that a large number 
of international and regional conventions, agreements and covenants have recognized 
international core labor standards, and that the existence of such standards are beyond dispute.32 
Professor Drusilla K. Brown argues that the establishment of universal core labor standards is 
justified on “both humanitarian grounds and notions of fair competition in international trade”.33 
Of course, the articulation of a core raises certain controversy in the academia. For example, 
Professor Jagdish N. Bhagwati believes that it is difficult to arrive at a universal moral consensus 
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 Mr. Michel Hansenne, Statement before the International Labor Conference, ILO, 85th Session, June 3, 
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Policy Occasional Papers, No. 43, OECD Publishing. Online: 
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as foundation for international core labor standards.34 Professor Steve Charnovitz also doubts the 
possibility for creating an “internationally recognized labor standards”.35 Professor Lance Compa 
argues that decent working conditions free from risk of injury or illness is as fundamental a right 
as working without discrimination.36  
 
Although these arguments represent different academic views, the idea of a core is strongly and 
clearly supported by consistent state practices around the world.37  In such practice, the core is 
crystallized by eight ILO fundamental conventions.38 We can see this consistent state practice in 
many different fora as follows: 
 
1) Both the United Nations Social Summit in Copenhagen in 199539 and in the WTO Singapore 
Declaration in 199640 referred to “internationally recognized core labor standards”.  
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 From Professor Jagdish N. Bhagwati’s position, it would be difficult to arrive at a universal moral 
consensus as foundation for international core labor standards. Bhagwati suggests that labor standards can 
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Rights: A half century after the Universal Declaration (New York: Peter Lang Publishing forthcoming 
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 Brian A. Langille, “The ILO and the New Economy: Recent Developments”, 15/3 Int'l J. Comp. Lab. L. 
& Indus. Rel. 229, 240-41 (Autumn 1999). 
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 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, it reads “We renew our commitment to the observance of 
internationally recognized core labor standards. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the 
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2) In a 1996 OECD report, the core labor standards were identified as follows: ① freedom of 
association and the right to bargain collectively, ② prohibition of forced labor, ③ prohibition 
of discrimination in employment, and ④ prohibition of exploitative forms of child labor.41 The 
study described these standards as “embodying basic human rights as exemplified in the 
Declaration of the World Social Summit”.42 Furthermore, a 2000 OECD report reconfirms a high 
degree of international political consensus on the contents of a set of core labor standards 
reflected in the list of fundamental principles and rights laid out in the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.43  
 
3) The US “Overview of Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1997” declares that there 
is an international consensus on core labor standards.44 They are: ① freedom of association on 
which workers can form trade unions and defend their interests; ② the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; ③freedom from gender and other discrimination in employment; ④ 
freedom from forced and child labor.45  
 
4) In a landmark pronouncement of ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work 1998, it declares that “all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
                                                                                                                                                 
them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further trade 
liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labor standards for 
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage 
developing countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO 
Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.”  
Online:< http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm> (date accessed: October 
18, 2004). 
41
 OECD, Trade, Employment and Labor Standards: A Study of Core Workers' Rights and International 
Trade (Paris: OECD 1996) at 26. 
42
 Ibid.  
43
 OECD, International Trade and Core Labor Standards, (Paris: OECD 2000) at 17-18. 
44
 Online: <http://www.hri.org/docs/USSD-Rights/97/Overview97.html> (date accessed: October 26, 
2004).  
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 Ibid.  
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question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to 
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the 
principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely:  
 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
 (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;  
 (c) the effective abolition of child labor; and  
 (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.”46 
 
This gives the fundamental principles and rights a universal reach, even to countries that have not 
ratified the relevant ILO conventions. As this is coupled with a reporting system with offers of 
assistance to governments, this is significant. ILO member states have thus acknowledged their 
obligation to respect, realize and promote the rights and principles in the very Declaration, 
whether through ratification of the Core or otherwise.47 These rights and principles are enshrined 
in the eight ILO Conventions48 , referred to in the 1998 Declaration as the Fundamental 
Conventions.  
 
They include: ① Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 
1948 (No. 87) which protects the right of workers and employers to establish and join 
organizations according to their own choices without prior authorization, and lays down a series 
of guarantees for the free functioning of organizations without any interference by the public 
                                                 
46
 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86 session, Geneva, June 1998, art. 2. 
Online:  
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=
DECLARATIONTEXT> (date accessed: October 22, 2004).  
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 Roger Blanpain & Chris Engels, eds., The ILO and the Social Challenges of the 21st Century: The 
Geneva Lectures (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001), at 106. 
48
 Online: <http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN> (date 
accessed: October 25, 2004).  
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authorities;49 ② Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) which 
guarantees workers right to enjoy adequate protection against anti-union discrimination, prohibits 
mutual interference between workers’ and employer’ organizations, and provides for measures to 
promote collective bargaining;50 ③ Forced and Compulsory Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) 
which requires member state to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labor in all its forms as 
soon as possible, with certain exceptions, such as military service, properly supervised convict 
labor etc;51 ④ Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105) which requires each 
member state to take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced 
or compulsory labor as a means of political coercion or education, punishment for the political 
dissenters, economic development, labor discipline, punishment for participation in strikes, or 
discrimination;52 ⑤ Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) which aims at the abolition of 
child labor and requires member state to specify a minimum age for admission to employment not 
be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling;53 ⑥ Convention Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (No. 
182), which requires members to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition 
and elimination of the worst forms of child labor such as slavery, prostitution, drug trafficking 
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(entered into force: 4 July, 1950). [hereinafter ILO Convention No.87]. 
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etc.54 ⑦ Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation Convention, 1958 (No.111) 
which calls for a national policy to eliminate discrimination in access to employment, training, 
and working conditions on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin and to promote equality of opportunity and treatment with regard to 
employment and occupation;55  and ⑧ Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) which 
calls for equal pay for men and women for work of equal value without discrimination based on 
sex;56 
 
The ratification status of the ILO Fundamental Conventions as at 28 April 200757 was shown by 
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[Source: Online: 
<http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN> (date accessed: 
April 28, 2007)] 
 
Based on the data above, almost 70 percent of the member states of ILO have ratified all eight 
fundamental conventions: some 124 states. These are not only the developed states but also a 
large number of developing ones.  
 
B. Human Rights and the Core 
In terms of the relationship between the universal human rights and international core labor 
standards, the writer’s position may be summarized in this way: the core labor standards could be 
regarded as a further concretization of the relevant general principles of human rights. Although 
the ILO was founded before “human rights” was a current term in the international world and the 
Constitution of ILO does not use the exact term -- “human rights” but speaks of “social justice” 
instead, it is believed that there is no contradiction between these two terms.58 To be precise, the 
core labor standards tend to be considerably more crystallized, containing more guidance on the 
means of implementation vis-à-vis the general human rights principles provided by the United 
Nations instruments on human rights.59 
 
For example, in the case of “freedom of association”, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) has only provided that “everyone has the right to freedom of association ... [and] has the 
right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests”60 without any further 
description on what kind of workers have such freedom and how to implement this freedom in 
detail; whilst, the core labor standards on worker’s right to freedom of association mainly 
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reflected by ILO fundamental convention No. 87 and No.98 provide more detailed guidance for 
workers to implement this freedom in practice. Put concretely, they provide that workers 
(excluding public servants) have the right to draw up their own constitutions and rules, to elect 
their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to 
formulate their programs without interference from public authorities, which would restrict this 
right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.61 Besides, these conventions also stipulate the 
legitimate limitation on worker’s right to organize and member states’ positive and negative 
obligations to ensure the free exercise of the right to organize etc.62 Through these concretized 
provisions, the freedom of association adopted in UDHR in its general term has thus got its 
specific implementation code for workers.  
 
This same reasoning applies to the remaining three aspects of the core labor standards.63 
 
2.2  Background Information of China 
A. Socialist China and Its Economic Development 
People’s Republic of China, the world’s most populous country and one of the largest by area, 
has been under one-party-ruling since the year 1949 when the Communist party won power. After 
ten years’ social and political disaster -- Cultural Revolution64 from 1966 to 1976, in 1978, the 
Chinese communist government finally announced that this socialist country would concentrate 
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its efforts on economic construction instead of class conflicts.65 From then on, China started 
engaging in a wide range of economic reforms to expand and modernize its economy. 
Consequently, “its high growth rate has been sustained with relatively minor fluctuations”66. 
These steps have led the country away from a centrally planned economy67 towards a market 
economy with socialist characteristics.68 While the socialist system is claimed to remain as the 
basic system, 69 a number of reformative policies and movements -- the open-door-policy, the 
rapid development on market economy, the privatization, the introduction of the idea of rule of 
law and various influences of from the capitalist world -- have combined to bring about 
fundamental changes to this socialist system.70 As some scholars observe, although “the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has not formally abandoned the doctrine of historical determinism, it has 
replaced the purely Communist utopian ideal with a more realistic market-driven vision for 
China’s future”.71 
 
With a remarkably rapid economic growth over the last two and a half decades, China has 
become the second largest economy in the world and it ranks first among the developing world in 
the size of its total economy.72 However, China is still a developing country and it is nevertheless 
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among the low-income countries as far as per-capita GDP is concerned.73 China’s per capita 
GDP, though reaching the record high of 1,740 US dollars in 2005, still ranks behind the 100th 
place in the world.74  
 
According to the official China Modernization Report 2005, the modernization gap between 
China and USA is 100 years and China would have no chance to join the developed group until 
2080.75 Of course, its potential for continued growth is great, given the size of its population and 
territory, status of current industrial development and its leadership’s positive and supportive 
policy towards economic progress. In terms of its labor force, China is expected to grow from 755 
million in 1990 to its maximum of 1,013 million in 2025.76 After that, it is expected to start 
falling until reaching 898 million, and then move up again and come to an equilibrium at about 
900 to 920 million.77 China’s present development and potential for continued growth have been 
recognized by the international society. In terms of FDI, China has ranked the first among the 
developing countries and the second after the United States worldwide.78 From the year 1996, the 
annual inflow of FDI has amounted to an average US $40 billion.79 Even in the year 2001, when 
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global direct investment started to shrink, China nevertheless attracted FDI to the amount of US 
$45 billion.80  
 
On December 11, 2001, China joined the WTO. In the year 2006, China's global trade reached 
approximately USD1,760 billion, which is the highest within its history.81 Nowadays, China not 
only dominates the international market for its traditional labor intensive exports such as apparel, 
footwear and toy production, but also moves towards the technology sector including a wide 
range of mechanical and electric products like televisions, computers, DVD players and 
microwave ovens.82  
 
The economic reform and the constitutional amendments83 accelerate the development of the 
non-public sector84 in this socialist country. Before the push towards economic development, the 
ownership structure of the economy in China was straightforward -- socialist public ownership of 
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the means of production.85 Now, after more than two decades economic reform, the ownership 
structure of the economy in China can be divided into two groups. The first is the public sector, 
comprising state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collectively-run enterprises (Jiti Suoyouzhi) and 
public service units (Shiye Danwei), such as public universities and non-profitable public research 
institutions etc. The second sector is what is called, the “non-public” sector (rather than the 
private sector). This includes but is not limited to individual economy (Geti Gongshanghu), and 
private-owned enterprises (Siying Qiye) under the forms of sole proprietorships, partnerships, 
limited liability companies and shareholding cooperatives as well as foreign invested enterprises 
-- Sino-foreign joint venture, Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises and foreign-funded share-holding companies and other types of ownership. 86 
According to a recent survey, jointly organized by All-China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce and the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, there were 3.44 million private companies87 that hired more than 47.14 million 
employees by mid-2004.88 As for its production value, it rose from 5.1 billion USD in 1989 to 
241 billion USD in 2003.89 It is expected that the growth rate of the gross of the non-public 
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economy will go beyond 10 percent annually during the next five to ten years, accounting for 60 
percent of the increase of the national economy.90 
 
B. Transformation Inside China and Its Impact on Labor Relevant Issues  
With its rapid pace of economic development as stated above, China is experiencing certain 
transformations whose implications on labor rights related issues should not be underestimated.  
 
First, the Chinese trade union is facing a dilemma in the conflict between its dual function. 
Designed to function in a typical Marxist socialist regime, the trade union’s role is both to 
encourage labor productivity for the sake of state’s interests and to protect workers legitimate 
interests. As the Chinese economy has changed, however, the Chinese trade union has met a host 
of new challenges that Mr. Marx never expected.91 As widely admitted by most communist union 
theorists, its dual function can only work properly when the interests of the state and workers are 
generally consistent.92 When there is such a consistent confluence of interest, it is possible for the 
trade union back then to work as “transmission belts” between state and masses, i.e., conveying 
state policy to labor and also sending information from the workplace to the state.93 However, 
measures such as SOEs releasing shares for sale on the stock exchange, the privatization of small 
and medium sized SOEs, the transformation of economic mechanisms, and the rapid development 
of private enterprises94 have changed the state’s role as a protector of the working class. With the 
open door policy coupled with the dissolution of state’s paternalistic function95, the Chinese 
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government has started to focus more on economic development, and thus gives less attention to 
the welfare of the working class.  
 
For example, life long employment96 -- an important feature of the old socialist system -- has 
been substituted by labor contract. This carries the potential of contracting away workers’ 
interests and rights as a master of an enterprise. Similarly, retrenchment policy (Xia Gang) and 
the reform to the retirement system have indicated the state’s unwillingness to look after its 
workers’ welfare as their major idea is to remove the burden of social security from the state to 
workers and employers, and make them fend for themselves97.  
 
As such, the competing power between the employers and workers becomes more and more 
unbalanced. The power of businesses to dominate the Chinese labor market has increased on one 
hand. On the other, labor’s power to influence the business decision and to promote the worker’s 
welfare has decreased. Thus, the Chinese trade union, while needed as a vital vehicle in 
protecting worker’s legitimate interests, has become weaker during this transitional period. A sign 
of that unions are less able to effectively represent workers’ interests is the number of the Chinese 
workers involved in street-demonstration. This is increasing year by year, 1 million workers in 
1995 to 3.6 million only three years after.98 When the Chinese workers “feel economically 
disadvantaged, socially disenfranchised and politically excluded”99 and cry for help from their 
own organization, the Chinese union suddenly relapsed into a dilemma on how to play its dual 
function in this transitional period.  
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Second, with the fundamental and far-reaching social economic changes in the last decade, social 
evils that relate to workers have started to resurface in China. With government’s policies 
focusing more on economic development and less on welfare of its citizens, coupled with years of 
disastrous socialist policies such as Cultural Revolution100, there is a disillusioned reaction to 
social injustice. This view is more tolerant and even cynical of social inequalities, combined with 
a new pragmatic and utilitarian attitude that moves away from any socialist concern with 
communal well being, and only focuses on personal interests.101 As the great rush for improving 
standard of life accelerates, values that see the exploitation of people and workers as inevitable 
and even necessary, are starting to gain a certain ground.102  
 
Thus, a direct result of feverish pursuit of wealth is that exploitation is no longer an abhorrent evil 
in the minds of Chinese citizens.103 An indication of this is that, just as China is experiencing 
rapid economic development, its public ethics are falling at the same time. The constant decline 
of Maoism and communism together with its concomitant rise of commercialism have marked a 
intellectual and spiritual crisis, i.e. an absence of a publicly accepted set of moral values to define 
proper behavior in today’s China.104 Confucian thinking has lost its place as China’s state 
ideology and became the target of deliberate attack especially in the 1960s and 1970s;105 
Marxism and Maoism have fallen to an even lower place in popular acceptance by the 1990s.106 
Some social critics suggest that the ideology with the potential to fulfill the moral vacuum in 
China is the philosophy of “making money”.107  
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From this, so many of the labor concerns -- which will be discussed in this thesis -- flow. 
Exploitative practices like forms of forced labor108 and child labor, often claimed to be connected 
with poverty,109 have started to resurface. Thus, ways to reduce the social costs in the case of the 
reemergence of forced labor and child labor during the transitional period must be considered as 
serious questions. 110   
 
Thirdly, with the rapid development of the Chinese market economy, China is also experiencing 
an unprecedented pace of urbanization.111 “From 1978 to 2004, China’s urbanization rate rose 
from 17.9% to 41.8% and its urban population increased from 170 million to 540 million.”112 
Farmers swarmed into cities for work. Some statistics show that by the end of 2005, the number 
of the farmers migrating from rural area to cities had reached 200 million.113 Indeed, the 
migrating wave as such has created a special social group in China, i.e., farmer workers, whose 
social status is semi-farmer and semi-worker.114 During the busy season in farming, they will 
usually return to their hometown to work in the field and, when the busy farming season ends, 
they will rush into the cities and become workers working in enterprises.115 It is observed that 
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most of them will end up with “3D” jobs (dirty, dangerous and degrading).116 Moreover, in these 
jobs, they commonly face discriminatory treatment such as doing same job with different and 
reduced payments, wage arrears, and long working hours with no extra-payment. 117  The 
phenomenon of the farmer workers has wider social impacts. A higher criminal rate has been 
observed among farmer workers in the cities, and this hints at the deeper social instability caused 
by the dramatic migrating wave.118 There is an urgent need to study the issues surrounding the 
farmer-workers, including their rights as workers, which is critical for building an equitable and 
harmonious society, as envisioned by the Chinese government. 
 
C. China and the Core 
i. China’s Ratification Status of the ILO Fundamental Conventions 
Although it was a founding member of ILO,119 China’s ratification record of ILO Conventions is 
not that satisfactory. To date, China has ratified twenty-five ILO Conventions 120 , which 
constitutes only some twelve percent of all ILO Conventions. As far as the eight fundamental 
conventions are concerned, China has only ratified four of them. 121  They are the Equal 
Remuneration Convention (No.100), Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 
Convention (No. 111), Minimum Age Convention (No.138), and Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention (No.182).122 China has not ratified the two fundamental ILO conventions concerning 
freedom of association: the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
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Convention (No. 87), and the Right to Organize Convention (No. 98). Nor has it ratified either 
fundamental Conventions against forced labor. 
 
ii. The Necessity for China to Ratify the Core Conventions 
Why should China ratify the remaining four core Conventions of labor rights? In this thesis, the 
main arguments at the Chinese domestic law level will be undertaken by Chapters 3 to 6. At this 
point, however, it may be useful to foreground these arguments in overview. There are three 
broad reasons for China to ratify and act upon the Conventions.  
 
a. An Implicit Call from the 1998 ILO Declaration 
Ratification of the Core is a call from the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamenta Principles and 
Rights at Work.123 In light of the Declaration, China is under an expectation “arising from the 
very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith” 
these four categories of fundamental principles and rights at work crystallized by the eight ILO 
Fundamental Conventions.124 Although the Declaration per se has not explicitly required every 
ILO member state to ratify the eight Fundamental Conventions, it does set up an expectation for 
every member state to “respect, to promote and to realize” the Core “in good faith”. In other 
words, it has laid down a step-by-step approach towards the end whose first step is to “respect” -- 
to avoid violation of or interference with the Core, the next is to “promote” -- to contribute to the 
progress or the growth of the Core, and finally to “realize” -- make real, fulfill the Core and each 
step shall be made in good faith.  
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As such, while ratification125 of the fundamental Conventions is not the only means towards the 
final realization of the Core, it is, nevertheless, the most effective and straightforward way to 
show a member state’s determination to respect the Core, to urge itself to move towards the 
direction of the Core with as little deviation as possible and ultimately to fulfill the Core in good 
faith. Although the Declaration per se has not explicitly provided any obligation for the ILO 
member states to ratify the fundamental Conventions, it is none the less an implicit call from the 
Declaration. 
 
b. The Core Provides An Internationally Recognized Guidance on How to Reform the 
Relevant Chinese Labor Legislation 
During China’s transitional period, various labor related social problems have emerged as 
mentioned above, including but not limited to labor unrest, forced and child labor as well as the 
side effects caused by the drastic internal migrating wave from rural to urban area. In order to 
reduce the social costs as such, in order to create a harmonious society so that the fruit of 
economic development can be evenly shared, the Core Conventions regarding four fundamental 
aspects of labor rights -- freedom of association and collective bargaining, prohibition of forced 
and child labor and freedom from discrimination in employment do provide an internationally 
recognized guidance on how to amend the relevant Chinese labor legislation to reduce the social 
costs of capitalism with Chinese characteristics.  
 
c. Ratification per se Will Influence the Domestic Practices to Move towards the 
Expectations Provided by the Core 
By borrowing Professor Harold Koh’s theory of “transnational legal process”, the author would 
like to argue that ratification per se increases the chances that China’s relevant practices will be 
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influenced to move towards the expectations provided by the Core Conventions.126 This is not to 
suggest that the Conventions can be enforced against China. Rather, compliance with the 
Convention is promoted by other means. One important way that the Core will influence China is 
that ratification provides people and interested social groups inside China with objective 
standards of behavior. These can then be the standard against which they can measure the 
domestic labor law and subsequent practice of their own authorities.127  
 
Also, the ratification of the Conventions provides a good occasion for Chinese authorities to 
review the country’s labor legislation and practice. This allows them to develop an in-depth 
understanding on whether they are in full conformity with these international labor standards, and 
ultimately to reach a stage of full compliance with all the fundamental Conventions. Such a 
process might start from the media, where more and more news reports and relevant comments 
appear. In this way, there would be more opportunities to make ordinary people and interested 
groups inside China more informed, and raise public awareness little by little, about labor rights 
and the Conventions. Of course, the academia would also start to react to the event of the 
ratification of the Core. For example, labor rights experts in China may launch their academic 
research, debates, interpretations and reviews on the relevant Chinese legislation under the 
framework of the Core.  
 
As such, ratification would spark interaction between core Conventions and China’s relevant 
domestic legislation, as well as interpretation provided by Chinese labor rights experts and other 
interested social groups. With participation of the media, academia and other interested groups, 
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this interaction could be repeated and increase in focusing and understanding on labor rights. 
From this, China might gradually be moved towards the understanding and observance of 
international core labor standards.  
 
As time goes on, certain governmental officials, very possibly, including legal advisors and 
in-house lawyers of the Law Commission (FalÜ Weiyuanhui) of the National People’s Congress 
(the “NPC”) and other relevant organizations with right to propose a bill, might start to notice the 
existence of such academic research, debates and reviews and might be educated gradually 
thereafter. Hopefully, the institutional mandates to measure whether the relevant Chinese 
legislation and governmental policies conform to the international core labor standards or how far 
the gap between the Chinese standards and the international core ones is could be acquired. Thus, 
over time, domestic decision-making structure would become “enmeshed”, as Professor Harold 
Hongju Koh observed, with international core labor standards. 128 When they are so enmeshed, 
institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of an international commitment 
become entrenched in domestic legal and political processes. 129  Gradually, ideologies of 
international core labor standards will “come to prevail among domestic decision-makers so that 
they seek to avoid perceptions that their action will be perceived as domestically unlawful”.130 
This process would, in effect, “bring international law home” and create “strong process linkages 
exist across issue areas”.131  
 
An example of this can be seen in the events that followed after China ratified the ILO core 
convention No. 138 and No. 182. After ratification, the relevant domestic law reform process 
started gradually via amendment of the criminal code. The first step was to criminalize the 
                                                 
128








employment of child laborers under certain dangerous circumstances. Later came the entry into 
force of the specialized legislation especially targeting the incident of child labor -- Rule of 
Prohibiting to Employ Child Labor.132 There was no provision directly against child labor in the 
Chinese Criminal Code (1997) until the promulgation of its fourth amendment in 2002. When this 
was promulgated, it explicitly prohibited any person from employing children under the age of 
sixteen for work at the high altitude, or in mines, or to expose to explosive, flammable, hazardous 
surroundings. 133  Any person in violation can be punished by three to seven years’ 
imprisonment.134 Immediately after the fourth amendment of the Criminal Code, the specialized 
legislation “Rule of Prohibiting to Employ Child Labor” particularly targeting incidence of child 
labor in China came into force. This not only criminalizes the behavior of employing child labor 
to work in the dangerous environment as an echo to the fourth amendment, but requires all the 
members of the Chinese society to fight against the practice of employing child labor as well.135 
As such, we should not be cynical about the potential effect of ratifying the ILO Core 
Conventions, even if these are relatively soft compared to, say, the WTO dispute settlement rules 
(which hold that “a government found to have failed to meet a WTO obligation can be required to 
put the matter right and, if it does not, the complaint may be authorized to take retaliatory trade 
measures”136). We have to see that even without such clear powers to penalize, the ILO Core 
Conventions have a creeping power to influence as well as to guide a government’s 
decision-making procedure.  
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As Professor Harold Hongju Koh comments, since “international legal obligations tend to be 
closely interconnected, even a single deviation tends to lead noncompliant nations into vicious 
cycles of treaty violation”.137 He concludes that: “these institutional habits soon lead nations into 
default patterns of compliance. These patterns act like riverbeds, which channel conduct along 
compliant pathways. When a nation deviates from that pattern of presumptive compliance, 
frictions are created.”138  In order to avoid such frictions in its continuing interactions, Koh 
argues that “a nation’s bureaucracies or interested groups may press their leaders to shift over 
time from a policy of violation into one of compliance”.139 Thus, it is through this repeated cycle 
of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of this transnational legal process, the 
international core labor standards acquire its “stickiness”, and China would come to “obey” the 
Core out of perceived self-interest that become an institutional habit.140 
 
2.3 Introduction to the Chinese Legal System and the Chinese labor law 
A. Introduction to the Chinese Legal System 
i. Overview 
China is a nation with civil law tradition. All Chinese laws are in written form and, in contrast to 
the common law system, principles of stare decisis are not applicable. From the time that the 
CCP came into power in 1949 to the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, the common 
methodology of the CCP’s leadership could be described as a “mass political campaign”, with 
accusations and struggles of different points of view and personalities in many different 
meetings.141 In that time and context, the law was regarded as a decadent relic from capitalist 
societies. A top-down contempt and negligence of judicial system permeated the Chinese socialist 
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regime.142 This phenomenon reached its extreme during the Cultural Revolution, where law was 
virtually substituted by Chairman Mao’s thoughts.143  
 
However, during the last two and a half decades, the Chinese legal system has experienced 
substantial changes. Its theoretical foundation has changed from a centrally planned economy and 
Marxist socialist theory to a market economy and a socialist theory with Chinese 
characteristics.144 The socio-economic reform in China, especially after 1978, requires good 
governance based on reliable legal structures and institutions.145 Government with transparency 
and accountability in the management of state affairs is indispensable during the transitional 
period.146 In this regard, the Chinese government has gradually realized that “the rule of law and 
a clear-cut legal system are the means to achieve this transparency, as well as being the 
foundation for all other aspects of society to develop in a way that guarantees fairness, equity and 
justice and predictability in terms of due process in cases of conflicts and controversies”.147 A 
significant political milestone came in 1997, when the Chinese government pronounced its goal 
of governing the country according to law and building up a socialist country with the rule of law. 
This was the first public recognition from the Chinese senior levels that the modernization of 
China depends on law, instead of programs, policies or plans.148 In its third constitutional 
amendment, the concept of rule of law is officially incorporated into the Chinese Constitution.149  
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Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 21. 
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All these imply a conscious move from the ideology of “rule by man” or “rule by law” to “rule of 
law”, and an improved understanding of the concept of the rule of law, particularly its value 
towards market economy and sustainable development of the Chinese society.150  
 
ii. Lawmaking in China 
a. National Level 
The national legislative power is vested in both the NPC and its permanent body -- its Standing 
Committee.151 In exercising its legislative powers, the NPC enacts and amends criminal, civil and 
state organic laws152 and other basic laws and its Standing Committee enacts and amends laws 
other than those shall be enacted by the NPC. 
 
As for administrative regulations, in accordance with the Constitution, they are enacted by the 
State Council, which is the central people’s government with the highest administrative authority 
over Chinese territory.153 An administrative regulation enacted by State Council may prescribe 
any of the issues as follows: ① matters that demand the enactment of an administrative 
regulation for the purpose of implementing a law; ② matters within the scope of State Council’s 
administrative management authority in accordance with article 89154 of the PRC Constitution.155  




 Constitution of PRC, art. 58. 
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b. Local Level 
The People’s Congress and its Standing Committee of a province, autonomous region, or 
municipality directly under the Central Government may enact local regulations, according to the 
specific circumstances and actual needs of the jurisdiction, provided that such enactment does not 
conflict with any provisions of the Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations at the national 
level.156 Additionally, the People’s Congress and its Standing Committee of relatively large cities 
may enact local regulations under certain circumstances, as long as they do not conflict with the 
legislation at higher level, viz. Constitution, laws, administrative regulations or local regulations 
in force in the province or autonomous region in whose jurisdiction the city is located.157  
 
As for various administrative rules, they are usually enacted by the ministries and commissions of 
the State Council, the People’s Bank of China, the General Administration for Auditing, and 
organs with administrative functions directly under the State Council within their respective 
authorities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(5) To draw up and implement the plan for national economic and social development and the state budget; 
(6) To direct and administer economic work and urban and rural development; (7) To direct and administer 
the work concerning education, science, culture, public health, physical culture and family planning; (8) To 
direct and administer the work concerning civil affairs, public security, judicial administration, supervision 
and other related matters; (9) To conduct foreign affairs and conclude treaties and agreements with foreign 
states; (10) To direct and administer the building of national defense; (11) To direct and administer affairs 
concerning the nationalities and to safeguard the equal rights of minority nationalities and the right of 
autonomy of the national autonomous areas; (12) To protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese 
nationals residing abroad and protect the lawful rights and interests of returned overseas Chinese and of the 
family members of Chinese nationals residing abroad; (13) To alter or annul inappropriate orders, 
directives and regulations issued by the ministries or commissions; (14) To alter or annul inappropriate 
decisions and orders issued by local organs of state administration at different levels; (15) To approve the 
geographic division of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government, and to approve the establishment and geographic division of autonomous prefectures, 
counties, autonomous counties and cities; (16) To decide on the enforcement of martial law in parts of 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government; (17) To examine 
and decide on the size of administrative organs and, in accordance with the law, to appoint, remove and 
train administrative officers, appraise their work and reward or punish them; and (18) To exercise such 









c. The Hierarchy of the Chinese Legislation 
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the State with supreme legal authority in China.158    
The law is in the secondary position, with its legal authority being subject to Constitution. The 
authority of law is however higher than the rest of legislation, such as an administrative 
regulation, local regulation, administrative rule or local rule.159  
 
Among administrative regulations, local regulations and local rules, their legal authority is 
arranged in a descending order.160 As for different local rules, the one made by the people’s 
government of a province or autonomous region is with higher legal authority than the one made 
by the people’s government of a relatively large city within the jurisdiction of the province or 
autonomous region.161 
 
As far as various administrative rules either enacted by ministries or by local governments are 
concerned, they are within the same class regarding legal authority, and they are expected to be 
implemented within their respective realms of authority.162  
 
iii. Legal Institutions163 
a. Court System in China 
The People’s courts are the judicial organs of China164, which consists of people’s courts at 
various local levels, military courts and other special courts, such as maritime courts, railway 
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transportation courts and forestry courts. The Supreme People’s Court, located in the Chinese 
capital city Beijing, is the highest judicial organ within the Chinese territory.165 
 
As far as people’s courts at various local levels are concerned, they are divided into three levels, 
i.e., basic people’s courts, intermediate people’s courts and high people’s courts.166 Both parties 
of a case have the right to appeal to the court at the next higher level, but only one appeal is 
permitted.167 
 
b. The People’s Procuratorate System in China 
The people’s procuratorate system, serving as the state organ for judicial supervision168, consists 
of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the highest procuratorial organ169, and the people’s 
procuratorates at various local levels, military procuratorate and other special people’s 
procuratorates, say railway transportation procuratorates.170 As a matter of fact, People’s courts 
at various levels have their corresponding people’s procuratorates so that judicial work in China 
could be supervised properly with no exception at each level.  
 
B. Introduction to the Chinese Labor Law 
i. Historical Review on the Chinese Labor Law and Relevant Policy Changes within 
Socialist China 
From the time the CCP came into power in 1949 to the beginning of Cultural Revolution in 1966, 
various labor legislation was promulgated by Chinese government, including but not limited to: 
“Trade Union Law” (1950), “Labor Insurance Regulation” (1951), “Production Safety in Work 
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Place Regulation” (1956), “Temporary Regulation on Workers and Retirement” (1958) and 
“Several Rules on Strengthening the Industrial Production Safety Management” (1963).  
 
During the ten years chaotic period171, however, even the existing labor legislation could not be 
effectively implemented, let alone the work of enactment of new labor legislation for the sake of 
labor welfare.172  
 
After the watershed third plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 1978, 
the Chinese government started to realize the value of a good legal system and the 
incompleteness of its own legal system, and hence, made its decision to strengthen it.173 From 
1978 to 1994, various labor related rules, regulations, concerning female workers’ welfare, 
mineworkers’ safety, child labor prohibition, labor contract system, labor dispute settlement etc., 
were enacted and promulgated.174 In 1994, the landmark comprehensive legislation, the “Chinese 
Labor Law”, came into force, and this symbolized the growth of China’s labor legislation into a 
relatively mature period.175 Recently, the long-awaited “Chinese Labor Contract Law” (Laodong 
Hetong Fa) was passed. This is considered as a further crystallization of labor contract under 
“Chinese Labor Law” and is expected to substantially improve the protection of employee’s legal 
rights.176  
 
Coupled with these legislative changes, there were other economic changes that have transformed 
the situation of laborers in China. Chief amongst these was that the lifetime employment system 
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 The Chinese Labor Contract Law was passed on June 29, 2007. 
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in China has become history and labor contract system, with the possibility of contracting away a 
worker’s role as “master of an enterprise”177, has been accepted since 1986.178 The structural 
readjustment of SOEs179 has come mainly under the control of government, and thus, workers 
have very limited chances to make their voices heard, let alone fighting for their interests, in the 
process of SOEs’ structural readjustment. On the contrary, the managers in an enterprise, who 
once were claimed to be the people’s servants in the socialist China, finally became the biggest 
stake holders. Meanwhile, a large amount of state owned assets were reported to disappear 
mysteriously (Guoyou Zichan Liushi).180  
 
Additionally, a new employment mechanism reform was introduced, i.e., the policy originating 
from the theory of a centrally planned economy that resulted in low salary, low efficiency, high 
employment rate (digongzi, gaojiuye), was substituted by the market economy ideas -- reducing 
the staff to improve efficiency and benefit (jianyuan zengxiao), competing to get the position 
(jingzheng shanggang). There has been a gradual increase of jobless rate from 1999 to 2008.181 
By end of 2008, the number of registered urban unemployed was already 8.86 million.182 As such, 
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it is fair to conclude that the “masters of an enterprise” in the socialist days has become one of the 
most vulnerable social groups in today’s Chinese society.183 
 
ii. Overview on the Current Chinese Labor Legislation 
The main purposes of the Chinese Labor Law are to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
workers, regulate labor relations, establish and safeguard a labor system under the socialist 
market economy and promote economic development and social progress.184 Thus, prima facie, 
it is clear that to protect worker’s legitimate rights and interests is the first and foremost purpose 
of Chinese Labor Law. In order to serve this primary purpose well, this comprehensive law 
covers various aspects of worker’s rights and interests, including collective contract, labor 
welfare and insurance system, wage, safety and healthcare, job training, special protection for 
female workers and under-aged workers and labor dispute settlement mechanism. Admittedly, 
this comprehensive legislation together with other related laws, regulations and rules (such as 
Trade Union Law, Labor Contract Law, the Woman Rights and Interests Protection Law, 
Regulation on Collective Contract, Notice on Labor Contract System, Regulation on Special 
Protection on Under Aged Workers, Implementation Rule on Mine Safety Law, Temporary 
Regulation on the Management of the Crossing Provincial Border Farmer Workers) have 
established a relatively competent legal system for labor rights protection in China.  
 
Yet, despite the fact that the Chinese Labor Law has improved a lot compared with what it was, 
the progress appears to be far from enough considering the dramatic downgrade of the social 
status of Chinese working class -- from “master of an enterprise” to one of the most vulnerable 
social groups. Indeed, substantial improvements are needed, especially in several sensitive and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Countermeasure” (Xiyiilun Jiegou Tiaozheng Xia De Zhongguo Laodong Guanxi Ji Gonghui De Xiangying 
Duice), Online: <http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=3343> (date accessed: June 2, 2005). 
183
 A handful of scholars in China including Zhang Yunmei, Chen Feng, Zhang Ming, Qiao Jian, Wang 
Licheng etc are sharing the same view with the writer regarding this aspect.  
184
 Labor Law of People’s Republic of China, 1995[hereinafter Labor Law of PRC], art.1. 
45 
fundamental aspects, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining and freedom from 
forced labor or child labor.  
 
To this end, for the rest of this thesis, the writer will examine the Chinese labor legislation in 
terms of the four main issues: (1) freedom of association and collective bargaining, (2) forced 
labor, (3) child labor, and (4) discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
 
2.4 Conclusion on Chapter Two 
When China is undergoing rapid economic growth and social transformations, it is also 
experiencing rising social unrest. When its trade union that is designed and functioning in a 
typical Marxist socialist regime relapsed into a conflicting dual functioning dilemma and cannot 
satisfy its members’ urgent and legitimate needs, when the long disappeared labor related social 
evil such as child labor reemerged, when a special social group -- “farmer worker” created by its 
internal migrating wave has caused serious discrimination problems in terms of employment as 
well as other social problems in the cities, China urgently needs a set of model law to guide its 
legislative reform so that the costs to its people during the transitional period can be reduced. 
 
Considered as a further concretization of the relevant general principles of human rights, the core 
labor standards covering four fundamental aspects of labor rights do provide internationally 
recognized labor standards to guide China and its leaders’ decision-making procedure. It is 
observed that “countries that have eliminated forced labor and the worst forms of child labor and 
have made important inroads against discrimination in employment and occupation are thriving 
economically”;185 also “respect for freedom of association reinforces popular participation and 
buttresses democratic institutions that can address an uneven distribution of the gains from 
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economic growth”,186 and thus promote social justice. As such, in the later part of this thesis, the 
writer will study the Chinese labor legislation in terms of eight ILO fundamental Conventions to 
find out the gap between them and provide feasible gap-filling solutions that not only taking into 



























Chapter 3: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: A Study on the Relevant 
Chinese Labor Law under the Framework of ILO Fundamental Conventions No. 87 and No. 
98  
 
3.1 International Labor Standards Relating to Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining 
 
A. The Value of Worker’s Right on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
“Freedom of Association is the most basic of all principles underlying the work of International 
Labor Organization (the ‘ILO’) and the activities of those who toil for social justice”187 As 
pointed out by the initial global report prepared by the ILO, the freedom of association and 
collective bargaining “can contribute to more participatory, transparent societies, which in turn 
promote economic growth and stability over time”.188 “It involves the right to join, form and 
withdraw membership freely from groups, associations and partnerships of different kinds.”189 
When an association organizes and functions within the scope of national legislation, the 
“non-interference” is a minimum requirement to the outsiders -- both state, other individuals and 
organizations.190 Besides, this right also implies that the state has a positive obligation to create 
and maintain an environment conducive to the proper exercise of this right.191  
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At the international level, the right to freely associate and bargain collectively is identified as a 
fundamental worker’s right by the ILO and is protected under the UDHR, which provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including the right to 
form and join trade unions for the protection of his (her) interest, and is free from being 
compelled to belong to an association.192 Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the “ICCPR”) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
“ICESCR”) further emphasize that except for certain conditions prescribed by law or for the 
protection of national security or public interests in a democratic society, everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions.193 
As a matter of fact, freedom of association exercised as one of the fundamental human rights 
have been reaffirmed by various international human rights conventions, such as Convention For 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms194, Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms195 and Convention on the Elimination of 
All Form of Discrimination Against Women (the “CEDAW”)196 etc.  
 
At the regional level, the right to freedom of association was recognized by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and by the European 
Social Charter as well.197 It was also incorporated into both the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American 
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International Charter of Social Guarantees.198 More recently, the American Convention on 
Human Rights recognizes in general terms the right to associate freely for all kinds of purposes 
including those relating to labor.199 “Its Additional Protocol on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted in 1988, and follows the wording of the UN’s 
Civil and Political Rights Covenant in respect of trade union rights.”200 
 
Indeed, freedom of association is highlighted by the ILO as “a precondition for social dialogue” 
that is crucial to promote decent work for all and is fundamental to the achievement of the 
strategic objectives of decent work.201 It provides workers with the opportunity to form and join 
organizations of their own and serves as a foundation stone upon which other labor rights could 
be built and respected. As such, freedom of association is one of the most effective means 
through which workers could defend their rights and interests in the workplace. 
 
 
B. Introduction to ILO Convention No. 87 
According to Convention No. 87, workers, without discrimination whatsoever, shall have the 
right to establish and to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization 
202
 (only the armed forces and the police may be exempted by national laws or regulations).203 
The CFA of the ILO has pointed out specifically that where the authority competent to register a 
union has the discretionary power to refuse the registration, such power is tantamount to a 
requirement for prior authorization, which is incompatible with the requirement -- “without 
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previous authorization”.204 In addition, the possibility of appealing to the courts against an 
administrative decision rejecting registration has been considered as an especially important 
safeguard.205 With regard to the entitlement of “the right to establish and to join organizations of 
their own choosing”, in principle, it does not prevent a voluntary decision by workers to choose to 
have a single organization to represent them. This is to avoid the potential problems that might be 
caused by parallel organization at the general, sectoral or enterprise levels.206 However, it does 
require that at the very least diversity should always remain possible.207 In other words, as the 
Committee of Experts observes, there is a fundamental difference between cases where a trade 
union monopoly is imposed or maintained by domestic law and situations where the workers or 
their unions voluntarily combined into one organization, independently of legislation.208 
 
Besides, workers have the right to draw up their own constitutions and rules, to elect their 
representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to formulate 
their programs without interference from authorities, which would restrict this right or impede the 
lawful exercise thereof.209 Put concretely, the CFA has refused to accept provisions that appear to 
imply subordination of trade unions to the national economic policy; however, the Committee is 
content that if the intention is to guarantee the union members’ right to participate democratically, 
the law of land may require that the majority of the members of a trade union must decide on 
certain issues which affect the very existence or structure of a union such as adoption and 
amendment of the constitution, dissolution etc.210 When a model constitution prepared by the 
authorities is made available to the unions to serve as a guideline rather than a compulsory model 
with legal obligations to follow, the ILO’s supervisory bodies have accepted its consistency with 
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the very “right to draw up their own constitution and rules” under article 3 of Convention No. 
87.211 In terms of the election of representatives in full freedom, the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations points out that the law of the land “should not 
establish very precise rules on the subject of trade elections, nor regulate the composition of its 
executive committee, nor fix the number of trade union leaders or the majority by which they 
must be elected, nor impose fines on members who do not participate in election”.212 In addition, 
the authority should not be allowed to have the power to approve the candidates or the result of 
the elections.213 The political views, affiliation or activities of a person should not constitute a 
legal obstacle to occupy trade union offices either.214 Furthermore, provisions restricting or 
prohibiting the re-election of trade union officers are a serious obstacle to the right of 
organizations to elect their representatives in full freedom.215 Of course, the CFA has stated 
repeatedly that the rights protected in article 3 of the Convention No. 87 do not prevent the 
supervision of the internal activities of a trade union if those activities violate legal provisions or 
rules; however, it is important that such control and power to take measures for the suspension or 
dissolution of the union should be exercised by the judicial authorities instead of administrative 
ones to avoid the arbitrary risks.216  
 
Furthermore, the dissolution and suspension of workers’ organization shall be decided by the 
organization per se instead of by administrative authorities.217 In terms of the law of the land, it 
is required not to impair the guarantees on right to freedom of association provided for in this 
Convention. 218  Moreover, it is each member state’s obligation to take all necessary and 
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appropriate measures to ensure that workers may freely exercise their right to organize.219 In 
terms of international affiliation, unions are not only entitled to establish and join federations and 
confederations and any other organizations as such, but also entitled to affiliate with international 
organizations of workers.220  
 
C. Introduction to ILO Convention No. 98 
Convention No. 98 further prohibits anti-union discrimination in respect of employment.221 
Specifically put, acts, such as making the employment of a worker subject to a non-union 
member identity or dismissing or prejudicing a worker due to his/her union membership or 
participation in union activities, are prohibited explicitly by the Convention.222 Indeed, the CFA 
together with the Committee of Experts have amassed a considerable jurisprudence on this 
point.223 It is submitted that acts of discrimination refer not only to those take place in hiring and 
firing, but to any discriminatory measures during employment, which includes transfers, 
downgrading and compulsory retirement, denial of promotion, disciplinary measures, blacklisting, 
and deprivations or restrictions on remuneration and social benefits.224 
 
The Convention reconfirms that Trade Unions are free from any interference from employers’ 
side in their establishment, functioning or administration. Especially, acts which are designed to 
promote the establishment of workers' organizations under the domination of employers or 
employers' organizations, or to support workers' organizations by financial or other means, with 
the objective of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers' 
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organizations, are prohibited.225 The Committee of Experts has noted that governments that ratify 
the Convention are under the obligation to take specific actions, in particular through legislation, 
to ensure respect for such non-interference requirements.226 In addition, the CFA has stated that 
the issuance of circulars by a company requesting its employees to state to which trade union they 
belonged, even though not intended to interfere with the exercise of trade union rights, may 
naturally be understood as interference prohibited under the very Convention.227 It is observed by 
the Committee of Experts’ 1994 General Survey that mere legislation prohibiting acts of 
anti-union discrimination is not enough if it is not accomplished by effective and rapid procedures 
to ensure its application in practice.228 Of course, as the CFA further points out, as long as 
protection against anti-union discrimination is in fact ensured, methods adopted to safeguard 
workers against such practices might vary from one state to another; however if there is such 
discrimination, it is the obligation of the government concerned to take all the necessary steps to 
eliminate it, irrespective of the methods normally used.229 In other words, it might be necessary 
for government to adopt methods not provided for in the legislation or to create new measures to 
supplement the existing uses or remedy of other deficiencies.230  
 
Measures shall be taken to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of 
machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers and trade unions (with the armed forces, 
police and public servants exceptions)231 with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements.232 According to the CFA’s statement, generally 
speaking, trade unions should have the right, through collective bargaining and other lawful 
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means, to seek to improve the living and working conditions of those whom they represent.233 
Thus, the public authorities are under the obligation to refrain from any interference that would 
restrict rights as such or impede the lawful exercises thereof.234 Put specifically, as the ILO’s 
supervisory bodies have contented, the most representative unions -- the organization or 
organizations that have the largest membership compared with others, should be accorded 
exclusive or preferential rights for collective bargaining.235 Of course, under the situation where 
no union has such majority, the Committee of Expert has concluded that in these circumstances 
collective bargaining rights should be granted to all the unions in the unit, at least on behalf of 
their own members.236 
 
3.2 Freedom of Association in China Vs. International Core Labor Standards on Freedom 
of Association 
A. Brief Introduction to the Law and Practice regarding the freedom of Association in 
China 
Generally speaking, the unions in China consist of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), local all-level federation of trade unions, sectoral unions and basic-level unions.237 
They are organized on the principle of democratic centralism238 which means “individuals obey 
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the organization, the minority obeys the majority, and unions at lower levels obey those at higher 
levels.”239 Therefore, all the other trade unions in China are subjected to the leadership of the 
ACFTU which was founded on May 1, 1925 with the participation of 166 local unions and over 
540,000 members. 240 To date, ACFTU has a membership of 137 million in more than 1.713 
million basic-level trade union organizations.241. It opens to all manual and mental workers in 
enterprises, undertakings and offices inside China whose wages constitute their principal means 
of livelihood and who accept the Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions. There is no 
discrimination based on their nationality, race, sex, occupation, religious belief or educational 
background. Under the leadership of ACFTU, there are 31 federations of trade unions of 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government and 10 
national industrial unions, covering various departments namely, education, seamen, energy, 
machinery, building, forestry, railway, telecommunication, light industry and banking etc.242 
“The local trade union federation is the leading body of the local trade union organizations and 
the local industrial unions in its locality.”243 The ACFTU, established as the unified national 
organization, is the leading body of all local trade union federations and all national organizations 
of industrial unions.244  
 
In order to have a clearer understanding on the organizational structure of the Chinese trade union 
system, please see Table 2 as follows: 
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Although China claimed in its report submitting to the ILO on the issue of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining that “government’s authorization is not required to establish a workers’ 
organization …, [and] freedom of association can be exercised at enterprise, sector/industry, 
national and international levels by all workers in the public service, medical professionals, 
teachers, agricultural workers, workers engaged in domestic work, workers in Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs) or enterprises/industries with EPZs status, migrant workers, workers of all ages and 
workers in the informal economy”,245 the relevant domestic trade union law and the de facto 
practice seems not to be the case.  
 
First, the writer would like to discuss the relevant legislation. Although the Chinese Constitution 
provides that citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of 
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assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration246, and the Chinese Trade Union 
Law 2001 further emphasizes that all laborers shall have the right to participate in and form trade 
union organizations pursuant to the law (regardless their nationalities, races, sexes, occupations, 
religious beliefs or education), and no organization or individual may hinder them from doing so 
or restrict them247, article 10 and 11 of the Trade Union Law nevertheless provides the restriction 
on the worker’s right to freedom of association in China. Put concretely, it provides that ACFTU 
shall be established as the unified national organization248 and the establishment of a basic-level 
trade union, local all-level federation of trade unions or a national or local specific industry trade 
union must be reported to the trade union organization at the next higher level for its approval.249 
In other words, the establishment of trade union in China is, by no means, purely subject to 
workers’ own choosing without previous authorization as provided by Convention No. 87. For 
good measure, the Constitution of ACFTU reconfirms its leading power, namely all local trade 
union federations and all national organizations of industrial unions shall be led by ACFTU 
only.250 Indeed, according to some labor rights experts’ observation, “these articles (in the 
Chinese Trade Union Law) not only shore up on the ACFTU’s monopoly on organization, but 
also technically and procedurally block the road to workers’ organizing independent union.”251 
Reports have shown that as for the trade unions which are voluntarily organized by workers 
without subject to the control of ACFTU, they are absolutely illegal in the eyes’ of Chinese 
authority. For example, several voluntarily organized worker associations for protecting farmers’ 
interests when they were working in cities of Zhejiang Province were alleged as illegal by an 
official statement from the Federation Trade Union of Zhejiang Province. The official position is 
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that organizations as such failed to obtain an approval from the union at the next higher level in 
advance.252 Worse still, such an official conclusioin is final, i.e., there is no other safeguard 
available for workers involved to seek for a chance to realize their freedom of association, such as 
appealing to the courts against a quasi-administrative decision as such.253 In this sense, it is fair 
for the leading global labor organization -- International Confederation of Free Trade Union (the 
“ICFTU”) to call the ACFTU as “trade union monopoly”.254 It shall be noted that the ILO 
Convention No. 87 has not banned the practice of trade union monopoly, if it is a voluntary 
choice made by workers themselves; however, it does prohibit the situation where the relevant 
laws of the land institutionalize a factual monopoly and deny the workers’ right to choose to set 
up unions outside the established structure as they so wish.255 Therefore, these provisions under 
the Chinese Trade Union Law are, unfortunately, inconsistent with the basic principle of 
association embodied in the ILO Convention No. 87.  
 
B. Dual Role of the Chinese Trade Union 
i. Trade Union’s Role under the Present Chinese Trade Union Law  
In accordance with the Chinese Trade Union legislation, trade unions are mass organizations 
formed by the working classes of their own free will.256 Considering that trade unions in China 
are voluntary unity of the leading class -- the working class, their status seems to be superior to an 
ordinary social organization. 257  
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The Chinese Trade Union Law provides that Trade Unions must focus on economic development, 
adhere to the socialist road and people’s democratic dictatorship, and insist on the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party and the guidance of Marxism Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and 
Deng Xiaoping Theory.258 Besides, trade unions in China shall assist the people’s governments 
in their work, uphold the leadership of the working class and support the worker-peasant alliance 
which forms the basis of the people’s democratic dictatorship of socialist state power.259 The 
general principles embodied in the Constitution of ACFTU reconfirm the trade union’s role as 
such.260 Accordingly, the Chinese trade unions are required by law and its own constitution to 
work as an assistant to the Chinese authority, i.e., work for the interests of Chinese government, 
which seems to be contrary to the interpretation of Convention No. 87 offered by the CFA -- 
provisions that appear to imply subordination of trade union to the national economic policy are 
regarded as jeopardizing a union’s freedom of its own operation guaranteed by article 3 of the 
Convention No. 87.261 Meanwhile, the Trade Union Law also provides that the basic function 
and duty of a trade union is to safeguard the legal rights and interests of the employees.262 Trade 
unions must liaise closely with employees, listen to and reflect their views and requirements, care 
for their livelihood, assist them in overcoming difficulties and serve them wholeheartedly.263 In 
fact, the law requires the Chinese trade unions to play dual role at the same time, i.e., one role is 
to work for the interests of the socialist government, and the other role is to act in the interests of 
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the workers. This is only possible when the state and the employees are sharing the same interests. 
The Trade Union Law does not incorporate any clauses in dealing with the situation where the 
interests of the State and the employees are conflicting. In other words, there is a legislative 
assumption that the interests of the state and employees are consistent most of the time. 
Unfortunately, assumption as such may not always be true, especially under the circumstances of 
a market economy.  
 
ii. Emergence of the Conflicting Interests between the State and Workers 
Before China’s radical economic reform, the Chinese trade union served dual functions just as 
what is described by Leninist doctrine of dual functioning trade unions in Communist country.264 
The trade union back then was required both to encourage labor productivity and to protect 
workers legitimate interests from the employer’s abuse.265 Admittedly, as certain communist 
union theorists have already observed, there might be certain internal contradiction when trade 
union is operating such dual function;266 however, considering the working class in China at that 
time was the genuine leading class and the state led by it was the actual employer267, chances 
were rare for the fundamental conflicts to exist between the union’s two functions. Thus, it is 
observed that conflicts as such in the socialist regime back then without antagonistic class 
conflicts are only of minor severity.268 By the same token, it is possible for the trade union at that 
time to work as “transmission belts” between state and masses, conveying state policy to labor 
and also sending information from the workplace to the state.269 Consequently, the legislative 
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assumption that most of the time the state and the employees were sharing the same interest as 
mentioned above did have its merits at that point of time.  
 
Things have changed greatly. The Chinese state is no longer what it was. “The privatization of 
small and medium sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs), releasing shares for sale on the stock 
exchange by large SOEs, the transformation of all economic mechanisms” 270 , the rapid 
development of private enterprises both domestic and foreign related and the widely retrenchment 
policy (xiagang) etc.271 have changed the state’s role as a working class protector; on the 
contrary, governments, especially the local ones, sometimes even stand on the opposite side of 
workers’ interests. According to a social investigation report in China, in order to attract 
investment, in order to collect more local annual revenue, in order to raise the chances to be 
promoted during their term, some local Chinese governments and its officers had tried to avoid 
the implementation of the Chinese labor law within their regions.272 Even worse, some of them 
have enacted certain local policies with the nature to sacrifice the dignity of the national labor 
legislation and the interests of workers within its region but to benefit the investors.273 In this 
sense, local government as such and employers are sometimes, if not always, within the same 
interest group. Take the Shenzhen special economic zone as an example. Theoretically speaking, 
the major responsibility of a labor bureau there is to adjust the worker-employer relationship and 
to protect the interests of both sides without prejudice;274 however, the main task of the bureau is 
indeed operated by a basic labor station who is also a constituent of the local government.275 
Logically, such labor stations have to follow the instruction of the local government, who 
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unfortunately is observed to share the same interests of employers/investors.276 Therefore, it is 
quite hard to expect the impartial performance of a basic labor station there. 
 
In addition, according to the information from some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
such as China Labor Bulletin based in Hong Kong which is specialized in labr rights protection in 
China, “almost every week in Hong Kong and mainland China, newspapers bring reports of some 
kind of labor action: a demonstration demanding pensions; a railway line being blocked by angry, 
unpaid workers; or collective legal action against illegal employer behavior such as body searches 
or forced overtime”.277 It is reported that more than 1 million workers in 30 cities joined the 
street demonstration in the year 1995 and the number had increased dramatically to 3.6 million 
after only three years.278 Worse still, evidence available shows the number is still increasing year 
by year.279 The China Labor Bulletin further confirms that the process of "economic restructuring 
has led to huge pressures on the Chinese labor market... many workers laid off from State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)280 have expressed dissatisfaction with the long working hours, short-term 
contracts and miserly benefits”.281 As a matter of fact, over 50,000 workers from the Daqing 
Oilfield have joined mass street demonstrations since March, 2002 to protest against Daqing 
Petroleum Administration Bureau’s breaking of the agreement on the terms of retrenchment.282 
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These were soon followed by large scale demonstrations by workers in several big industrial 
cities in China, including its capital city Beijing. 283  The protesters there surrounded the 
government headquarters, blocked public traffic and demanded an official solution on the 
problem of retrenchment.284 After an unusual long strike at a Chinese factory acquired by China 
Resources Enterprises due to the problems caused by privatization, some scholar comments: 
“There is similar unrest at factories all over the country at the moment and we expect more strikes 
as China continues its SOE reform”.285 Surprisingly, even a senior officer of ACFTU also 
admitted that the strike in China is a normal phenomenon at present.286  
 
iii. What Shall Be the Genuine Mission for A Trade Union in Today’s China in Terms of 
Convention No. 87 & No. 98? 
Some scholars in China argue that the reason for the demonstration phenomena abovementioned 
is because the interests of the State and employees may conflict in the short run; in the long term, 
they are nevertheless consistent.287 The argument may go in this way: when the efficiency of 
enterprises improves, the state will benefit from taxation from enterprises and since the state 
represents its people’s interests, its people will also benefit thereupon.288 As such, in the long run, 
state and workers’ interests are consistent. In theory, this argument might work, if a few practical 
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issues could be properly addressed: (1) whether workers’ short-term interests could be sacrificed 
for the sake of a state’s long term interest; (2) whether it is possible that the so called workers’ 
short-term interests might be the genuine long term interest of a state; and (3) who is authorized 
to decide which interests prevail. In addition, if this long-term state interests argument could 
survive, it will be doubtful whether a union in China can really protect the legitimate interests of 
employees or it just serve as a de facto “eye and ear” of the state inside every workplace.289 
Some trade union leaders from Shanghai (China’s economic centre) admit that the trade union has 
owed workers too much and cast doubt on its value since it fails to fulfill its missions.290 Some 
trade union leaders even comment in this way: if we are fighting for the interests of workers and 
are punished or fired by employers, who is going to fight for our interests?291 
 
In fact, the CFA has concluded that “many provisions of the [Chinese] Trade Union Act were 
contrary to the fundamental principles of freedom of association and had requested the 
Government to take the necessary steps to ensure that the provisions in question were 
modified”.292 The Committee found that the provisions under the Chinese Trade Union Law such 
as section 4, 11 and 13 “result in the imposition of trade union monopoly and the requirement that 
grass-root union be controlled by higher-level unions and that their constitutions shall be 
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established by the National Congress of Trade Union Members constituted major constraints on 
the right of unions to establish their own constitutions, organize their activities, and formulate 
programs.”293 The committee reminds that the missions of trade unions should be to defend and 
promote the interests of their constituents rather than reinforcing the country's political and 
economic system.294 China Labor Bulletin also criticizes that “getting workers back to work as 
soon as possible, regardless of whether or not their demands have been met, has always been the 
priority of the ACFTU”.295 To be fair, the Chinese trade union none the less has played certain 
positive roles in protecting workers’ legitimate interest during the transitional period especially 
with respect to the non-public sector, though limited. For example, trade unions at various levels 
have placed special emphasis on unionizing non-state-owned sectors given the fact that the union 
establishment rate in the non-public sector including township enterprises, foreign invested 
enterprises etc. are quite low. “During the nationwide inspection by the National People's 
Congress (the “NPC”) of the Trade Union Law enforcement in 2004, the ACFTU sponsored a 
number of meetings, including the Workshop on Raising the Unionization Rate in Foreign-funded 
Enterprises, the 17th National Conference on Trade Union Work in Special Economic Zones and 
Development Areas, the National Conference on Trade Union Work in New and Hi-tech 
Development Zones and the Conference on Trade Union Work in Jiujiang Development Zone, so 
as to better guide the organizing drive in foreign-funded enterprises and development zones”.296 
Ultimately, trade unions have been successfully established in certain Multinational Corporations 
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(MNCs) such as Carrefour, McDonald’s as well as Samsung.297 Put aside the union’s efficacy 
issue at the moment, the establishment of trade unions inside these work places per se is a sign of 
progress promoted by ACFTU in protecting workers’ interests.298  
 
As is widely accepted, trade unions play an important role in keeping a balance between the 
power of government, business interest and worker’s interest in a modern industrial society. 299  
It is observed that the fast development of MNCs, the deregulated finance, the end of Cold War 
and the wave of Liberalizing Trade have undermined the trade union’s role as leverage; however, 
its importance has only increased.300 As China becomes more and more involved in the global 
economy, especially after its entering into WTO, the interest of the socialist government 
especially government at the local level and its workers are no longer that consistent as before. 
Therefore, the role of the Chinese trade union to protect the legitimate interests of its workers, 
rather than its role as a government assistant, becomes more and more important, particularly 
when its members’ basic interests are seriously threatened by the fact that local governments and 
employers start sharing the same interests. 
 
C. Reorientation of the Chinese Trade Union 
i. The Relationship Between Chinese Trade Union and CCP: A Historical Review 




 Some reports including the one from the Chinese official website, such as China.com.cn (Zhongguo 
Wang) have shown that though the union establishment rate is increasing year by year after 1999 when the 
ACFTU decided to put the task of unionizing non-state sector on the priority of its agenda, the efficacy of 
the union there is not satisfactory at all. It is quite logic to understand such circumstances in the sense that 
even the unions in the public sector could not function well to protect its members’ legitimate interests, let 
alone the newly established ones inside the private sector. For more information, please see generally in 
online: <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/282893.htm>, (date accessed: June 6, 2006); Chen 
Shengyong & Zhang Ming, “Reform on the Local Trade Unions in China and the Direct Election of the 
Grass Root Unions”, online: <http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=3948> (date accessed: 
June 6, 2006). 
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Back to the first day of the birth of ACFTU, it had established a special relationship with CCP. 
To be precise, it is almost subject to the complete control of CCP. Under the leadership of CCP, 
the Chinese working class established ACFTU, enacted its constitution and elected its first 
executive committee in 1925.301 Serving as a revolutionary power, ACFTU was fighting fiercely 
against imperialism and warlords during Great Revolution Period (from 1919 to 1927). 302 At 
that time, with the leadership of CCP, massive strikes for the sake of workers’ interests were well 
organized in several large cities in China, including but not limited to Shanghai and Wuhan etc.303 
After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, the ACFTU started playing an active supportive role in 
assisting CCP’s anti-Japanese battle.304 During the civil war period, once again, the ACFTU 
worked as a loyal supporter of CCP via opposing Jiang Jieshi’s ruling till CCP finally came into 
power in 1949.305 Due to this revolutionary history of ACFTU led by CCP, its status, which is 
supposed to be a voluntarily established workers’ organization, is inclined to be heavily 
politicized even in today’s China.   
 
After the establishment of PRC, the relationship between ACFTU and CCP became even closer. 
As I have mentioned above in the “Dual Function Theory”306 part, the dual role has been 
reflected without any exception on the trade union’s function in the socialist China back then. 
Moreover, due to the backwardness of the China and the permeating desire to develop a socialist 
economy at that time, naturally, there was a de facto bias in trade union’s functioning, i.e., 
overemphasizing its productive function and neglecting its worker’s guardianship role. 
Consequently, the trade union gradually became a semi-governmental agency in assisting state’s 
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policy enforcement. Of course, during the period between 1949 till year 1989, certain heated 
debates307 on what shall be an appropriate role of trade union in China to protect its workers 
interests well were held by several Chinese unionists, such as Li lishan, Lai Ruoyu, Deng Zihui 
and Gao Gang etc.308 Below are few examples. Deng Zihui argued that the Chinese trade unions 
should only work for the legitimate interest of its workers; however, from Gao Gang’s position, 
since there was no exploitation existing in an SOE, there would be no class conflict. Thus, 
theoretically there should be no differences and conflicts between union work and the 
administrative work in an SOE.309 His argument was refuted by Li Lisan who held that even in 
an SOE, there was still some conflicts such as the conflict between personal interests and the 
collective interests, long term interests versus workers’ daily interests. As such, he emphasized 
the importance to strengthen the independence of the Chinese trade unions.310 These views and 
theories, however, were either purposefully neglected or drastically criticized by the CCP. As a 
matter of fact, in ACFTU’s “About Certain Ideas on Trade Union Reform” (1988) (Guanyu 
Gonghui Gaige De Shexiang), it publicly admitted its bureaucratic nature and expressed its hope 
to separate with CCP and to change the actual nomination practice on the leaders in grass root 
trade unions into democratic election in the future.311 Unfortunately, this dream broke after the 
political turmoil of Tiananmen Square in 1989, whose occurrence was partly because of the 
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democratic activities of the Beijing Autonomous Workers' Federation (BWAF) whose original 
core group was made up of blue collar workers from steel factories, the railways, and the aviation 
industry, as well as shop assistants and casual workers.312 From then on, the CCP engaged in 
strengthening its control over Chinese trade unions via promulgating several state orders, such as 
“Notice on Strengthening the CCP’s Leadership on the Chinese Trade Union” (Jiaqiang Dui 
Gonghui Lingdao Tongzhi) etc. (merely looking at its name, CCP’s steadfast decision on strict 
control of ACFTU is beyond doubt).313 Hence, CCP’s strict control over trade unions has become 
a normal political picture in the present China.  
 
ii. Depoliticizing Chinese Trade Union 
a. Dilemma of Trade Union in Transitional Period 
Before China’s rapid economic reform, as a typical situation, the Chinese government used to be 
in charge of every important aspect of life of an ordinary Chinese citizens located in the urban 
area -- the main source of the Chinese working class, from housing, schooling, kindergartens, job 
arrangement, and medical insurance to financial support after retirement till death. In such a 
paternalistic society, although urban people in China have relatively limited liberty in choosing 
the life style as they wish from a westerner’s point of view, they have very few things to worry 
about because government has taken the responsibility to think and arrange for them. From 1980s, 
with the open door policy coupled with the dissolution of state’s paternalistic function, the 
Chinese government started focusing more on economic development, thus less on the welfare of 
its urban people, the majority of whom belong to the Chinese working class. Lifelong 
employment system, traditionally called “iron rice bowl policy”314, did not exist any more, with 
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 This system is a typical socialist one to guarantee a worker’s lifelong employment. In fact, based on this 
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its substitute -- labor contract, carrying the potential of contracting away workers’ interest and 
rights as a master of an enterprise. Even worse, retrenchment policy (xiagang) and reform on 
retirement system, i.e., removing burden of social security expense from the state to workers and 
employers themselves, have seriously affected workers’ interests in a so called socialist society 
with market-economy characteristics. When the state is no longer willing to take the 
responsibility to protect workers welfare, logically, trade unions are obliged and expected to 
represent and guardian its members’ interests.  
 
It is a pity that traditional trade unions in China have been overemphasizing their productive role 
as a government assistant, and unduly neglecting their guardianship role for quite some time. As a 
consequence, when workers started to cry for help from a trade union, it suddenly relapsed into a 
dilemma on how to play its conflicting roles in this transitional period. In the later part of this 
chapter, the writer will propose certain solutions on how the Chinese trade unions will be able to 
walk out of this dilemma. 
 
b. Ideal Model: Independent Trade Union 
As the writer has mentioned above, the dual role of the Chinese trade union has already trapped it 
into a real dilemma. Even worse, it is because of this problem, trade unions have gradually lost 
their member’s trust. According to several social investigation reports prepared by ACFTU itself, 
around 60 percent of the workers interviewed had a negative impression on the Chinese trade 
unions these days.315 A survey conducted by the writer herself on 50 Chinese workers currently 
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working or used to work in SOEs located in Shanghai, China shows the similar result.316 In 
Tianjin, one of the Chinese municipalities, this number raises to 80 percent.317 How to readjust 
the image of a trade union in workers’ hearts? How to reestablish workers’ almost-lost trust on a 
Chinese trade union? The answer could be: independent trade union.  
 
1. The Legitimacy of an Independent Trade Union under ILO Convention No. 87 
ILO Convention No. 87 provides workers with the right to establish and to join organizations of 
their own choosing without previous authorization.318 Following a logical interpretation, this 
right shall not be confined to a mere freedom to join a single trade union, such as ACFTU. 
Though this provision per se favors neither unity, diversity for trade union, nor does it make trade 
union diversity an obligation, as discussed above, it does require that at the very least diversity 
should always remain possible.319 In other words, it implies that the workers are entitled with the 
undeniable right to establish independent trade unions. This rationale is reconfirmed by the other 
provisions within this convention. For example, according to article 4 of Convention No. 87, in 
terms of its functioning and organization, a trade union shall be free from interference by the 
public authorities. 320  In fact, a trade union is also entitled to affiliate with international 
organizations of workers.321 Also, the interpretation offered by the Committee of Experts further 
confirms that there is a fundamental difference between cases where a trade union monopoly is 
imposed or maintained by domestic law -- which is the exact case under the Chinese labor 
legislation -- and situations where the workers or their unions voluntarily combined into one 
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organization, independently of legislation.322 As such, although the Convention per se never 
explicitly uses the exact phrase “independent trade union”, it is believed to be implied by it. Of 
course, Convention No.87 provides certain restrictions on the freedom of association, i.e., when 
exercising this right, workers are required to respect the law of the land on the condition that the 
law in question has not impaired the guarantees provided for in this Convention.323 Considering 
that in Section 3.2 (A) of this paper, the writer has proved that the actual trade union monopoly 
structure in China legalized by its Trade Union Law has seriously impaired the fundamental 
principles of freedom of association, trade union in China is therefore justified to deviate from 
certain provisions of the Chinese Trade Union Law against the basic spirit of freedom of 
association.  
 
2. The Value of an Independent Trade Union in Contemporary China 
(1) Fulfilling China’s Obligation under the Treaty Law 
As the writer has discussed in Section 3.1 of this thesis, both UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR have 
provided everyone the right to form and join a trade union. In ICESCR, it further clarifies the 
right as follows: 
  
“The right of everyone to form trade union and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to 
the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and 
social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; 324 The right of 
trade unions to function freely subjected to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and 
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which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;” 325 
 
As such, it goes without saying that the right to organize and join an independent trade union has 
been guaranteed by these international bills of human rights. The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has articulated that “government domination of a state Party’s trade unions 
contravenes this right, as it does not allow for trade union pluralism”.326  
 
Given that China has not only signed but also ratified UDHR and ICESCR, it hereby became 
China’s treaty obligation to guarantee the appropriate performance of the right to form and join 
trade unions. Admittedly, when China ratified ICESCR, it made a statement that the Chinese 
government will only implement article 8 (1) (a) of the Covenant within the parameters of its 
Constitution, Trade Union Law and Labor Law.327 Given that certain provisions under Chinese 
Trade Union Law are conflicting with the fundamental principles of freedom of association328, 
this statement constitutes a de facto reservation.  
 
Putting aside the issue of validity of the said reservation,329 except for article 8(1)(a), it is still 
China’s treaty obligation to obey the rest of the clauses under article 8.  In 
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terms of article 8(1)(c), it entitles the trade union to function freely, and the only limitation is 
from the law of the land, which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Because of this 
first limitation, some may argue that China is thereby entitled to restrict the free functioning of 
those independent trade unions since they are against the Chinese Trade Union Law. As far as the 
first limitation namely “subject to those prescribed by law” is concerned, however, following a 
holistic approach of treaty interpretation, it shall be understood and interpreted in light of the 
context of the whole Convention. Article 4 of ICESCR explicitly prescribes that the state may 
subject the rights provided by the Convention only to such limitations as are determined by law 
so far as the law is compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. Following a logical interpretation of 
this article, it has provided certain limitations on the law of the land, i.e., the law in question shall 
be compatible with the nature of these rights under ICESCR and for the purpose of promoting the 
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general welfare in a democratic society. In other words, it implies that the law, which is 
inconsistent with these two limitations, is prohibited in ICESCR. As such, the “law” in article 8(1) 
(c) shall be read in light of the scope provided by article 4, namely subjecting to those two 
limitations. Since certain provisions of Chinese Trade Union Law have been proved to be 
conflicting with the fundamental principles of freedom of association, in other words, being 
incompatible with the nature of the right to freedom of association, it thereby fails to satisfy those 
two limitations in article 4. In this sense, article 8(1)(c) is justified to be read and obeyed 
disregarding certain problematic provisions of the Chinese Trade Union Law, especially those 
justifying the union monopoly practice in China and prohibiting the legitimacy of an independent 
trade unions. In conclusion, notwithstanding China’s reservation on article 8(1) (a), China is 
nevertheless subject to the obligation in article 8(1) (c) which entitles a trade union to function 
freely. An independent trade union with a legitimate status recognized by its trade union 
legislation is the only solution for a trade union in China to enjoy real freedom within the 
meaning of ICESCR. 
 
 (2) Avoiding ACFTU’s Representative Crisis 
After more than two and a half decades of transition from centrally planned economy towards 
market economy, the Chinese workers have become increasingly differentiated and stratified.330 
“The expansion of the non-public sector, the establishment of Special Economic Zones on the 
eastern coastal board, the relaxation of residential controls and intra-country migration 
restrictions have shattered rigid urban/rural divides of the past and given birth to new categories 
of workers such as farmer workers331, workers in foreign invested enterprises, workers in 
township and village enterprises, workers in private enterprises or individually owned enterprises 
                                                 
330
 Jude Howell, “Trade Unionism in China: Sinking or Swimming”, online: 
<http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=3341> (date accessed: June 1, 2005).  
331
 In chapter 6 of this thesis, the writer argues that farmer workers, although they should belong to 
Chinese working class, but in practice, they have never been regarded as the real workers so far. 
76 
and contract workers.”332 Moreover, with the restructuring of SOEs from 1993, came the new 
distinction between the unemployed and the retrenched workers.333 With the growing of this 
diversification and stratification trend, a representative crisis is attacking ACFTU. It is not clear 
how ACFTU is able to represent such a differentiated workforce with different and 
un-harmonized interests. To be honest, designed to function in a typical Marxist socialist regime 
which is indisputably not the case in today’s China, ACFTU has met a host of new challenges 
under such a new socialist structure that embraces capitalism, which both ACFTU and Mr. Marx 
have never expected before. Thus, to artificially and compulsorily maintain a unity amongst 
workers when their needs are so diverse and expectations are so different is unwise.334 An 
independent trade union, autonomously organized by workers with relatively the same type, with 
the workers’ own choosing leaders and own drafting charters, and based on its members’ 
common needs and expectations, is likely to avoid ACFTU’s representative dilemma. 
 
(3) Creating a Virtuous Competing Environment for Both ACFTU Controlled Unions and 
Independent Unions 
Imagine if the legitimacy of an independent trade union has been ultimately granted under the 
Chinese legislation, what might happen in the future? Since an independent trade union is 
relatively single-minded, purely-motivated and less politicized (it will only fight for the 
legitimate interests of its members without keeping the need to assist CCP in mind) its work and 
programs in protecting workers interest will definitely be more effective than a union with 
contradictory nature and over-diversified interests among its members under ACFTU. Generally 
speaking, workers are more willing to join a union that can represent its interests sincerely and 
effectively. Therefore, a gradual movement of members from ACFTU controlled unions to 
independent trade unions seems to be inevitable. 









At the same time, the trade unions under the ACFTU that have gradually lost their members will 
have to reflect on their own value and functioning. Naturally, if they do not want to lose most of 
its members, a heartfelt “sorry” decision has to be made. Very possibly, it will choose to adjust 
the priority of its function with a gradual change of emphasis on its guardianship role and a 
de-emphasis on its CCP’s assistant role. In this case -- after readjusting the role of a trade union 
under the ACFTU, it would become a powerful competitor of an independent trade union. Under 
such circumstances, there will be two types of trade union system in China. In order not to lose 
respective members, a virtuous competing circle with a blessing to race to the top regarding 
protection on workers’ legitimate rights could be created, with each system to fight for its 
workers’ interests devotedly. 
 
(4) Increasing Social Stability 
It is observed that the reason for the widespread worker’s protest in China is because workers 
“feel economically disadvantaged, socially disenfranchised and politically excluded”, whereas 
very few social safety networks are available to help them.335 With the development of an 
independent trade union, a workplace representative body with professional union personnel who 
will sincerely express workers’ concerns could come into stage.336 Rather than going to streets to 
protest and express their dissatisfaction in such a drastic way, taking the risk of even facing 
certain administrative sanctions, such as RTL337, reasonable workers, very possibly, would rather 
go to an independent trade union for help.338 Here, the writer does not mean that there would be 
no protests at all, but the number of protesters is expected to drop significantly.  
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As a matter of fact, certain independent trade unions have secretly emerged (although not 
officially recognized by the Chinese authority) and played a positive role in protecting workers’ 
legitimate interests. For example, it is reported that an independent trade union in Shanxi, Xian 
Province, was established in 2004, which is the first independent trade union in Xian.339 Though 
without official recognition, this trade union has helped a host of farmer workers to solve their 
wage arrear problems. The total amount of arreared wages that finally returned to those farmer 
workers reached RMB 350,000, which is not a small amount especially to these blue collar 
workers surviving at the bottom of the Chinese society.340 Reports as such have shown that these 
independent trade unions, without any ambitious political purposes, let alone threatening the 
CCP’s ruling, are performing their workers’ guardianship role wholeheartedly and effectively.341 
 
(5) Raising Productivity in Workplace 
Evidence has proved the positive economic benefits of well organized workplace and their higher 
productivity.342 It is said that union activities, such as providing workers with a collective voice, 
balancing the power relationship between workers and management, limiting employer’s 
arbitrary and exploitative or retaliatory behavior, establishing grievance and arbitration 
procedures, combined with an overall improvement in industrial relations can be conducive to 
higher efficiency and productivity.343 As China continues to transform its economic and social 
structure, it will be necessary for its factories and enterprises to introduce new technological 
changes and methods of accomplishing tasks to compete internationally. Organized firms will be 
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able to adapt to the requisite changes much faster than those that are unorganized.344 It has been 
submitted that “employees more readily accept technological and organizational change when 
their interests are expressed by credible representatives.”345 
 
(6) Benefiting the Workers Involved in the Non-public Economy 
Despite limited state protection and even policy reversals sometime in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
dynamic private economy in China nevertheless managed to develop at a miraculously rapid 
pace.346  As the writer has mentioned in Section 2.2 (A) above, China’s privately owned 
enterprises have become a visible player, accounting for 55.2 percent of tax revenue in year 
2003.347 Unforunately, the trade unions inside these privately owned enterprises are neither 
capable nor powerful. Reports have shown that most of the trade unions in privately owned 
enterprises are under the control of employers and some of them are merely puppets without free 
will.348 If an independent trade union system in China could develop well, naturally, those 
workers employed by private-owned enterprises would be attracted to join an independent trade 
union immuned from employer’s multifarious interference. It is expected that under the guidance 
of an independent trade union, those workers will be able to unite together tightly so that they 
could take collective action easily to fight for their legitimate interest with few or even no 
negative influence from the employer’s side. 
 
c. Realistic Model: Bottom Up Approach 
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Despite various abovementioned advantages for the development of an independent trade union 
system in China, to be realistic, considering that the memories of Tiananmen Square Incident349 
launched by students and later joined by workers in 1989 and Falun Gong demonstrations are still 
fresh, recognizing that the Chinese government has traditionally been sensitive and cautious on 
the development of NGOs including independent trade unions within its territory and inclined to 
regard them as an element causing social instability, which is valued as the most important 
preconditions for Chinese rapid economic development,350 realizing the revolutionary role once 
played by the independent and self-governing solidarity trade unions in Poland351 during the 
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81 
social and political changes after 1980, at the current stage chances for the Chinese government to 
admit the legitimacy of an independent trade union in China via legislation are rare. Therefore, 
the writer plans to propose a soft solution with more feasibility based on the present 
circumstances, which is a reform happening inside the contemporary ACFTU system. 
Unfortunately, a soft approach as such may not be able to bring about certain fundamental 
changes. For instance, it could not disengage the ACFTU from its dual role dilemma thoroughly. 
 
1. Direct Democratic Election in Grass Root Trade Union 
 
Different from the trade unions at the higher level, the grass root trade unions based in work 
places are directly linked with workers and therefore are the first resort for workers to turn for 
help. Serving as the root of a trade union system, the Chinese grass root trade unions’ role is 
critical to the healthy development of a national trade union system and to the effective protection 
of workers’ interests in the future. Only when the leaders of grass root unions, who are serving as 
the core of unions’ daily function, could be trusted by union constituents and represent them 
wholeheartedly, could the grass roots unions play their guardianship role well. In other words, a 
devoted and trustworthy union leader is crucial. 
 
The Chinese Trade Union Law has not regulated the election of the leaders of grass root trade 
unions. In the Constitution of ACFTU, it provides the general right for its members to elect, to be 
elected and to vote democratically without any detailed description on how to implement this 
right.352 Of course, ACFTU has promulgated the “Temporary Rule on the Work of Grass Root 
Trade Union Election” (Gonghui Jiceng Zuzhi Xuanju Gongzuo Zanxing Tiaoli)353  which 
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 It shall be noted that the Temporary Rule promulgated by the ACFTU per se, is not a real law, but a 
model rule whose nature could be regarded as an administrative guidance within Chinese context. 
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provides certain details on the election procedure of leaders of grass root trade unions in China. In 
accordance with this temporary model rule, the general procedure for the grass root union 
election can be divided into two stages. 
 
The first stage is to elect the members of grass root union committee (Gonghui Weiyuan Xuanju). 
During this period, the name list of the candidature for grass root trade union committee members 
is recommended by the previous union committee in accordance with the name list suggested by 
each basic group of the grass root trade union and such a list will not be valid until it is approved 
by the CCP committee (Tongji Dangwei) at the same level354. Once the candidates are confirmed, 
members of the union committee will be elected based on the said name list through the union 
member representative assembly (Huiyuan Daibiao Dahui). At the second stage, after a 
democratic negotiation among elected members of the union committee, the candidature of the 
chairman and vice chairman for the standing committee of a grass root trade union will come into 
being and they shall be approved by the same level CCP committee in the work place together 
with the trade union at the next higher level; alternatively, the candidature of the chairman and 
vice chairman could also be nominated after the democratic negotiation between CCP committee 
and trade union at the higher level according to the elected members of union committee.355  
 
First, it is worth pointing out that according to the spirit of ILO Convention No. 87, the principle 
that workers have the rights to elect their own representative in full freedom by no means implies 
that the authority could be allowed to have the power to approve the candidatures or the result of 
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an election.356 Accordingly, in the case of the Chinese union election, CCP committee, as the 
very agent of the Chinese authority inside the work place, should not be allowed to interfere the 
union leader’s election as such. Secondly, it is natural that the CCP committee would prefer to 
choose a candidature that could be trusted by itself, rather than by the workers, so that the said 
candidate could loyally follow CCP’s instruction. In other words, chances for workers to elect a 
devoted union leader who can truly represent and be trusted by them to fight for their interests are 
limited. As for the election, especially its second stage, it is merely a smoke screen (even if it was 
directly elected by every union constituent) because the candidature available is usually hardly 
the one that workers are willing to choose. Thirdly, during the second stage election (which is not 
an election strictly speaking), most of the grass root unions do not adopt one worker one vote 
practice, namely workers do not have the right to choose the union leaders directly. The 
“election” is actually through a “union committee conference” (Gonghui Weiyuanhui Quanti 
Huiyi）constituted by all the union committee members (which is constituted by a small amount of 
union members). Through a democratic negotiation (Minzhu Xieshang) instead of an election in 
this conference, the chairman and vice chairman of a grass root union will finally come into 
stage.357 In light of the above analysis, it is not difficult to reach a conclusion as such, i.e., grass 
root union members in China have very limited opportunities to elect their representatives in full 
freedom.  
 
Even worse, rather than following the Temporary Rule which is already problematic as discussed 
above, the election procedure in practice is sometimes even more disappointing. The writer would 
like to introduce a brief case study on the grass root trade union election in year 2005 of an 
enterprise “X” (a former public service unit, now is transformed into an SOE) located in Shanghai, 
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 Indeed, there is no clear legislation with regard to how the chairman and vice chairman of the grass root 
union comes out. Based on the writer’s own research and interview with the grass root union leaders in 
Shanghai, the general practice is that through a democratic negotiation instead of an election in the union 
committee conference, the chairman and vice chairman of a grass root union will be born finally.  
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China. During the first stage of this election in X, i.e., the election of members of union 
committee, among the total elected five union committee members, Mr. A won more than 95 
percent of the voters while Mr.B had about 50 percent only. Clearly, these figures, at the very 
least, reflected union members’ preference for Mr. A to be elected as chairman. After the second 
stage “election”, however, Mr. B surprisingly became the chairman while Mr. A was only the 
vice chairman. Through the writer’s further investigation, she was informed that at the second 
stage election, the general manager of enterprise X actually skipped the democratic negotiation 
procedure in the union committee conference and directly nominated B as the union chairman 
because B was regarded as a loyal follower of him.358 
 
How to avoid such disappointing reality? How to guarantee a free election for workers to choose 
their own leaders？Based on the investigation abovementioned, the writer thereby provides her 
suggestion as follows: to realize direct democratic election in grass root trade unions. Simply put, 
each worker shall be entitled by the Chinese Trade Union Law to have a vote to choose their 
leaders in full freedom. As a matter of fact, the value of this direct election idea has already been 
recognized by ACFTU per se. In its “About Certain Ideas on Trade Union Reform” (1988), it 
explicitly pointed out that the candidatures of a grass root trade union leader shall be 
recommended by workers themselves alone, rather than nominated or approved by CCP 
committee and union at the higher level, and it further admitted that this “bottom to up” 
candidature recommendation system could avoid the former practice’s shortcomings; if possible, 
the leader shall be directly elected by all of the constituents of a union.359 This idea, in spite of its 
value, has never been absorbed into the official Chinese legislation to secure its implementation 
by law. The writer, therefore, suggests that the current Chinese Trade Union Law shall be 
amended to incorporate several provisions which entitle each grass root union member a vote to 
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choose their own leaders from the candidatures recommended by themselves without interference 
from CCP committee or any other higher level union. And the candidature that gets the most 
voters shall become the chairman spontaneously. A directly elected union leader as such will win 
workers’ trust and support more easily vis-à-vis a union leader “elected” out of a disappointing 
procedure such as the one mentioned in the case study of enterprise X, and therefore strengthen 
the solidarity of a grass root union; meanwhile, given that the leader is elected directly, in practice 
he/she shall have much stronger sense of responsibility when they are fighting for workers’ 
legitimate interests and practical needs.360 In fact, over the years, there are substantial progresses 
in the Chinese village-level democratic movements, in particular the improvement in electoral 
procedures.361 The direct democratic election similar to the writer’s proposal in this section has 
been adopted by certain Chinese provinces.362 For example, in Jilin Province, all forms of CCP 
or other organizational nomination are prohibited. 363  Village residents there pioneer “sea 
nomination” (after a Chinese proverb “to fish a needle out of the sea”) to “nominate all candidates 
for offices, thus enabling them to discover and promote those neighbours” with capacity to 
represent them.364 By the same token, if such direct election at the village level is able to work, 
the direct democratic election in grass root union proposed in this thesis shall be worth trying and 
with feasibility.  
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2. Financial System Reform in A Grass Root Union 
   
According to the Chinese Trade Union Law article 42, the sources of trade union funds are 
constituted by several parts, i.e., (1) membership dues paid by union members which equal to 0.5 
percent of workers salary, (2) monthly allocations of 2 percent of the total wages of all its 
employees paid to a trade union as funds by the enterprises, public institution or government 
organ that establishes the said union, which is the major source of a union’s fund, (3) income 
turned in by the enterprises or public institutions to which the trade union is subordinated, (4) 
central or local government’s subsidies and other sources such as donation etc.365 The law also 
prescribes in its article 43 that where an enterprise delays or refuses to pay a trade union’s funds 
without justified reasons, the union may apply to the local people’s court for order of payment; if 
the enterprise still refuses to execute in accordance with the order, the trade union could apply to 
the people’s court for compulsory enforcement.366 It is worthy to be mentioned that within the 
1992 version of the Chinese Trade Union Law, there is no provision directly dealing with the 
situation when an enterprise purposefully delays or refuses to pay the union funds. As such, it is 
reported that almost 50 percent of the union funds nationwide could not be collected in due 
course.367 As such, a new clause was added into the Trade Union Law 2001 version to provide 
certain compulsory measures to secure the proper collection of union funds provided by article 43. 
Admittedly, this provision which is highly praised by some Chinese scholars is a progress on how 
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to successfully collect union funds.368 However, after several interviews with some Chinese 
scholars and grass root union leaders, the writer realized that the phenomenon of refusing to pay 
union funds by the enterprises was nevertheless a serious problem in spite of the amended Trade 
Union Law.369 
 
It is observed that although the added provision entitles a trade union to apply for a court’s 
compulsory enforcement order, it still fails to impose any further personal liability on those who 
shall be directly responsible for the delay or refusal of the due payment. Considering the 
unenforceability of court decided cases is such a serious problem in China that a special academic 
terminology has been created to described phenomena as such -- “the difficulty of enforcement” 
(Zhixing Nan)370, with 30 to 40 percent of the decided cases not being able to be enforced 
finally371, even if a court issues a compulsory enforcement order upon collecting union’s funds, 
the implementation of such an order is nevertheless a problem. What if an enterprise chooses not 
to cooperate with the court’s executors? Under such circumstances, only one solution is available, 
i.e., imposing personal liability on those who is directly responsible for the due payment to union. 
After all, it is the person under the disguise of an enterprise to make the ultimate decision either 
to pay or not to pay the due. Only when the personal liability is imposed, such as in the form of 
administrative fine, public apology or even through media exposure, could the trade union law 
secure enough “threatening power” to increase chances of implementation. Also, only via 
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imposing personal liability as such, would the person in charge, especially the boss of a private 
enterprise take the issue of union funds seriously372.  
 
Besides, based on the writer’s research, the source of the salary of a grass root union leader brings 
about another problem on the function of a union’s guardianship role. Theoretically, the working 
personnel for a grass root union could be divided into two types in China, i.e., full-time working 
personnel who are only working for the trade union in a work place and part-time union working 
personnel who have other positions in the work place.373 Both of their salaries are paid by the 
employers. It is common sense that workers need salary to support their daily life and reasonable 
needs -- to buy food, necessary groceries, and support their families etc. As such, once their 
salaries are paid by employers, it implies that their economic status is, to some extent, subject to 
the control of the enterprise. Accordingly, when their employer’s decision conflicts with workers’ 
legitimate interests, it is hard to expect those union working staff to fight against their employers 
wholeheartedly without a second thought. Indeed, in the case of non-public sector, the situation is 
even worse. For example, as a business man, a boss of a private enterprise is likely to take the 
purpose of making more profit as his/her enterprise’s priority. Thus, the chances that a privately 
owned enterprise’s business decision may conflict with its employees’ interests are much higher 
than that of an SOE. As long as a trade union leader in a private enterprise still wants to maintain 
his/her monthly payment, naturally, he or she would have to follow the instruction of the boss, or 
at the very least, to avoid direct confrontation against him or her. Moreover, considering that a 
union working personnel’s own rights might be easily violated without adequate legal 
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protection374, it is hard to imagine that a union’s guardianship role can be well implemented by 
those union working personnel when their own rights and interests are jeopardized.  
 
A reasonable solution to this union working personnel dilemma could be divided into two steps. 
First step, it is better to give up the part-time union working personnel practice and only allow for 
full-time one. Once those professional union working personnel are solely subject to the grass 
root union without any direct connection with the enterprise, it is relatively easy for them to avoid 
the negative influence from the enterprise’s side whatever its ownership. Second step, as far as 
their salary is concerned, it shall be disengaged from the enterprise and only come from union 
member’s dues375. Through this practice, the union working personnel can be regarded as being 
employed by workers themselves rather than by the enterprises. Under such labor-employment 
relationship, a relatively independent union -- independent from employer’s control -- coupled 
with the working personnel system with more willingness and freedom to fight for the interests of 
its employers, viz. workers, could be established. Only when the Chinese labor legislation 
manages to secure the said two steps practice, a union leader as such might be able to have a free 
will to fight for the workers’ legitimate interests.  
 
3. Taking Grass Root Trade Union Leader’s Rights Seriously 
It is reported that when grass root union leaders are performing their duties in protecting workers’ 
legitimate interests, some of them have suffered revenge from their employers either through 
financial means, such as reducing salary, or demotion.376 Even worse, some of them are fired 
simply because they are discharging their duty -- performing a union leader’s guardianship 
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role.377 According to some union leaders, they have apprehension and worries on their own 
interests when discharging their union leaders’ duty. Therefore, although they have the will and 
intention to protect workers’ interests, they may not have the due courage and power.378  
 
Admittedly, the Chinese Trade Union Law does take situation as such into consideration. The law 
provides that union leaders shall not be arbitrarily transferred to other positions.379 If indeed 
necessary, the respective level union committee and higher level union’s approval beforehand 
must be obtained.380 In the case of dismissal of a union leader, union general assembly or its 
representative assembly shall be held to discuss such an issue.381 Only when all members of the 
general assembly or 50 percent of the representatives of the representative assembly approve, 
could the dismissal be valid. 382 Besides, those (mainly employers) making vindictive attacks by 
transferring union’s working personnel who are performing their duties in accordance with law 
from his/her positions without justification shall be ordered by the administrative department of 
labor to make correction and compensation if loss is thereby caused.383 Clearly, legal protection 
on a union leader’s interests is guaranteed to some extent via these well-intentioned provisions. 
However, if the legislation per se seems sound, when performing their duties, why union leaders 
nonetheless appear to be lacking of courage and having various concerns? The problems exist in 
the implementation and feasibility of the said provisions. 
 
The related legislation does prohibit arbitrary transfer union leaders to other positions; whilst it is 
not clear that in the case of an enterprise violating this provision, what liability might be imposed 




 During my interview in Shanghai in February 21 and 22 of year 2006, 10 union leaders there 
interviewed told the writer so. 
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 Trade Union Law of PRC, 2001, art. 51(1). 
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on the said enterprise, or any personal liability on those who are directly responsible for such 
violation. In other words, there is no driving force and “threatening power” for the said relatively 
soft legislation to create a “political will” to push enterprises and employers to show enough 
respect to the rights of a union leader. In the case of the occurrence of vindictive attacks to union 
leaders from employers, labor department’s administrative order to correct as the only safeguard 
appears far from enough to endow union working personnel with enough courage to perform their 
duty wholeheartedly. During the writer’s interview, several vice chairmen of some grass root 
trade unions admitted that they doubted whether an administrative order could bring about any 
changes when employers choose to ignore it.384 Unfortunately, the law fails to provide any 
further liability directly imposing on responsible personnel or the enterprises themselves when 
they choose to neglect an administrative order. 
 
Based on the discussion above, the writer hereby suggests that in order to arouse employers’ 
serious attention on the relevant labor legislation, in order to create their respect to a union 
leader’s rights, certain provisions in relation to personal liability shall be introduced into the 
Trade Union Law. For example, personal liability imposing on those who are directly responsible 
for the vindictive attacks to union leaders in the form of public apology or financial compensation 
to the victims can be incorporated into the legislation. As such, employers may have a second 
thought before they take any unjustified action against a union leader. 
 
D. Conclusion on Part 3.2 
In this part, the writer discusses the trade union monopoly phenomena in China from the 
perspective of ILO Convention No. 87. She questions the Chinese union’s “dual role” practice 
during the transitional period of the Chinese society. It is submitted that economic reform and the 
opening-up policy have brought about some fundamental changes in the Chinese society, among 
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which the Chinese workers have been proved to be demoted from their past master’s status all the 
way down to the bottom class and became a de facto vulnerable social group. Accordingly, a 
trade union’s role as workers’ guardianship turns out to be more critical to the welfare of the 
Chinese workers than ever before. Thus, the writer proposes two models in dealing with the 
problems faced by the current Chinese trade union system. The ideal model is to recognize the 
value of an independent trade union. The legality and the advantages of an independent trade 
union in the Chinese context are discussed thereafter. However, given the contemporary 
economic and political environment in China as well as the Chinese government’s serious 
apprehension on social stability, in spite of various advantages and legal justifications of an 
independent trade union illustrated in this thesis, the writer nevertheless observes that the chances 
for the Chinese government to implement this ideal model via legislation are rare. A realistic 
model is therefore proposed, with means such as direct democratic election, financial system 
reform in grass root trade unions and strengthening the legal protection on union leaders’ rights. 
Of course, the writer admits that this realistic model may not be able to solve all the problems 
faced by today’s Chinese trade union system because it is a relatively minor reform within the 
ACFTU system without touching some essential defects of ACFTU’s structure. For example, it is 
not able to completely disengage ACFTU from its “dual function” dilemma. Neither would it be 
easy for ACFTU to tackle its representative crisis through this bottom up approach. In the case of 
some private enterprises with no existence of trade unions inside their work places, this realistic 
model appears to be largely irrelevant.  
 
Indeed, only with limited amendment on certain provisions of the Chinese trade union law 
without the well establishment of ROL -- an ideology to which the Chinese government has made 
a serious commitment385-- in China, it is not easy to create enough driving force and respect from 
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the employer’s side to obey the relatively soft provisions under the Chinese Trade Union Law. 
However, it is believed that this milder yet doable model with chances to cause gradual 
improvement inside ACFTU might be the only positive comprise available at present.  
 
 
3.3 Right to Collective Bargaining in China 
A. General Legislation on Collective Bargaining in China 
It is observed that collective bargaining and social dialogue are “necessary elements for creating 
an environment that encourages innovation and higher productivity, attracts foreign direct 
investment and enables the society and economy to adjust to external shocks such as financial 
crises and natural disasters”.386 As widely admitted, the mechanism of collective bargaining in a 
market economy is the basic way for a trade union to fully develop its role as a protector as well 
as a representative of workers’ interests. Thus, the importance of a well-built collective 
bargaining system to the welfare of its working class inside transforming China is beyond doubt.  
 
There is no exact terminology as “collective bargaining” under the Chinese labor legislation. The 
nearest ideas are the “collective negotiation” (Jiti Xieshang) and “collective contract” (Jiti 
Hetong).387 In accordance with the Chinese Labor Law, the workers of an enterprise may sign a 
collective contract with the management on pay, working hours, rest and vacation, safety and 
health, insurance and welfare.388 Collective contracts are to be developed through collaboration 
between a labor union and management.389 In the absence of a trade union, it shall be signed by 
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representatives of the workers and the management.390 The recently passed Labor Contract Law 
re-emphasizes that after bargaining on an equal basis, employees and their employers may 
conclude a collective contract on matters such as labor compensation, working hours, rest, leave, 
working safety, hygiene, insurance and benefits etc.391 In addition, the “Regulation on Collective 
Contract of People’s Republic of China” (Jiti Hetong Guiding) established in December 5, 1995 
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security specifies every aspects of a collective contract, such 
as its negotiation procedure, its content, its approval, examination and the dispute settlement. Put 
concretely, according to the 1995 Regulation, the content of a collective contract can cover 
subjects including but not limited to wages, working hours, leave and holiday, insurance, working 
safety and sanitation, duration of the contract, amendment, dissolution and termination of the 
contract as well as responsibilities.392 After a collective contract is reached, in order to obtain its 
validity, it shall be submitted to an official labor administrative department for examination 
within seven days’ after it is executed by both parties.393 The criteria for an official approval are 
based on contents as follows: ① whether both parties of the contract are legitimate under the 
relevant laws and regulations; ② whether the collective contract is negotiated in light of the 
principles and procedures specified by the relevant laws and regulations, mainly the 1995 
Regulation; ③ whether the content of a contract conforms to the minimum labor standards laid 
down by relevant laws and regulations.394 According to the explanation of the Committee of 
Experts, a requirement of prior approval by government authorities before a collective agreement 
comes into effect, even if it is subjected to judicial review, is contrary to the spirit of voluntary 
collective bargaining; however, there is one exception to the prohibition as such, i.e., the official 
approval is based on the criteria such as whether the collective agreement has a procedural flaw 
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or whether it is consistent with the minimum standards provided by general domestic labor 
legislation.395 In this sense, the prior approval requirement provided by the 1995 Regulation is 
consistent with the principle of collective bargaining under the international core labor standards. 
Above and beyond this, the 1995 Regulation lays down general principles and specific provisions 
on dispute settlement relating to a collective contract as well. In terms of a dispute arising during 
the course of a collective negotiation, both parties can submit the dispute to a labor administrative 
department (Laodong Xingzheng Bumen) and such a department is under the obligation to make 
its decision regarding the disputed issue within 30 days.396 When the dispute is relatively 
complicated, the time limit of a dispute settlement as such could be extended to 45 days.397 
During the period of such dispute, the enterprise is prohibited from firing the workers’ 
representatives.398 If a dispute happens during the course of enforcement of a collective contract, 
the dispute settlement procedure shall follow the Rules on Handling Labor Disputes in 
Enterprises (Qiye Laodong Zhengyi Chuli Tiaoli).399 In conclusion, the Chinese labor law, prima 
facie, has recognized worker’s right to collective bargaining; its general provisions on collective 
bargaining is consistent with the requirements under the ILO Convention No. 98. 
 
However, there are something worthy to be mentioned here. The Chinese Labor Law only 
provides that the workers of an enterprise may (keyi) sign a collective contract with the 
management400 instead of recognizing the workers’ specific right to sign a collective contract. 
The recently passed Labor Contract Law adopts the same wording by stipulating that employees 
and their employers may conclude a collective contract.401 Thus, the explanation of the word 
“may” brings about some controversy and uncertainty. Could it mean that both workers and 
                                                 
395
 Supra 58, at 222 & 223. 
396




 Ibid., art. 36. 
399
 For more information, please see text below accompanying note from 1394 to 1403. 
400
 Supra 388. 
401
 Supra 391.  
96 
employers have the right to choose either to sign or not to sign a collective contract? Or, when 
employers are required to negotiate a collective contract, do they have an obligation to cooperate 
or have a right to refuse? Moreover, if the requirement to negotiate a collective contract is turned 
down by employers, will the workers or their unions have a right to sue the employers -- is there a 
cause of action? To date, the law has not provided a clear interpretation regarding issues as 
such.402  
 
B. The Efficacy of the Legislation with Regard to Collective Bargaining 
According to the data provided by the Department of Labor Relations and Wages and records 
from China’s Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s, the number of collective contracts signed 
and registered with the Ministry exceeded 240,000 by the end of 2000 and covered more than 60 
million workers which constitute only less than 10% of the Chinese labor force.403 In the end of 
year 2007, this figure has increased to about 50%,404 which is a substantial progress. However, 
the increment of the volume does not necessarily bring about the improvement of the quality of a 
collective contract. Indeed, it is always a problem. Reports show that most of the collective 
contracts are just like a document reiterating the working conditions as it is in an enterprise 
without substantial provisions with regard to the specific conditions of a certain enterprise.405 
                                                 
402
 As for this point of view, several Chinese scholars such as Chang Kai and Zhou Changzheng share the 
same view with the writer. For more information, please see Chang Kai, “WTO, Labor Standards and 
Labor Interests Safeguard” (WTO, Laogong Biaozhun Yu Laogong Quanyi Baozhang), Chinese Social 
Science (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue), the first issue of 2002; Zhou Changzheng, Study on Globalization and 
Chinese Labor Law (Quanqiuhua Yu Zhongguo Laodong Fazhi Wenti Yanjiu) (Nanjing China: Nanjing 
University Press, 2003), from 69 to 70].  
403
 Supra 68 at 238. For more information on Chinese labor force, see above text accompanying note 76 & 
77. 
404
 Worker Daily, China, May 26, 2007, online: 
http://www.labornews.com.cn/ldbzb/xwzx/ylpl/19283.shtml (date accessed: February 24, 2008). 
405
 Yu Yu Lan, “Strengthen the Capability of Collective Bargaining of Trade Union and Prepare For the 
Internationalized Labor Relations” (Jiaqiang Gonghui Jiti Tanpan Nengli, Yingdui Laodong Guanxi 
Guojihua Tiaozhan), Journal of Hangzhou Chinese Communist Party School (Zhonggong Hangzhou Shiwei 
Dangxiao Xuebao), the fifth issue of 2002; online: 
http://www.lm.gov.cn/gb/salary/2005-05/26/content_74710.htm> (date accessed: February 24, 2008). 
97 
Even worse, some so called collective contracts are just copies of some standard contracts 
embodying certain general clauses without maneuverability by workers.406 
 
Furthermore, it is observed that most of these agreements were products of an administrative 
process between ACFTU and the management rather than the real fruit of a process of collective 
bargaining.407 Among the fifty workers who are currently being employed or was employed by 
SOEs and were interviewed by the writer, thirty-five of them are not aware of the exact content of 
the collective contracts between their employers and unions, let alone being involved in the 
collective bargaining process.408 As such, it is better to name these so called collective contracts 
“notice, document or memo” instead of “collective contract” which shall be the product of a 
bargaining process between two different parties.  
 
C. Elements Critical to Improve the Efficacy of the Collective Bargaining System in China 
 
i. Independence of the Chinese Trade Union 
Lack of independence of a Chinese trade union might be the primary reason for the lack of 
efficacy of the Chinese collective bargaining system. As discussed above mainly in Section 3.2 
(B), it is doubtful whether a Chinese trade union is able to protect worker’s interests, or is just a 
semi-administrative agency under the control of the Chinese Communist Party. Even worse, in the 
case of the non-public sector, the trade unions are under the control of the private employers. It is 
reported that a large number of trade unions within non-state-owned enterprises are under the de 
facto control of the bosses or their associates.409 Ironically, some chairpersons of the trade unions 
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are relatives or even the wives of the owners.410 Therefore, it might be fair to conclude in this 
way: the trade union in China is a puppet either under government or private employers’ control 
without free will. It is common sense that a “collective bargaining” happens between two parties, 
i.e., workers and enterprises which are under the control of either government or private 
employers. Without independence, a trade union is not qualified to represent the interests of its 
workers; indeed, it is under the negative influence either from government or employers who are 
the very other party during the process of collective bargaining. In other words, a rhetorical 
“two-party bargaining” is just window dressing. Simply put, there is hardly any bargaining.  
 
As far as the independence issue of a trade union is concerned, the writer has provided her 
solutions above, viz. both the ideal model and the realistic model, to deal with the Chinese trade 
union’s independence conundrum in Section 3.2 (C) (ii) (b) and (c) . Of course, as the writer has 
commented in the conclusion part of section 3.2, although the realistic model has its shortcomings 
and may not be able to solve some inherent dilemma inside ACFTU, it nevertheless has its 
advantages though limited. As for the ideal model, it might be able to compensate the defects of 
the realistic model, hence, unites and guides workers inside each non-state-owned enterprise and 
therefore revitalizes the union movements in the non-public sector of China. 
 
ii. In the Absence of A Trade Union in The Work Place, Who Is Going to Represent The 
Workers to Negotiate A Collective Contract With Employers? 
                                                 
410
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In the absence of trade union in some enterprises, mainly non-state-owned enterprises411, the 
chance to reach an effective collective contract is very low. It is reported that more than 90 
percent of the non-state-owned enterprises fail to establish trade unions.412 Although the law has 
anticipated the situation as such, the feasibility of its provision is problematic. It provides that in 
the absence a trade union, a collective contract shall be signed by representatives of the workers 
and managers. 413  Generally speaking, the basic background of the labor relations in the 
non-public sector is that capital resources are scarce and the labor supply is much larger than 
demand. It is observed that the nationwide registered urban unemployment rate in China is with 
increasing trend. For more information on the registered urban unemployment rate in mainland 
China published by the relevant Chinese authority, please see table 3 below:  
  
 [(1) Figures of 2000 to 2005 are from source: online: <www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/166597.htm> 
(date accessed: June 14, 2006) ; (2) Figure of 2006 is from 
online :<www.china.org.cn/english/features/china/239631.htm> (date accessed: April 2, 2009);(3) Figure 
of 2007 is from online:<news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-09/24/content_10878117.htm> (date accessed: 
April 2, 2009); (4) Figure of 2008 is from “Public Concern Over Jobs, Pay Gap”, China Daily, December 
16, 2008)]. 
 
Yet these data have not covered the labor surplus accumulated in the rural economy under the 
Maoist development strategy,414 nor have it included the retrenched workers (Xiagang Gongren) 
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or university graduates who are still looking for jobs.415 If all of them are taken into account, the 
unemployment rate is expected to be 8 percent to 9 percent.416 As for the exact number, it is 
between a hundred million to two hundred million.417 A report on China's labor and social 
security also shows that there are 13 million unemployed and laid-off urban workers nowadays, 
and a large number of surplus laborers from rural area need to find jobs in cities.418 Indeed, the 
reserved army of migrant rural workers coupled with the massive layoff caused by the close down 
of numerous small and medium sized enterprises located at the southern part of China due to the 
current financial crisis had created a total buyer’s market for labor.419 In other words, bosses can 
afford to be cavalier about wages, working conditions and safety standards.420 As such,  when 
there is no trade union’s involvement, the writer is wondering whether these poorly organized 
workers dare to or are willing to elect their representatives to negotiate with employers given that 
lots of desperate jobless are in the waiting list to replace them anytime and anywhere. Moreover, 
the candidate of a representative is another problem. Who is willing to take the risk of being fired 
to negotiate with the employers?  
 




 Ibid. In fact, these data are mainly from government statistic which is believed to be conservative. 
According to some statistic from other sources, the unemployment rate is far more beyond that. For 
example, US Central Intelligence Agency, by the end of 2004, the unemployment rate of China is 9.8 
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August 4, 2005)]; During an interview, a professor from Beijing University Jiao Zhuoji, member of China’s 
National Consultative Conference, claimed that the real unemployment rate in Chinese urban areas is 
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to be 0.1 billion.[Online: <http://www.zaobao.com/special/npc/pages2/npc080302b.html> (date accessed: 
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How to deal with a “no trade union phenomenon” as such? A simple and effective solution will 
be the abovementioned ideal model -- independent union system, i.e., when workers in 
non-public sector are attracted to join an independent union due to its effective guardianship 
function, through the work of an independent union representative, who is also a professional 
union staff without any interest or connection with the employer’s side, an effective collective 
contract with more chances to protect worker’s interests is expected to come into being. 
 
However, the ideal model is nevertheless ideal. Its feasibility might be hindered by CCP’s 
sensitive and cautious ruling policy. Thus, a backup plan is proposed with more feasibility and 
less revolutionary ideas.  
 
Admittedly, in general terms, the Chinese Trade Union Law has expressed its supportive attitude 
towards the establishment of trade unions in non-public sector. It is stipulated that all laborers 
doing physical or mental work in enterprises, public institutions and government organs within 
the Chinese territory who earn their living primarily from wages shall have the right to join and 
form trade union organizations regardless of their nationalities, races, sexes, occupations, 
religious beliefs or education status and this right is immune from any organizational or 
individual interference.421 In the Chinese Temporary Rules on Private Enterprises (Siying Qiye 
Zanxing Tiaoli), it reemphasizes that workers in private enterprises have the right to organize 
trade unions.422 It is therefore clear that the problem of the low establishment rate of trade unions 
in non-public sector is not caused by legislation but by the unfeasibility and poor implementation 
of the law.  
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Specifically put, the model law “Temporary Rule on the Work of Grass Root Trade Union 
Election” promulgated by the ACFTU 423  has not taken the special circumstances of the 
non-public sector into consideration. It assumes that the process of establishing a union in a 
private enterprise shall be the same as in an SOE, despite that the circumstances for establishing a 
trade union in an SOE and in a private enterprise is indeed very different.424 Comparing with the 
situation in SOEs, the workers in non-public sector may appear to be seasonal and most of them 
may fail to sign formal labor-employment contracts with their employers. Hence, one of the 
features of the union members in non-state-owned enterprises is its instability, which will create 
more practical difficulties in establishing a union in the private sector than in an SOE. Besides, in 
the case of the election of a union leader in an enterprise no matter private or public, according to 
the Temporary Rule on the Work of Grass Root Trade Union Election, its very first step is the 
name list recommendation procedure to be approved by CCP committee in every work place.425 
Unfortunately, very few enterprises of non-public sector have CCP committees inside its work 
place because most workers there are not CCP members. As such, it is fair to say that the election 
procedure lacks its maneuverability from the very beginning, let alone its further procedure. In 
order to fundamentally solve the problem as such, a specific model law promulgated by the 
ACFTU solely targeting the trade union in private sector and especially designed in accordance 
with its features (in particular its differences from the union of an SOE), covering every aspect of 
a trade union’s healthy development in the private sector -- from its establishment and operation 
to its member’s and leader’s rights and obligations etc.-- is expected to be enacted.  
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In addition, as argued above, the bargaining power between the workers in non-public sector and 
employers are very unbalanced.426 As such, government’s active interference to guarantee the 
implementation of the right to organize in a non-public enterprise is valuable. The writer hereby 
proposes a “simultaneous approach” (non-public enterprise and its union shall be established at 
the same time) to borrow the government’s power to assist the establishment of a trade union in a 
private enterprise. Put specifically, when a non-public enterprise is applying a business licence, 
the related government authority shall require it to prepare for the establishment of a trade union 
inside its work place within a reasonable period after its establishment. If this requirement can not 
be met during the required period, its business licence might be suspended. Through this 
relatively compulsory method, the union establishment rate in non-public sector is expected to 
increase in the foreseeable future. To the already established non-state-owned enterprises, the 
governmental authority in charge of its registration can also link its renewal of licence with its 
union establishment status.427  
 
 
iii. Right To Strike -- A Necessary “Evil” in Today’s China 
 
a. Value of Right to Strike On Collective Bargaining 
Right to strike is critical to the success of a collective contract. Although right to collective 
bargaining does not automatically entail the right to strike, its efficacy nevertheless will be 
seriously impaired without a strike weapon as such. Under the market economy, one of the 
critical reasons for workers and employers to reach a final collective agreement is that both sides 
have their trumps, i.e., employers can close the factory and workers can go to strike (a last resort, 
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“whose use could be readily justified by good workers against bad employers in defense of 
established rights, or in furtherance of claims expressing minimum needs”).428 The competition 
of these two resorts guarantees the bargaining power of both sides. As far as right to strike is 
concerned, its existence compensates the comparative disadvantages on the worker’s side and 
adjusts the unbalanced bargaining power. As stated in the Committee of Experts’ 1973 General 
Survey, “a general prohibition of strikes constitutes a considerable restriction of the opportunities 
opened to trade unions for furthering and defending the interest of their members”429. Thus, it is 
fair to regard the right to strike as a necessary precondition of a successful collective bargaining 
system. Indeed, the CFA of the ILO “has always recognized the right to strike by workers and 
their organizations as a legitimate means of defending their economic and social interests”.430 
 
If a collective bargaining process is to be carried out in a relatively fair and equal way, right to 
strike, as closely associated with democratic ideas of freedom, is the necessary and desirable 
counterpart against the combination of power on the employers’ side. As most labor rights 
lawyers observed, a general prohibition on the right to strike has a severe negative impact on the 
“essential means” available for workers to defend their interests and rights.431 An absolute ban on 
right to strike is tantamount to authorizing a police to shoot the murderer without giving him a 
gun. Legislative protection on the collective bargaining system without a guarantee on right to 
strike is no more than an empty promise. 
 
b. Is There A Right To Strike in China? 
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Although neither the Chinese Constitution nor the Chinese Labor law explicitly entitles workers 
the right to strike, it might be inaccurate to reach any rush conclusion on whether workers in 
China have or have no right to strike before a thorough study on the relevant legislation.432 To 
have a better understanding on this issue, a historical review on the Chinese legislative attitude 
towards right to strike appears to be necessary.  
 
1.  Four Constitutions and Right to Strike  
 
Back to the history before the establishment of PRC, especially the period of the first forty years 
of twentieth century, saw massive waves of strikes organized by CCP shaking the then Kuo Ming 
Tang (KMT) authority. For example, during the year 1925 only, there were 318 strikes in the 
whole nation. And in 198 cases where figures were reported, 784,821 workers were involved, and 
the average duration of a strike was about 19 days.433 However, this tradition, once recognized 
and actively supported by CCP, seems to lose its charm after CCP came into power. 
 
From the establishment of the socialist China by CCP till today, the Chinese government has 
enacted four Constitutions. Passed by First National People’s Congress on September 20, 1954, 
the first Constitution granted People the freedom of speech, correspondence, press assembly, 
association, procession, demonstration and religion without a single word referring to the right to 
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strike.434 Considering the social and economic background at that time, i.e., China had just 
experienced eight years Sino-Japanese War and four years Civil War, and faced serious inflation 
and unemployment, it is understandable for the government to exclude the right to strike from its 
first Constitution for the sake of economic recovery as well as social and political stability. This 
Constitution, confirming the tasks of the state during the transitional period (from capitalism to 
socialism) and establishing the people’s congress system, was later highly appraised not only for 
the direction towards which it led the nation, but also for its democratic drafting process.435 
 
The second Constitution namely the 1975 Constitution emerged during the ten years’ national 
disaster -- Cultural Revolution436. Its article No. 28 explicitly provides that “citizens... enjoy the 
freedom to strike”. However, because of its special background -- unprecedented period of 
political disaster, the Chinese official comments on this Constitution is that it was negatively 
influenced by the leftist thoughts437 and was a big step back from the 1954 Constitution.438 
Although it played a relatively slight role in the Chinese constitutional history, it was nevertheless 
the first Constitution in the socialist China that granted the right to strike to the Chinese working 
class.  
 
Three years after the end of Cultural Revolution (the “Gang of Four”439 was removed from the 
political arena), the 1978 Constitution came into being with the purposes of bringing the state 
back to its normal status.440 Its number of articles has been doubled from 30 to 60 vis-à-vis that 
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of 1975 Constitution.441 The court and the procuratorate systems, which were minimized or 
dumped altogether in the 1975 Constitution, were restored to a certain degree.442 Furthermore, 
citizens’ rights were reinstated with its article 45 being read as follows: 
 
“Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, 
demonstration and the freedom of strike, and have the right to speak out freely, air their views 
fully, hold debates and write big-character posters.”443  
 
Unfortunately, this constitution still had the scar from the Cultural Revolution that had just ended 
with the revolutionary language’s persisting, especially an insistence on class struggle.444 Indeed, 
1978 constitution can be understood as a product of compromise -- not entirely abolishing 
Chairman Mao Zedong’s thoughts and partly reflecting his successor Hua Guofeng and Deng 
Xiaoping’s political ideas of modernization and rapid economic development.  
 
To date, the 1982 Constitution is the longest one within the socialist China’s history, with a 
preamble and four chapters -- including 138 articles. 445  This Constitution purposefully 
deemphasizes the idea of class struggle, places priority on economic development and recognizes 
the values and contributions and interests of non-party groups towards China’s modernization.446 
Actually, it erases almost all the rhetoric associated with the Cultural Revolution included in 1978 
version.447 As for the rights of citizens, its article 35 states that “citizens of the PRC enjoy 
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of 
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demonstration.”448 Compared with 1978 version, the so called “four big rights”-- to speak out 
freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters, together with the right 
to strike, are missing.449  Despite the removal of various rights in the 1982 version, the 
constitution is nevertheless praised by the Chinese official as the best one, which not only takes 
into consideration of the social and economic circumstances back then but the future development 
of China as well.450  
 
2. Why Right To Strike Is Finally Removed From The 1982 Constitution? 
Before starting my analysis on this section, it is worthy to be highlighted here that indeed 
countries, such as France, Italy, Spain, Japan and South Korea have either explicitly or implicitly 
provided for constitutional protection for the right to strike.451 
 
(1) Mis-linking Right To Strike to Revolutionary Idea 
Due to China’s special history, right to strike is traditionally classified by the Chinese socialist 
government as a pure political right. As mentioned above, before CCP came into power, the 
Chinese workers had a good tradition in practising their rights to strike.452 Admittedly, during 
those revolutionary days, such strikes were carried out for more political reasons (fighting against 
KMT’s authoritative regime and Japanese invasion) than for economic needs. Naturally, after the 
new China was established, CCP is likely to understand this right in its political sense -- linking it 
with revolution, and therefore regards it as a potential threat to its sovereignty -- worrying about 
the replaying of the history. As such, CCP fails to understand the essence of the right to strike 
which is for workers to use strike as a means to reach their economic goals during peaceful era. 
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 Liu Ronggang, “Peng Zhen and The Enactment of 1982 Constitution” (Peng Zhen Yu 1982 Nian Xianfa 
De Zhiding), online: <http://www.rdyj.com.cn/2004/rdqk-9-12.html> (date accessed: August 15, 2005).  
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In addition, the inclusion of the right to strike into ICESCR453 rather than into ICCPR has served 
as direct and hard evidence that this right has been internationally recognized as belonging to 
social and economic rights instead of a pure political right. 
 
This is especially right when taking into consideration the features of strikes happening in today’s 
China. Some Chinese scholars have concluded the major reasons for strikes happening in 
contemporary China as follows:454  
 
1. Lack of safety and industrial accidents happen frequently without appropriate compensation;  
2. Wage arrears;  
3. Unduly prolonged working hours;  
4. Sweatshop-like working conditions and unfair payment, especially for female workers and 
child laborers;  
5. Through illegal fine or deposit system, employers have actually stolen worker’s money under a 
disguise.455  
6. Ill-regulated Privatization Process -- corrupted SOEs managers sell the factories together with 
its facilities to foreigners or other private owners without taking into consideration any workers’ 
basic legitimate interests. 
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 ICESCR, art. 8(1)(d). 
454
 Please see generally in Su Miaohan, Yao Hongmin & Zhen Lei, “Recognition and Regulation on Right 
to Strike in China”(Dui Bagongquan De Falü Queren), online: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=2092; Liu Yajun & Zhang Li, “Finding The Long Lost 
Right to Strike” (Xunzhao Shiluo De Bagongquan), online: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=4010 (date accessed: July 12, 2005). 
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 For example, during my research in Guang Dong province, I found that several joint ventures there 
would require their newly employed workers to submit certain amount of money from RMB 100 Yuan to 
500Yuan as so called “deposit”, and only when the workers have fulfilled their employment contract, 
would the money be returned.  It is not clear what is the real purpose of these money and the employers 
simply refused to talk about it.  
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This list might not be complete, but there is one thing that is clear -- the reasons for strikes in 
today’s China have nothing to do with political purposes.456 In other words, the political strike 
once prosperous in the Chinese history no long exists, whilst its twin brother -- economic strike 
comes into stage. To ask for a decent salary or a safer and better working condition is always the 
theme. Sometimes, in order to avoid government’s suspicion, some strikers have demonstrated 
their slogans as follows: “we are not here for the purpose of turmoil, we just want a job and our 
salary back”, “we are supporting CCP’s leadership and its four basic principles457” etc.458  
 
Besides, it is not difficult to find out that only when the basic conditions for living have become 
seriously unsecured and no other peaceful solutions available, will workers in China choose strike 
as a means to express their dissatisfaction. Based on the writer’s field study, most of the Chinese 
workers interviewed tended to consider strike as a last resort to expressing their dissatisfaction on 
economic predicament. 459  Different from the circumstances in some developed countries, 
represented by France, where strikes are as common as daily meals and used by those who have 
already been well-off and wish to be better off460, almost all the strikes happened in today’s China 
are simply because most of the participants have felt either their working or living conditions are 
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 Four basic principles in China refer to “the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, 
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111 
beyond forbearance.461 In sum, CCP’s concern that strikes launched by the Chinese workers 
would endanger its ruling seems to be groundless.  
 
(2) Misunderstanding the Nature of Right to Strike: Regarding It As A method For Class 
Struggle Only Belonging to The Capitalist World 
Some Chinese scholars and CCP leaders are inclined to link the phenomena of strike to the 
capitalist world, i.e., strike is a mirror reflecting the labor-employment relationship inside the 
capitalist world and it is also a method used for class struggle which is believed to be the 
principle contradiction that exists in the capitalist states;462 whilst in socialist states, for example 
in China, there are no fundamental conflicts between workers and employers (in theory, most 
enterprises in socialist states are owned by the states who are under the people's democratic 
dictatorship led by the working class)463 As such, class struggle is by no means the principle 
contradiction in today’s China.464 For that matter, in China, the interests of the workers and the 
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 The only exception to economic strike arguably existing is what happened in 1989 political turmoil -- a 
student led demonstration. The demonstrators, mainly students later followed by a number of people from 
all walks of life believed the CCP government was too corrupt and economic reform had gone too far 
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 Constitution of PRC, art. 1.  
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interests of the state, which are dependent on SOEs performance, are generally consistent. 
Accordingly, if workers are entitled to the right to strike, the suspension of production in a work 
place as a logical consequence of every strike will not only bring about disadvantageous to the 
enterprise, but indirectly harm the state’s interests as well, which are consistent with the workers’ 
interests in theory.465 In this sense, it seems that it is better for the labor employment disputes 
happening in China to be resolved via peaceful methods such as mediation, negotiation, 
arbitration or lawsuit etc.  
 
This argument might be correct in theory, however, it is no longer applicable to the contemporary 
China who has transformed from a socialist state in Marxist sense into a socialist state that 
embraces capitalism. As is mentioned above466, the Chinese working class has lost its status as a 
leading class, but all the way down to become a vulnerable group – surviving at the bottom of the 
current Chinese society. Moreover, in terms of the number of participants, duration and scale of 
the economic strikes in today’s China, they are increasing day by day. Therefore, it is time for the 
CCP leaders and the Chinese scholars to envisage realities and reevaluate the nature as well as 
value of the right to strike in China.  
 
3. De Facto Statutory Attitude towards Right to Strike in China -- Unsupportive Attitude 
Based on the above discussion, it is not difficult to reach a conclusion that the right to strike is not 
a constitutional right in China. Indeed, the current Chinese Constitution has adopted a “no support, 
no direct prohibition” approach towards strikes in China. As for the other statutory attitude 
towards this right, it is going to be discussed in this part of the thesis.  
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 For more information, please see Wu Jie, “Discussion on the Political Rights and Freedom of Chinese 
Citizen” (Luelun Woguo Gongmin De Zhengzhi Quanli He Ziyou) in Luo Yaopei, ed., Thesis Collection on 
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(1) The Chinese Labor Law and Right to Strike 
Within its 13 chapters, the Chinese Labor Law spends a whole chapter467 discussing the issue of 
labor disputes. Consultation, mediation, arbitration and court trial are all the legitimate dispute 
settlement mechanisms available468among which consultation, mediation is optional and the 
process of labor arbitration is the precondition for court trial.469 As for the detailed rules of these 
mechanisms, some relevant implementation rules such as “Organization Rules on Labor Disputes 
Arbitration Committee 1993” (Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Guize), “Rules on 
the Organization and Working of Labor Dispute Mediation Committee in Enterprises 1993” (Qiye 
Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Ji Gongzuo Guize) and the like are promulgated to 
serve as complementary provisions.  
 
Despite various dispute settlement mechanisms available in the Chinese labor legislation, the 
right to strike is found nowhere. In addition, in the “Rules on Handling Labor Disputes in 
Enterprises” (Qiye Laodong Zhengyi Chuli Tiaoli), it provides that during the process of labor 
dispute settlement, the parties involved are prohibited in any extremist activities that could 
worsen the contradiction. 470  As to the meaning of the “extremist activities”, no further 
interpretation is provided in this rule. Indeed, even if this so called “extremist activities” is not 
expressly linked to strike, it is believed to refer to strike implicitly since strike is widely 
recognized by the Chinese official as a means reflecting revolutionary ideas and a cause of social 
and political instability. The writer hereby argues that the right to strike is at least not supported 
by the Chinese labor legislation; consequently, there is no legislative protection available for 
strikers. In other words, once the strikers cause certain material losses in their work places or 
                                                 
467
 Labor Law of PRC, chapter 10. 
468
 Ibid. art.77. 
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 Ibid. art.84. 
470
 Rules on Handling Labor Disputes in Enterprises of PRC, 1993, art.6 (2).  
114 
other places during the course of their strikes, they have no chance to enjoy either impunity of 
civil or criminal liability which might be available otherwise if there is a strike clause. 
 
(2) Criminal Law and Right to Strike 
Quickly go through the Chinese Criminal Code and its six amendments, there is no crime directly 
related to strike. Based on the principle of “a legally prescribed punishment for a specified crime” 
which is widely accepted by the Chinese academe,471 strike is not criminalized in China. Besides, 
there is no report from the Chinese official sources relating to the issue of criminalizing a worker 
due to its attending or organizing strikes. However, from some oversea sources, a small amount 
of leaders, organizers and other active participants in strikes are sentenced under the criminal 
charges of “intentional destruction of property” or other relevant crimes.472 Certain NGOs even 
offer a name list of those detained labor rights activists together with their brief experiences and 
the reasons for their imprisonment.473 It shall be noted that in most cases, the reasons for them to 
be sentenced to jail are not directly linked with their behavior of organizing or attending a strike, 
but because of the destruction of property or public order during the course of a strike, which has 
a chance to get certain immunity from civil or criminal responsibility if there were strike 
legislation in China.474 In this sense, it might be arguably right to comment that in practice the 
Chinese authority adopts a de facto antagonistic policy against strikes in China, even if they are 
purely economically driven. 
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c. Rethinking the Value of Right to Strike and How to Appropriately Regulate This Right in 
the Context of the Contemporary Chinese Society 
 
1. Rethinking the Significance of Right to Strike in Today’s China 
First, as mentioned several times in the text above, China has transformed from a 
centrally-planned economy towards a market one, with official recognition of this transform via 
its 1993 constitutional amendment.475 Based on this dramatic political and social change, the 
once prosperous public ownership labor relationship -- state and workers are the two parties -- 
have been substituted by labor relations colored by capitalism.  
 
In today’s China, the rising of its non-public sector -- privately owned, foreign-invested as well as 
collectively owned enterprises -- shall be not underestimated at all. With the development of this 
non-state force, the labor relations start to become complicated. The workers’ interests are to 
increase wages, enhance the safety standards and be covered by social insurance, whilst their 
employers are focusing more on cutting costs as much as possible and increasing the profits 
eventually. Obviously, this inborn structural antagonism of interests will lead to more labor 
employment tension than ever before in the socialist Chinese history.  
 
Secondly, even in the case of SOEs nowadays, it is different from the former central planning era 
where SOEs had very little freedom on their enterprises’ running and management. During those 
days, SOEs’ total production amount was decided by government in advance and almost all of 
their profits would have to be turned in to the state to be redistributed. 476 Under the rigid 
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governmental control as such, wages, working conditions and profit distribution, sales, technical 
reform and research and development on new products had already been pre-decided so that there 
was almost no necessity of a collective bargaining.477 On the contrary, in today’s China, rather 
than strictly following governmental directives, SOEs are granted more freedom for them to make 
decisions on their own production, sales, and management as well as candidates of employee. In 
addition, instead of handing over the state all of their profits, SOEs are required to pay certain 
amount of tax to the state and entitled to keep the rest under their discretion.478 Under such 
circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the SOEs want to get more profits just as those 
non-state-owned enterprises do. As such, a contradiction of interests between SOEs and their 
employees appears to be inevitable, although not as dramatic as in the non-public sector. 
 
Moreover, as the writer has mentioned above, the labor contract system with the potential to 
contracting away workers’ master’s role in an SOE has already substituted the traditional “iron 
rice bowl” policy.479 In short, the Chinese working class has much less job security than it used 
to have. 
 
As such, the rise of private economy, the freedom granted to SOEs together with the labor 
contract system have transformed the Chinese working class into a relatively vulnerable group 
with their interests conflicting with both non-state-owned enterprises and SOEs. How to ease the 
tension as such and balance such disproportionate bargaining power between the Chinese workers 
and their employers? It is high time for the Chinese authority to enact certain special legal 
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protection on the Chinese working class’ right to strike so that the disadvantageous can have a 
legal weapon to help themselves.  
 
2. How to Regulate Right to Strike in the Context of the Contemporary Chinese Society 
The purpose of this section is to propose certain legislative suggestions with feasibility on right to 
strike, which not only taking into consideration the other countries’ relevant legislation,480 but 
adapted to the current Chinese context as well.  
 
(1) Legal Foundation for Right to Strike in China  
Under the ICESCR, article 8(1)(d) requires its member states to ensure “the right to strike, 
provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country”481. Considering 
that China has officially signed and ratified this convention without reservation on this particular 
clause, based on the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda, China is under the obligation to grant the 
right to strike to its working class.  
 
(2) Several Steps to Regulate Right to Strike in China482 
 
The first step is about the definition of a strike in China. What is a strike? Different legislation 
from different countries may offer slightly different answers483; however, the core is generally the 
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 In this section, in order to propose a strike legislation adapted to the Chinese context, the writer refers to 
a number of countries’ legislative experiences, including but not limited to UK, US, Canada, New Zealand, 
Ireland, Argentina, Japan, Swiss, Finland, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. 
481
 ICESCR, article 8 (1)(d).  
482
 This part is based on the writer’s research on several industrial countries’ strike legislation, including 
UK, US, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Australia, Ankara, Germany, Argentina, Swiss, Finland and several 
continental European countries.  
483
 It is noted that there is no legislative protection on right to strike and a worker who engage in a strike 
may expose him/herself to great legal liability in UK. “Besides, the law allows an employer to operate 
during a strike by replacing strikers and offering them permanent status. At the conclusion of the strike the 
employer need not reinstate striking workers if no vacancies exist because replacements occupy the strikes’ 
positions. However, the requirement that the British employer dismiss all strikers, or reinstate or reengage 
all strikers to avoid employee claims of unfair dismissal poses a significant restraint on the British 
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same, i.e., a strike is a collective withholding of labor services by workers who are unsatisfied 
with the payment, working condition, benefits package and the like offered by employers.484 
 
The second step is to confine the right to strike. As the supervisory bodies of ILO observe, right 
to strike is not an absolute right.485 It is important to note that despite its importance towards 
worker’ rights, a strike may reduce an enterprise’ productivity, therefore negatively influence its 
taxation turned in to the government indirectly. As such, nobody would argue against the idea 
that to some extent, a strike has its side effects. Moreover, based on the writer’s studies on the 
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strike legislation of several countries including but not limited to New Zealand, UK, US, Canada, 
Japan and Argentina, to date, there is no legislative protection on an absolute right to strike.486 
Therefore, to confine this right appears to be necessary. 
 
The details are as follows: 
 
First, the purpose of a lawful strike shall be purely economically driven. In other words, political 
strikes (they are likely to be linked with dramatic political movements and revolutions and their 
purposes are not “directed against the employers but against State government, to induce it to 
give to the workers more political rights, or to dissuade it from obnoxious acts”)487 and other 
non-economically motivated strikes, such as “solidarity strike”488 and “sympathy strike” shall be 
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completely banned in order to maintain social stability and protect public interests in China. In 
fact, most strike legislation promulgated by the developing countries and quite a few strike 
legislation of the developed world have explicitly or implicitly prohibited the non-economically 
motivated strike. According to the Committee of Experts’ 1983 report, “in many countries 
political strikes are explicitly or tacitly recognized as unlawful”.489 Below are a few legislative 
examples:490 ① in the Collective Labor Agreement, Strike and Lock-out Act of Ankara, “a 
strike called for political purposes … shall be unlawful”;491 ② in the Workplace Relations Act 
(1996) of Australia, it provides that “only strikes in enterprise bargaining at a single business 
have protections against statutory and common law penalties”;492 ③ according to the German 
strike law, a political strike is completely prohibited.493  Even the ILO’s attitude towards 
politically motivated strike is negative. The CFA clarifies that “a prohibition of strikes is not an 
infringement of the freedom of association if the reasons are as follows: ①  their 
non-occupational character; ② they are designed to coerce a government with respect to a 
political matter; or ③  they are directed against the government’s policy and are not in 
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furtherance of a labor dispute”.494 “The term ‘political strike’ is the term associated with 
illegality and disapprobation [and] the reason is that ‘the political strikes’ are viewed as disruptive 
of democratic processes”.495 Based on the circumstances in today’s China, especially CCP’s 
emphasis on social stability, it is believed that to follow those legislative models is rational. 
 
Second, the participants of a strike shall be confined to those workers either under the labor 
contract or those employees although not covered by a labor contract but has established a de 
facto labor employment relationship with employers. As for the civil servants and those employed 
by certain essential services -- “services whose interruption would endanger life, personal safety 
or health of the whole or part of the population”496, such as hospital sector, furnishing of water 
and electricity, and the telephone service and air traffic controllers,497 shall be prohibited from 
enjoying this right.498 Under common law, it is well-known that there is a traditional ban on 
public employees’ strikes which is justified by the principle argument referred to as “sovereignty 
argument”, i.e., a strike by public employees constitutes a denial of governmental authority and 
would contravene common good.499 Of course, the writer has observed that this traditional 
blanket ban on public employee strikes has changed to some extent in the case of County 
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Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Association, Local 660, where the 
California Supreme Court concluded that the threat posed to the public by public employees’ 
strikes has not provided enough justification to warrant a blanket prohibition of public employee 
strikes, thereby granting public employees a limited right to strike under certain circumstances.500 
Despite this change, the writer nevertheless suggests that under the current circumstances of 
China -- ① social stability and a healthy and safe community are critical to China’s current 
economic development and its peaceful rise, ② chances for public employee to strike are rare 
since almost all of them enjoy relatively good salary, safe working conditions and well-designed 
social security system, a blanket ban on strikes of public employees is necessary, reasonable and 
tallies with China’s contemporary national condition. Therefore, to critically borrow common 
law’s experience without taking into consideration certain unsuitable changes is strongly 
recommended in this thesis. 
 
Third, the timing of strike shall be limited. For example, according to the National Labor 
Relations Act of America, “a strike that violates a no-strike provision of a contract is not 
protected by the Act, and the striking employees can be discharged or otherwise disciplined, 
unless the strike is called to protest certain kinds of unfair labor practices committed by the 
employer.”501 By the same token, in the case of China, if a collective contract is reached through 
collective bargaining and a no-strike clause is included, during the period of the contract, right to 
strike shall be prohibited accordingly. Of course, if the conditions of the contract are seriously 
violated by the employer, a right to strike is hereby justified based on the principle of fairness. 
Moreover, a work stoppage whose sole purpose is to avoid abnormally dangerous conditions 




 “Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)”, online: 
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cannot be the basis for an unfair labor practice charge even there is a peace clause included in the 
collective agreement.502  Besides, during the period of national emergency such as natural 
calamity, wartime, serious conflict and insurrection where the normal conditions for the 
functioning of the society are absent, right to strike shall be suspended for a limited period and to 
the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation for the sake of public interests and 
national security.503  
 
Fourth, strikers’ behavior shall also be well confined within peaceful action. In the course of a 
strike, workers who engage into serious misconduct, such as “physically blocking persons from 
entering or leaving a struck plant”504, “threatening violence against non-striking employees”505 
and intentional “attacking management representatives”506, may lead to the unlawfulness of the 
strike and shall be expressly prohibited by the future Chinese strike legislation. Logically, if a 
striker’s misconduct constitutes a criminal offence, the Chinese penal code could be enforced 
against the striker.507 Also, an employer shall be allowed to sue based on the cause of action of 
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an illegal strike and the damages caused by it, so that the illegal strike as such can be stopped and 
the normal production will not be impacted seriously.508 
 
Fifth, certain restrictions on the procedure of a strike might be important. Under Canadian case 
law, the only lawful strikes are timely ones -- “they follow exhaustion of compulsory dispute 
resolution procedures such as conciliation, mediation, dispute inquiries”.509 Also under the case 
law of Swiss as well as the strike legislation of Argentina, a strike is only admissible after 
conciliation has failed.510 According to these legislative experiences, it is suggested that in the 
case of collective labor disputes, the Chinese strike legislation can provide that during the process 
of negotiation, mediation, arbitration or trial, strikes shall be prohibited.511 Only when these 
means are not able to solve the problem, could strikes be allowed as a last resort. Moreover, in 
order to organize a strike well so that it represents the idea of the majority, a ballot system might 
be introduced so that only when the majority of workers in an enterprise are agreeable to launch a 
strike, could a strike be legally initiated. In fact, this practice is well regulated under the Trade 
Union Law of Japan, Canadian legislation as well as British law on strike. For instance, according 
to Trade Union Law of Japan, union members shall hold a secret balloting before a strike is 
allowed.512 In the context of Canadian legislation, a “majority principle” is provided so that only 
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when the majority of the bargaining units vote in favor of a strike could a strike be legally 
launched.513 In the case of British legislation, the immunity of unions and individual strike 
organizers could only be granted when a majority of union members have approved such an 
industrial action in a properly held ballot in secret.514 Of course, in order to be fair to both sides 
and also for the sake of reducing the unnecessary side effects of a strike, an advance notice of a 
strike from the employee’s side to the employers might be introduced into the future Chinese 
strike legislation.515 As the CFA suggests, the future Chinese strike legislation could incorporate 
some procedural requirements before a union is able to declare a strike, such as the exhaustion of 
conciliation or mediation procedure and a cooling off period etc.516 
 
Sixth, since workers are entitled to the freedom to launch a strike, they shall be entitled to have 
the same freedom to opt not to attend a strike. “Thus, it is an unfair labor practice for a union [or 
other striking workers] to coerce or attempt to coerce a worker into joining a strike.”517  
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The third step is to provide a lawful strike with certain legal protection. Admittedly, in spite of 
its values, strike is nevertheless a destructive power to the production of an enterprise. Therefore, 
it is better to entitle strikers engaged in a lawful strike to certain legislative immunity during the 
course of a lawful strike so that certain unavoidable consequences of a lawful strike can be 
immune from any civil, administrative or criminal liability. As the ILO supervisory bodies 
observes, “arrests and dismissals of strikers on a large scale involve serious risks of abuse, and 
place freedom of association in grade jeopardy; and generally, the authorities should not have 
recourse to imprisonment for the mere fact of organizing or participating in a peaceful strike”.518 
 
Besides, after a lawful strike, strikers shall be allowed to return to its former working positions 
and to get the same salary and treatment as before. According to the American experience, a 
striker who returns to work shall be treated as a returning worker -- returning from eligible leave, 
which implies that there shall be no change in the striker’s tenure or seniority status;519 otherwise, 
right to strike would be under certain potential threat from the employee’s side once the employer 
hires a permanent replacement and refuses to reinstate the striker at the end of a strike.520 This 
legislative protection is especially important under the Chinese context. Based on Professor 
Atleson’s theory, to allow employer to hire permanent replacement during the course of a strike 
has its most devastating impact on those employees in the weakest bargaining position, where 
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“the union is relatively weak, the community is not pro-union, the strikers are unskilled, and the 
supply of unemployed persons in the labor market is high”, which unfortunately is the exact 
picture of today’s China.521 Of course, in order to reach a balance, employer shall have the right 
to adopt certain countermeasures such as to employ temporary replacement to keep its business 
operating, lockout522 -- right to close the employer’s place of business during the course of a 
strike, so that its losses could be decreased to the minimum level. Following the American 
experience, in terms of employer’s right to employ a replacement, once the strike in question is to 
protest against a substantial employer’s unfair labor practice and the employer is proved guilty of 
the said unfair labor practice, at the end of the strike, the striking worker shall be entitled to have 
his job back even if he is replaced by another worker during the strike.523 In terms of the “right to 
close”, it needs certain limitations and qualifications to avoid abuses of this right too. For 
example, through a series of cases, such as the case of Fiberboards Paper Products Corp. v. 
NLRB, Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. and NLRB v. William J. Burns 
International Detective Agency, Inc. etc., the US appellate courts decided that when an employer 
was making a “closing enterprise” decision, as long as management reasons for such a decision 
were economical, there was no requirement of collective bargaining on this decision in 
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advance.524 By the same token, if the decision to close is for the anti-union purpose, the employer 
shall have no right to act unilaterally -- a requirement of beforehand collective bargaining on this 
issue shall be met.525 It is suggested that the legislative experience as such shall be borrowed by 
the future Chinese strike legislation in order to reach a balance between right to strike and right to 
close.  
 
Considering that the strike legislation per se is complicated and in need of being modified from 
time to time, the three steps proposed above are obviously incomplete. To be honest, various 
details and issues with minor importance have not been covered. For example, (1) the issue of 
whether the striking workers have any right to claim payment during the strike if the strike is to 
protest against an employer’s unlawful conduct; (2) the issue of partial strike -- the refusal to 
work at a normal work pace -- is not discussed as well. Indeed, the purpose of this part -- “Several 
Steps to Regulate Right to Strike in China” is mainly to highlight the most important aspects in 
China’s future strike legislation based on the writer’s study on the strike laws of several countries 
such as UK, US, Canada, Japan, Ireland and Argentina etc.526 As for how to regulate this strike 
legislation under the Chinese legal system in practice (either through constitutional amendment, 
Labor Law reform or other relevant legislative changes, such as under the frame of collective 
contract legislation, or even enact a totally new law mainly on strike) it shall be decided by the 
Chinese legislator in the future. Regardless of the form of China’s future strike legislation, it is 
better to incorporate the said three steps so that it is able to help China’s economic reform 
develop in a healthy way -- a way not to sacrifice the Chinese working class’ interests.  
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 (3) Certain Conundrums Linking the Implementation of Right to Strike under the Chinese 
Context 
As far as the implementation of right to strike is concerned, trade union plays a critical role. As 
above mentioned, based on the writers’ study on the strike legislation from other countries, most 
strikes shall be organized by trade unions so that they can truly represent their members’ 
interests.527 Unfortunately, the lack of independence of the Chinese trade union, which has been 
proved in the text above, creates a practical difficulty in implementing right to strike. Therefore, 
the writer has to emphasize once again the value of a union’s independence as well as the 
importance that the relevant legislative amendment proposed in the previous part. Only when the 
suggested legislative amendment is followed and trade unions start to represent their members 
sincerely without unreasonable interference, could the right to strike be implemented in practice. 
 
D. Conclusion on Part 3.3 
In this part, the writer discusses the general legislation on collective bargaining in China and 
points out the related inefficacy of the legislation. In the writer’s view, the independence of the 
Chinese trade union plays a critical role in developing the efficacy of the Chinese legislation on 
collective bargaining. In the absence of a trade union in a work place, especially in the non-public 
sector, the writer proposes the “independent union system.” The writer, however, is aware that the 
feasibility of this ideal model is seriously blocked due to CCP’s sensitivity on the development of 
independent organizations within its regime. As such, a backup plan is proposed. A specific 
model law promulgated by the ACFTU solely targeting union in non-public sector and especially 
designed to accommodate its feature is expected to be enacted. A “simultaneous approach” is 
proposed as well to borrow the government’s power in assisting the establishment of a trade 
union in a private enterprise. Moreover, it is proved that right to strike is critical to the success of 
a collective bargaining system. After a historical review on the attitudes of the four Chinese 
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constitutions towards right to strike and a review on the de facto statutory attitudes towards right 
to strike, it is argued that under the current Chinese legislation, this right is not supported by the 
Chinese law at all. The writer hereby suggests the CCP to reevaluate the importance of right to 
strike in the context of contemporary Chinese society. Moreover, the writer proposes several 
legislative proposals based on a number of countries’ legislative experiences on strike to help 
protect the interests of the Chinese working class during the transitional period. 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks on Chapter Three 
First, the general international law on freedom of association and collective bargaining is 
introduced. After that, the writer starts to analyze the trade union monopoly phenomenon in 
China and queries the Chinese union’s “dual role” practice. Two models in dealing with the 
problems as such are proposed, with the ideal model of legitimizing independent trade union 
system and the realistic model of introducing certain amendments on the current labor law in 
China. In the third part of chapter 3, the writer discusses the collective bargaining system in 
China, points out its inefficacy and proposes her solution to activate this system, including 
strengthening the independence of the Chinese trade union system, enacting a specific 
administrative rule solely targeting trade union problem in the non-public sector as well as 











Chapter 4: Forced or Compulsory Labor in China versus ILO Convention No. 29 and No. 
105 
4.1 General International Law on Forced Labor 
A. Under the Treaty Regime 
i. General Introduction of International Treaties Relating to Forced or Compulsory Labor 
At the end of World War II, the UDHR was given birth with its article 4 explicitly prohibiting 
slavery in all its forms.528 After the majority of states all over the world have officially abolished 
slavery and its related trade, certain slave-like practices, including serfdom, bonded labor as well 
as forced labor started to attract international attention. As a response to such phenomena, the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery was adopted under the UN treaty regime with the purpose of 
targeting “slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery which have not 
yet been eliminated in all parts of the world”.529 Besides, under one of the international bills of 
rights -- ICCPR, once again, slavery, slave trade in all its forms, servitude and forced or 
compulsory labor are expressly prohibited.530  
 
Moreover, the ILO conventions especially aiming at forced labor crystallize the general terms 
within UDHR and ICCPR etc. Under ILO Convention No. 29, 1930, the definition of “forced and 
compulsory labor” is provided as follows: “the term forced or compulsory labor shall mean all 
work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which 
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”.531 The same wording could also be found in 
article 5 of the Slavery Convention adopted by the League of Nations in 1926, which was 
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retained by the ILO in order to maintain similar terminology.532 “As used in the Convention, the 
terms ‘forced’ and ‘compulsory’ are synonymous, and this kind of compulsion can be 
encountered in all kinds of situations: in cities as well as in rural areas, in factories, workshops, 
business and other closed undertakings as well as on the streets and in full public view.”533 As for 
the term “work or service” under the general definition, it is observed that the generality of these 
terms without providing scope or limitation in detail might cause some problems in practice.534 
So far, however, there is no comprehensive interpretation provided by the ILO supervisory 
bodies.535  The only interpretation available is case-based.536  For example, in the case of 
compulsory vocational training which includes practical exercises in condition similar to 
employment, according to the interpretation provided by the Committee of Experts, it shall be “by 
reference to the elements involved in a particular training scheme that one may determine 
whether it is unequivocally one of vocational training, or involves the exaction of work or service 
within the definition of ‘forced or compulsory labor’, infringing the Convention”.537 Another 
element in the definition is that the prohibited forced or compulsory labor must be exacted “under 
the menace of any penalty”; it is agreed by the Committee of Experts in its 1979 General Survey 
that the Convention refers to the menace of a “penalty” involving “a sanction that goes beyond 
the normal elements of an employment relationship or contract for the delivery of services ... and 
it does not only refer to ‘penalties’ in the strict sense of penal sanction, (but) also includes 
deprivation of any rights or privileges”.538 Besides, as for some national constitutions including 
the duty to work as a counterpart to the right to work, the Committee has concluded that so long 
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as it does not take the form of a legal obligation enforced by sanctions, such constitutional duty is 
compatible with the spirit of the Convention.539  
 
ii. Exceptions to Forced or Compulsory Labor under ILO Convention No. 29 
Convention No. 29 provides several exceptions to “forced labor” as well -- military service 
exception 540 , normal civic obligations exception 541 , prison labor exception 542 , emergency 
exception543 and minor communal services exception544. In the case of military service exception 
-- “any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws for work of a purely 
military character”, according to the Committee of Experts, it applies only to members of the 
armed services recruited under compulsory military service laws, whereas it does not apply to 
career military personnel, nor to soldiers enlisting voluntarily.545 Since it is required that the 
exclusion of compulsory military service is compatible with the Convention only when work 
concerned is of a purely military character, it implies that the employment of conscripts on public 
works, for instance, is contrary to the Convention.546 “Otherwise, governments could establish 
systems of forced or compulsory labor for public works contrary to the basic purpose of the 
Convention, which is to eliminate such compulsion.”547  
 
In terms of the exception of normal civic obligation, examples such as minor communal services, 
work in the event of an emergency, compulsory jury service and the duty to assist a person in 
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danger or to assist in the enforcement of law and order are regarded as within the scope of 
“normal civic obligations” by the Committee of Experts.548  
 
In the case of the third exception, i.e., prison labor exception -- “any work or service exacted 
from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law”, to understand it literally, 
“conviction” implies that it is inconsistent with the Convention to impose prison labor on persons 
who have been deprived of liberty but have not been convicted.549 Indeed, the 1979 General 
Survey conducted by the Committee of Experts further confirmed that the usage of the term 
“conviction” implied that the person concerned must have been found guilty of a criminal 
offense.550 In the absence of such a finding, compulsory labor imposed cannot be regarded as 
legitimate exception, even if it is a result of a decision made by a court of law.551 Besides, the 
“conviction” is required to be a decision made “in a court of law”. Thus, neither administrative 
decision, by no matter how high an authority, nor a decision by any other authority, is 
sufficient.552 In addition, it is submitted that the purpose of such provision is to guarantee respect 
for the rules of due process.553  Furthermore, prison labor must be carried out under the 
supervision and control of a public authority and the prisoner must not be hired to or placed at the 
disposal of private individuals, companies or associations.554 During the course of adopting this 
provision, the International Labor Conference expressly rejected an amendment permitting the 
hiring of prison labor to private undertakings engaged in the execution of public works.555  
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As for the “emergency” exception -- “in the event of war or of a calamity or threatened calamity, 
such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases, invasion by animal, 
insect or vegetable pests, and in general any circumstance that would endanger the existence or 
the well-being of the whole or part of the population”, the Committee of Experts has emphasized 
the restrictive nature of the notion of emergency, and has insisted that the power to call up labor 
should be limited to genuine cases of emergency -- “a sudden, unforeseen happening calling for 
instant measures”.556  
 
As for the exception of “minor communal service”, the performance of which must be “in the 
direct of the said community” and a precondition must be met -- the members of the community 
or their direct representatives shall have the right to be consulted with regard to the need for such 
services.557 The Committee of Experts has insisted that the concerned service must be of “minor 
importance”: mainly maintenance work and in some exceptional cases -- to the erection of certain 
buildings intended to improve the social conditions of the population of the community per se, 
such as a small school, a medical consultation and treatment room etc.558  
 
It is required as well that the competent authorities of a member state “shall not impose or permit 
the imposition of forced or compulsory labor for the benefit of private individuals, companies or 
associations”559 and no concession involving any form of forced or compulsory labor for the 
production or the collection of products shall be granted to private individuals, companies or 
associations.560 Besides, chiefs who exercise administrative functions may, with the express 
permission of the competent authority, have recourse to forced or compulsory labor, subjecting to 
several tests, i.e., a) “direct interest”, b) “present or imminent necessity”, c) “not too heavy a 
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burden”, d) “no removal from worker’s habitual residence” and e) “exigencies of religion, social 
life and agriculture”.561 Meanwhile, where forced or compulsory labor is exacted as a tax, and 
where recourse is had to forced or compulsory labor for the execution of public works by chiefs 
(which is already required by the convention per se to be abolished progressively) who exercise 
administrative functions, the authority concerned is also required to meet the five tests 
abovementioned.562 In addition, this convention also regulates the premedical examination, 
remuneration, daily working hour, rest, maximum working period within one year, compensation 
for accident and sickness, medical advice in the case of necessary transfer, working safety, living 
condition, worker’s physical development and underground working prohibition and other 
relevant issues in detail.563 
 
iii. Immediate and Complete Abolition of Forced or Compulsory Labor in the Forms 
Provided by ILO Convention No. 105 
In ILO Convention No. 105, it further provides that member states shall take effective measures 
to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labor564 in the forms as 
follows: 
 
“(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing 
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic 
system; 
 (b) as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; 
 (c) as a means of labor discipline; 
 (d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes; 
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 (e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.”565 
 
In terms of the forced or compulsory labor for political purpose, the ILO supervisory bodies have 
developed certain jurisprudence on this point.566 One “relates to the range of activities which 
should be protected against sanctions involving forced or compulsory labor”, i.e., “activities 
relating to the right of free expression of political or ideological ideas, whether verbally or by 
other means, and particularly through the press or other writings”.567 The other relates to “the 
limitations or restrictions which may be accepted on these rights and freedoms in normal times as 
reasonable safeguards against the abuse of these rights”, such as “laws on libel, incitation to 
violence, rebellion and racial hatred, restrictions on meetings and demonstrations in public places 
etc”.568 The Committee of Experts has pointed out that when dealing with such an issue on 
deciding the reasonable limitations, it is important to “take into account criteria similar to those 
contained in the UDHR and the ICCPR, which accept certain limitations on the exercise of rights 
as such, in particular in order to preserve the values of democratic societies”.569 Linking with the 
above comments, “the Committee has stated that the Convention does not prohibit punishment 
involving forced or compulsory labor of persons who use violence or engage in preparatory acts 
aimed at violence, nor judicial imposition of certain restrictions on persons convicted of crimes of 
this kind.”570 Thus, an allegation stating that this provision defends any kind of political violence 
is surely problematic.571 “What the Convention does prohibit is the imposition of forced labor for 
the mere expression of political or ideological opinions.”572  Of course, when a state of 
emergency or martial law is declared, general restrictions or limitations of expression or other 
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rights relating to the Convention might be imposed; however, as the Committee of Experts stated, 
“the recourse to such exceptional powers should be limited under the Convention to what is 
necessary to meet circumstances that would endanger the existence or well-being of the whole or 
part of the populations”.573  
 
In the case of forced or compulsory labor for the purposes of economic development, the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Forced Labor noted that “the system of forced labor for economic ends was the 
result of various penal measures implying forced recruitment and the compulsory mobilization of 
manpower”.574 “These measures, combined with other restrictions on freedom of employment 
and vigorous labor discipline, and with severe penalties in case of refusal to comply, went beyond 
the ‘normal civic obligation’ and the rules applicable in times of emergency” permitted within the 
scope of Convention No. 29.575  
 
As for forced or compulsory labor as a means of labor discipline, generally speaking, it can be 
divided into two types.576 One “consists of measures to ensure the due performance by a worker 
of his service under compulsion of law (in the form of physical constraint or the menace of a 
penalty)”; the other “consists of a sanction for breaches of labor discipline with penalties 
involving an obligation to perform work”.577 To the latter, the Committee of Experts has 
distinguished between penalties imposed to enforce labor disciplines which are prohibited by the 
Convention and penalties imposed for the protection of a general public interests, which might 
not fall within the Convention’s prohibition if certain preconditions are met -- “there is a real 












danger, and that the workers concerned remain able to terminate their employment by reasonable 
notice”.578  
 
As for the forced or compulsory labor adopted as a punishment for having participated in a strike, 
certain references are useful for evaluating different situations that arise in practice.579 For 
example, the International Labor Conference “considered that ‘in certain circumstances penalties 
could be imposed for participation in illegal strike and that these penalties might include normal 
prison labor’; and that in particular such penalties might be imposed where there were ‘national 
laws prohibiting strikes in certain sectors or during conciliation proceedings’ or ‘where trade 
unions voluntarily agreed to renounce the right to strike in certain circumstances’”.580 In addition, 
the Committee of Experts has agreed that the application of sanctions involving forced or 
compulsory labor as a punishment for having participated in a purely political strike is in 
principle compatible with this provision of the Convention.581 
 
When dealing with the forced or compulsory labor as a means of racial, social, national or 
religious discrimination, the Committee of Experts “has considered that the prohibition envisaged 
in this provision is applicable to any discrimination based on one of the stated motives, in relation 
to compulsory military service, labor imposed as part of normal civic obligations, work imposed 
in cases of force majeure, or in obligatory minor communal services”.582 
 
iv. Regional Treaties against Slavery or Slavery-Like Practice 
In fact, not only the international treaties, but the regional ones as well provide legal protections 
against slavery or slave-like practice. For example, American Convention on Human Rights 1969 
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states that “no one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in 
all their forms” and “no one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor”.583 In 
addition, both African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 and European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 1950 publicly condemned the slavery 
and forced labor practice.584 Even in the Muslim world, the sixth World Muslim Congress -- the 
oldest Muslim organization founded in 1926 -- has pledged global support for all anti-slavery 
movements.585  
 
B. Under Customary International Law (CIL) 
As widely accepted, CIL consists of two elements, i.e., usage -- state practice and opinio juris -- 
sense of legal obligation. State practice refers to consistent and general practice by states which 
traditionally need a certain period of time as “duration test” before it is qualified as one of the 
element of CIL; whilst opinio juris means that the practice is followed by states out of a sense of 
legal obligation.586 Slavery and slave-like practice, such as forced labor, are arguably prohibited 
under CIL. Back to the 19th century, a host of countries have already started abolishing slavery 
and slave trade. “In 1781, Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II abolished serfdom in the Austrian 
Habsburg dominions”.587 During French Revolution, the famous Declaration of the Rights of 
Man was adopted with its well-known statement “men are born and remain free and equal in 
rights”.588 Later, Denmark, Britain, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Brazil, 
Russia, America etc. had officially abolished slavery and slave trade.589 In the first half of the 
20th century, the success of the campaign of the Congo Reform Association (CRA) to end forced 
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labor 1909, the birth of the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave 
Trade, Forced Labor Convention under ILO and UDHR etc., and the legally abolishing slavery in 
Sierra Leone even Burma590, witnessed the long-lived state practice of abolishing slavery, slave 
trade and slave-like practice. Besides, given the law-making nature of most of the slavery, or 
slave-like practice related treaties mentioned in the previous part --“Under the Treaty Regime”, 
these multilateral treaties are qualified to be considered as international legislation signed and 
ratified by its member states under the sense of legal obligation. Accordingly, the second criterion 
-- opinio juris is thereby met.  
 
Moreover, it is believed that one of the least controversial peremptory norms of CIL is the 
prohibition against slavery and slave-like practices.591 Some scholars argue that the general 
prohibition against slavery, slave trade and slave-like practice, such as forced labor, has been 
widely accepted as a jus cogens norm. The ILO has also publicly stated that forced labor practice 
is a violation of jus cogens norm under international law, especially “when it is practiced in a 
manner equivalent to slavery; signified, for example, by imposing forced labor for an indefinite 
amount of time (thereby presuming ownership rights by the perpetrator and a loss of personhood 
of the victim) and in highly abusive conditions”.592  
 
Under the international human rights law regime, it is arguably right that in spite of the 
disagreement over priorities of human rights among western industrialized states who 
traditionally emphasize civil and political rights, and the developing world whose focus is often 
placed on social and economic rights, the international instruments and state practices reveal a 




 Dinusha Panditaratne, “Rights-Based Approaches to Examining Waiver Clause in Peace Treaties: 
Lessons from The Japanese Forced Labor Litigation in Californian Courts” (2005) 28 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 299.  
592
 Ibid.  
142 
core of civil, political and economic rights that enjoy almost-universal recognition, inter alia, 
prohibition against forced labor.593  
 
4.2 Forced Labor in China: Three Types of Forced Labor 
A. The First Type of Forced Labor -- Normal Workers as Its Subjects 
i. Introduction to the First Type of Forced Labor and Relevant Legislation in China 
In the case of the first type of forced labor, its subject is normal workers under employment 
contract either in written or in oral fashion. Both the Chinese labor law and its criminal law have 
explicitly prohibited forced labor of this type. Under the Labor Law, a worker may notify the 
employer of his decision to dissolve the labor contract at any time if the employer compels a 
worker to work by use of force, threat or by means of illegally restricting personal freedom.594 
Besides, if an employer compels workers to work by use of force, threat or by restoring to the 
means of restricting personal freedom or insults such as punishes physically, beats, illegally 
searches or takes workers into custody, the public security organ shall detain the persons 
responsible for such behavior less than 15 days or levy a fine or give a warning and, if the case is 
serious enough to constitute crime, a criminal responsibility is attached.595 In terms of the 
recently passed Labor Contract Law, “if a labor administration authority, another competent 
authority or a member of its working personnel neglects its/his duties, fails to perform its/his 
statutory duties or exercises its/his authority in violation of the law, thereby causing harm to a 
worker … , liability for damages shall be borne and the leading official directly in charge and 
other persons directly responsible shall be subjected to administrative penalties in accordance 
with the law; if a criminal offense is constituted, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance 
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with the law”.596 According to the Chinese Criminal Law, where an employer, in violation of the 
laws and regulations on labor administration, compels its employees to work by restricting their 
personal freedom, if serious enough, the persons who are directly responsible for the said offence 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention 
and shall also, or shall only, be fined.597 Other relevant provisions in the Chinese Criminal Law 
which might be cited to curb the first type of force labor include provisions relating to intentional 
injury crime598 and crime of unlawful detention599.  
 
With the development of the market economy in China, forced labor of this type started to 
emerge and there is a trend that it is spreading gradually. Influenced by some negative capitalistic 
ideas such as Mammonism,600 in order to make profit as much as possible, some privately owned 
enterprises have engaged in the de facto forced labor practice. It is reported that workers in some 
privately owned enterprises are forced to work overtime.601 Sometimes, security guards are hired 
whose main task is not for the security of a factory or its personnel, but to monitor the workers’ 
behavior and prevent them from running away.602 Any worker who is suspected to run away will 
be subject to physical violence or quarantine.603 The recent shocking news regarding hundreds of 
people being forced to work under slave like conditions in the brick kilns located at the 
mountainous area of Shanxi Province once again reflects the severity of the problem as such.604 
Even worse, news reveals that forced labor as such is not only discovered in small privately 
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owned enterprises located in rural area, but found in relatively bigger enterprises and even joint 
ventures located in large cities, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Fuzhou etc.605  
 
To be fair, China’s legislation on this aspect is relatively competent. It imposes not only civil 
liabilities but also proportionate criminal liabilities to those who are responsible for the forced 
labor practice as such. Thus, it is submitted that legislation per se is not the reason for the spread 
of the forced labor as such in today’s China. Implementation of the law is the major issue. As for 
the issue of implementation, it mainly depends on the aspects covering but not limited to 
improvement of judicial independence, professionalization of judges, and anti-corruption 
movement.  
 
ii. How to Deal with the Ineffective Implementation of Legislation against Forced Labor in 
China 
a. Judicial Independence 
According to the Chinese Constitution, the courts in China are free from any interference from 
any administrative agencies, social groups or persons.606 Only interference from NPC, as the 
highest organ of state power, and its standing committee are legally permitted and protected.607 
This is much like the UK system where parliament supremacy is beyond the confinement of 
judicial review.608 As such, it is fair to say that the Chinese court has been guaranteed judicial 
independence by Constitution and such independence is only submissive to NPC and its standing 
committee. 
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To better understand the issue of judicial independence, one must be clearly aware that the 
Chinese judicial system is, in practice, placed alongside the pre-existing institutions of the Maoist 
model of party-state. 609  In fact, the problem of the Chinese courts in terms of judicial 
independence is mainly relating to interference from the CCP and local governments as well. 
 
For example, since judges are appointed, promoted and removed not by Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) or the Chinese Ministry of Justice but by local governmental elite, and the courts are 
mainly financed by the government, who are under the control of the CCP, logically, when 
making a court decision, it might be difficult for judges to practise in a neutral way without 
extrajudicial influence.610 In other words, judicial impartiality is an impossible mission in the 
Chinese context. In fact, reports have shown that courts often favor enterprises on which local 
governments depend their revenues.611 As a logical consequence, it is not difficult to imagine that 
if enterprises as such adopt forced labor practice, possibly, the court will choose to keep a blind 
eye, or even if it finally decides against those enterprises, the penalty might be too mild to threat 
those enterprises and their owners to fully give up forced labor. 
 
It is observed as well that judges and their courts are inclined to be responsive to local influences 
rather than legal norms. Both the SPC’s annual report and the speech presented by the vice 
president of SPC Mr. Cao Jianming condemned such a phenomenon of local protectionism. In his 
speech on China’s entering into WTO and the rule of law implication, Mr. Cao criticized the 
courts harshly “for their unwillingness to enforce judgments rendered by courts elsewhere in 
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China against local defendants”612 For that matter, even if an enterprise is found guilty and fined 
subsequently for its forced labor practice by a local court elsewhere, the enforcement of such a 
judgment by the local court where the enterprise is located is nevertheless problematic. 
 
b. Professionalization of Judges and the Issue of Corruption 
Most papers dealing with rule of law in China would express their concerns on the lack of 
professional training of the Chinese judges.613 Throughout 1980s, most Chinese judges, in spite 
of their lacking either a university degree or legal training, were transferred from the CCP or from 
the military to the positions as judges.614 It is observed that only ten to fifteen percent of all 
currently serving Chinese judges have completed their four-year law school education.615 In 
other words, the majority of the Chinese judges failed to have enough professional training. 
Fortunately, all new judges will have to succeed in a unified “National Judicial Examination” 
(Sifa Kaoshi); whilst, to those formerly appointed judges, there is nevertheless no qualification 
required.616 In this sense, with neither adequate legal training, nor enough “cultivation of the 
sense of being members of an independent profession with its own ethics and professional 
attitude”617, it is difficult to expect them to practise impartially.  
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In terms of professionalization of judges, when they have not received enough legal education 
and have not been cultivated to have the professional ethics that judges should have, as most 
judges in US for instance, they are much more easily to be corrupted. In other words, it is hard for 
them to resist the temptation of various briberies, inter alia, bribery from those enterprises 
involved in forced labor practice. 
 
Of course, the writer is aware that corruption in the Chinese legal system is a complicated issue. 
It is not solely because of the lack of professionalization of the Chinese judges, but also because 
of some other reasons, such as the institutional problem of the Chinese courts, the monopoly of 
power by CCP in law and in practice, lack of competent monitoring system available and no clear 
separation of powers etc., which are beyond this thesis’ reach.618 What the writer tries to argue is 
that to increase the judicial competence of the Chinese judges can serve as one of the important 
means in fighting against corruption in the Chinese judicial system. As such, chances for 
ineffective implementation of laws, inter alia, legislation against the first type of forced labor, 
can be reduced.619 
 
c. Conclusion 
In sum, to have a better implementation of law is a long term task. From the micro point of view, 
at the least, the issues of judicial independence, judge’s professionalization and corruption shall 
be dealt with; however, in order to change the implementation dilemma of legislation in China 
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thoroughly, from the macro point of view, the construction of rule of law620 in China shall be 
furthered and strengthened, which is by no means an easy and short-term task. 
 
B. The Second Type of Forced Labor: Convicted Labor Reform System (Laogai) 
i. Re-visit the ILO Convention No. 29 & 105  
The subject of the second type of forced labor in China is convicted criminals -- prison laborers. 
According to ILO Convention No. 29, prohibited forced labor is subject to several exceptions, 
inter alia, prison labor exception, i.e., any work or service exacted from any person as a 
consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out 
under the supervision and control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired or 
placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations.621 In other words, the 
prison labor exception is qualified by three criteria: (a) convicted via judicial procedure, (b) 
supervised by public authority, and (c) no private sector’s involvement. In addition, to read 
Convention No.29 in connection with No. 105,,an immediate and complete abolition of forced or 
compulsory labor as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purpose of economic 
development is required.622 In sum, prison labor exception is subject to four tests, viz., “convicted 
via judicial procedure”, “supervised by public authority”, “no private sector’s involvement” and 
“not serving as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purpose of economic development”.  
 
ii. Introduction to the Chinese Convicted Labor Reform System (Laogai) 
The major function of the existence of China’s prison system is to help inmates who have gone 
through judicial process and have been convicted by court in accordance with relevant criminal 
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provisions to correct thoughts and behaviors.623 Through the means of combining labor of 
criminals organized by prison with education624, it is believed by the Chinese authority as well as 
its academia that most prisoners could be cultivated to have an awareness of making their own 
living and learning certain means and techniques of making a living themselves, thus, preventing 
them from re-committing any crimes in the future.  
 
According to the Chinese Prison Law (Jianyu Fa), any prisoners with labor capacity shall 
participate in labor.625 Accordingly, there is a legal obligation for a prisoner with good health and 
physical condition to take part in working. The law also stipulates that a prison shall, in the light 
of the individual conditions of prisoners, rationally organize them to do labor so as to correct their 
bad habits, to cultivate their habits of working, to acquire production skills and to create 
conditions for employment after their returning to society.626 It is observed that the intention of 
such legislation is to “make the prisoners change their guilty minds, to cultivate good behavior 
through labor based on the individual conditions of each prisoner, to learn the rules of living and 
also to prevent trouble caused by idleness which leads to depression, unpredictable actions and 
low morale and which hence, threatens the safety and order of prison life”.627  
 
In addition, it is state’s obligation to ensure enough expenditures of prison for the reform of 
prisoners, as well as to provide production facilities and expenses necessary for prisoners to do 
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labor.628  In other words, prisons not only force the convicted criminals to perform their 
obligation of labor, but under the legal obligation to open employment chances for them as 
well.629 Besides, the current Prison Law also provides detailed regulations on the daily working 
hours (usually eight hours per day)630, secures prison labor’s right to rest on statutory festivals 
and holidays631 and right to get payment.632 If a prison laborer is injured, disabled or dead in the 
course of executing his or her duties, certain labor insurance shall be guaranteed.633  
 
As far as the working activities are concerned, for quite a long time, farm production is the 
principal work for the Chinese criminals, because many Chinese prisons are located in remote 
countryside, and mountain areas, by river rapids or lake area.634 Factories are set up by those 
prisons in and near cities, so that prisoners could participate in industrial manufacture.635 In 
addition, there are prisoners undertaking to produce handicrafts.636 Official statistics show that 
about 90 percent of the prisoners are involved in various working activities in today’s China.637 
 
To minor criminals, there is a remarkable change of policy, i.e., from “full-time labor to correct 
thoughts and behavior” to “education as a major means to correct thoughts and behavior, 
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accompanied with part-time light labor”638. By law, labor for juvenile delinquents shall be 
suitable for the characteristics of minors and its main objectives shall be for them to acquire an 
elementary education and production skills.639 Generally speaking, minor criminals will have to 
participate in labor program for four hours and take literacy classes for another four hours per 
day.640 They are usually involved in programs such as cooking, hairdressing and repairing 
machines so that their professional skills for employment or for vocational training after returning 
to society can be enhanced gradually.641 Of course, under certain circumstances, for instance, in 
the peak season of production, prisons might have some discretion to adjust the working hours to 
be more than four hours.642 In addition, a prison is under the legal obligations to cooperate with 
the state, society and educational institutions in providing necessary conditions for the juvenile to 
receive compulsory education.643  
 
In terms of female criminals, special treatment is given in accordance with their physical and 
psychological characteristics.644 Most female criminals are arranged by prisons to take part in 
household and vocational labor, such as manual knitting, sewing, dressmaking, planting etc.645 
The guiding principle is for female prisoners to “exercise the psychological quality with patience 
and calmness”,646 and meanwhile accumulate useful experience as well as employment skills.  
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To compare China’s convicted labor reform system as introduced above with the said four tests of 
prison labor exceptions’ prescribed by ILO Convention No.29 and 105 -- “convicted via judicial 
procedure”, “supervised by public authority”, “no private sector’s involvement” and “not serving 
as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purpose of economic development”, prima facie, 
China’s convicted labor reform system is qualified to be considered as a legitimate exception to 
the prohibited forced labor. Considering that prisoners working in labor reform enterprises have 
gone through judicial process, have been convicted by court in accordance with relevant criminal 
provisions647 and they are under the supervision of prison authority648, who is subject to the 
supervision of people’s procuratorate649, the first two criteria have been met. Besides, in terms of 
the third standard -- no private sector’s involvement, it is stipulated expressly by the Chinese law 
that prisons are purely led and owned by the state and are obliged to organize and arrange 
prisoners to various working activities.650 As such, it seems that during the whole process of 
labor reform, there are no private elements involved. As far as the last criterion is concerned, it 
has been emphasized from time to time by both the Chinese government and its legislation that 
the main purpose for the labor reform system is to “cultivate the prisoners’ awareness of earning 
their own living and to learn means of earning a living in order to prevent them from 
re-offending”.651 Based on this statement, it seems that the fourth criterion is met as well. In sum, 
merely looking at China’s legislation in relation to its convicted labor reform system, it is 
consistent with the said four requirements provided by ILO fundamental conventions No.29 and 
105.  
 
iii. Different Stories on the Chinese Convicted Labor Reform System 
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Despite the said legality argument of China’s convicted labor reform system, there are some 
different reports available from other sources instead of the Chinese authority telling a totally 
different story as follows. 
 
Immediately after the Chinese Communist Party came into power, it stated that one of the 
purposes for the labor reform system in China is to serve as a method of mobilizing and using 
labor for national economic development.652 The former Minister of Public Security, Luo 
Ruiqing, pointed out that “forced labor...is possessed of the greatest political and economic 
significance...Compulsory labor will produce wealth for the Government.”653 Encouraged by 
China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping, labor reform camps became de facto enterprises.654 In 
1980, it was reported that the Chinese national government created a dual responsibility system 
for prison labor, under which labor reform enterprises must achieve both individual reform 
purposes and production purposes.655 Labor reform administrators are required not only to adhere 
to traditional emphasis of reform of prisoners into new socialist persons, but also to reach certain 
productivities and profit levels.656 In the eyes of some commentators, the so-called “dual 
responsibility” ended up with an over-emphasis on production and a de-emphasis on the well 
being of prisoners.657 In this sense, it seems that in practice the Chinese labor reform system 
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serves as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purpose of economic development, which is 
arguably conflicting with the fourth test provided by ILO Convention No.105 -- “not serving as a 
method of mobilizing and using labor for purpose of economic development”.658  
 
Moreover, it is reported that the Chinese government not only encouraged products from labor 
reform camp to enter the international market to earn hard currency, but labor reform enterprises 
as well to even establish joint ventures with international businesses.659 In one of the State 
Department documents, U. S. diplomats claimed that the published official Chinese statements 
put the prison-exports figure at $100 million each year.660 There have been accusations that a 
host of prisoner made goods constitute a large amount of China’s legitimate export goods; 
therefore, plays an important role in China’s economic development.661 Harry Wu, one of 
China’s famous human rights activists serving 19 years in the Chinese labor reform camp from 
the age of 23, once commented: “all the labor-reform officials talk about is getting more foreign 
money.” 662 Although this statement might be too absolute to be true, some might be inclined to 
believe that it, at the very least, reveals that a substantial number of labor-reform officers are keen 
to earn foreign exchange. Besides, it is also reported that the material well-being of both the 
security personnel and the prisoners is directly linked to the profitability of the labor reform 
enterprises.663 After an unrevealed percentage of money earned by the labor reform enterprises 
goes to the central government’s pocket in the form of taxes and fees, the rest is allocated by the 
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labor reform enterprises under their discretion.664 Some sources reveal that generally speaking, 
more than forty percent of the money goes to the pocket of security personnel and other 
management in the form of bonuses while prisoner, as the real hard working laborers, receive 
very few, sometimes even nothing, from the products made by themselves.665  
 
Furthermore, evidence shows that some labor reform enterprises have registered as companies.666 
For example, it is found that Shanxi Boiler Factory is also Provincial Prison No.2.667 As such, 
some scholars including some Chinese ones believe that the Chinese labor reform enterprise has 
two identities, i.e., labor reform camp and company. Usually, the prison designation is only used 
by the government internally, whereas, the name of the company is displayed to the public, for 
both business purposes and the purpose of avoiding foreign visitors’ suspicion.668 Very often, 
these so called companies have also entered into certain partnership agreement with some private 
enterprises for production purposes.669 Based on the discoveries above, it seems that there is a de 
facto labor-employment relationship between some prison laborers and some labor reform camps 
and the prison laborers, at least part of them, are placed partly at the disposal of some private 
companies who have established certain business cooperative relationship with labor reform 
camps. Practice as such is clearly inconsistent with the third test abovementioned -- no private 
sector’s involvement.  
 
iv. Critical Evaluation of the “Different Story”:   
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It might be true that the statements above reveal part of the stories. However, merely based on the 
discoveries as such, it is not fair to deny the value of the whole convicted labor reform system in 
China, let alone classify its nature as the forced labor practice with official support, which is 
prohibited by ILO Convention No. 29 and No.105.  
 
First, the writer is not going to deny the fact that there was a period of time when the Chinese 
labor reform system was used as a method for national economic development; however, it is no 
longer the case. After CCP came into power in 1949, China’s economic situation was seriously 
troubled. After twelve years’ war – eight years Sino-Japanese war immediately followed by four 
years civil war, China’s national economy was on the edge of collapse. Issues on how to establish 
a socialist nation on the ground of a large scale of ruins left by war and colonization and how to 
feed its starving people as quickly as possible were the priority of the CCP agenda. Above and 
beyond this, when leader Deng Xiaoping made his statement to encourage production by 
prisoners, it was just after the ten years national disaster -- Cultural Revolution, when, once again, 
the Chinese national economy was on the edge of collapse. Under such critical circumstances, it 
might be understandable and forgivable for the Chinese government at that point of time to adopt 
a national policy to use prison labor as a means for national economic development to satisfy the 
needs of the general public and save the endangered nationhood. However, things have changed 
dramatically as China is no longer what it was. As I have mentioned in the above text, according 
to Prison Law of PRC promulgated in year 1994, labor of criminals is mainly for the good of 
prisoners themselves rather than for the sake of national economic development.670 According to 
the writer’s interview with several officers from a prison in Shanghai, the ideology that prison 
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labor reform system could contribute to national economic development, therefore, shall be 
adopted as an important means to that end had been completely abolished by the authority for 
years.671 To criticize China for its past wrongdoings without opening eyes to its positive changes 
may be unfair to today’s Chinese convicted labor reform system. In addition, in accordance with 
the official statistics calculated in 1990s, the gross production from the Chinese prison system is 
merely around 2.5 billion Chinese yuan per year, constituting only 0.8 ‰ of GDP of the 
corresponding year.672 My interviews with several correctional officers (Jianyu Guanjia) have 
also confirmed that technical and professional training to help the inmates to repent as well as to 
learn certain skills for future life is always the only goal of today’s convicted labor reform system. 
Indeed, the production made by prisoners per se is far from enough to support prisoners’ own 
daily consumption, let alone playing an important role in China’s economic development.673 
Prisoners usually work for five or six days a week, less than eight hours a day and are entitled to 
rest during public holidays.674 In fact, the writer was informed that the CCP government had to 
allocate a large amount of governmental fund for the proper operation of the Chinese prison 
system and the welfare of prisoners.675 In terms of the salary paid to the labor reform officers, the 
writer was informed by some officers interviewed, who are currently in charge of some prisons in 
Shanghai, that their salary is strictly prohibited to be linked with the work load of the inmates, but 
is purely from the governmental source.676 As such, the accusation claiming that prison labor 
plays a very important role in China’s economic development must have been exaggerated. In 
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addition, the statement accusing that all the officers in charge of the prisons are thinking about 
making as much foreign exchange as possible seems to be groundless. In fact, it is time for some 
human rights activists to reflect their static point of view on the Chinese convicted labor reform 
system and open their eyes to the fundamental progress that China has made. 
 
Second, in terms of the accusation which links China’s export with prison labor production, it 
might be partly true that there are some prison-labor made products unfortunately and secretly 
entering into the international market. “$100 million each year” is claimed to be an official 
statement made by the Chinese government itself regarding its annual prison labor related exports; 
however, the credibility of the accusation as such is questionable. In fact, no official permission 
from the Chinese authority is promulgated to allow export of prisoner made products, let alone a 
so called official statistics that was published by the Chinese government disclosing the exact 
exports value made by prison products. Furthermore, an official administrative legislation “Rules 
about Restatement on Prohibition against Exports Made by Prison Labor” (Guanyu Chongsheng 
Jinzhi Laogai Chanpin Chukou Guiding) jointly promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Ministry of Justice and later approved by the Chinese State Council in 1991 especially 
emphasized that companies in charge of export affairs were prohibited to buy products related to 
prison labor and prisons were banned to become suppliers of such companies.677 In addition, no 
joint ventures between prisons and foreign investors were permitted.678 After all, it does not 
make sense that on one hand, a government seriously declares its determination against any 
exports of prison made products, and even promulgated relevant legislation against practices as 
such; on the other hand, it nevertheless published its official statistics informing the whole world 
the exact figure of its prison labor related exports. From the writer’s point of view, it might be too 
subjective to state, as what the famous Chinese human rights activist Harry Wu commented, that 
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“all the labor reform officials talk about is getting more foreign money”. (As for Harry Wu 
himself, assuming he is a trustworthy person,679 he might be unfairly put into prison from 1959 to 
1979 and might be terribly mistreated for almost twenty years; however, all his personal stories 
and testimonies about the Chinese Laogai system, be it true or not, are only about the Laogai 
practice in 1960s and 1970s .680 After he left China in 1985 and finally became an American 
citizen, he returned to China once for 38 days only.681 Logically, he will not have any chances to 
understand the well developed Chinese convicted labor reform system in 1990s, let alone to 
experience the gradual progress after year 2000.) Actually, it is believed that there are nonetheless 
some exports involving prisoner-made products entering into foreign markets through illegal 
means. However, practice as such is by no means systematic with the support from the Chinese 
central government. As for the prisoner’s payment, the Prison Law has stipulated clearly that 
prisoners in China are entitled to get payment as well as enjoy working safety and welfare.682 It is 
possible that there are prisons refusing to follow the law as such since the implementation of law 
is a problem in China, but phenomenon as such does not necessarily mean the existence of a 
systematic practice of exploiting prison laborers in China. To be fair, minor defects could not be 
used to deny the virtue of a person as a whole since it is human nature to err. By the same token, 
no matter how carefully the Chinese government and its legislator design and manage its 
convicted labor reform system, it is inevitable that at the level of implementation, power misuses 
and abuses might happen. 
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Third, in terms of the accusation on the double identities of some Chinese prisons, the writer is 
not going to deny the existence of the phenomena as such; however, there are very few reports 
about the double identities problem at present. It is true that there was a period of time when 
prisons in China had double identities -- both prison and enterprise with inmates being organized 
to work as employees.683 During those days, due to the nationwide economic plight -- the state’s 
appropriation to prisons is not enough, some prisons had to manage their finances on their own.684 
As such, it is commented by some human rights activists that “reform” has taken a step back 
while “profit making” has been pushed to the front. 685  However, things have changed 
dramatically. The issue of separation between enterprises and prisons (jianqi fenkai) has become 
a national policy at the top of the Chinese governmental agenda.686 A few examples are 
illustrated as follows. The former Labor Machine Factory (Laodong Gongju Chang) -- a factory 
established partly by a prison in Shanghai has been divided into two independent entities, i.e., 
Wujiao Chang Prison and Star Labor Machine Company (Minxin Laodong Gongju Youxian 
Gongsi) with no connection ever after; the former prison-built Flat Glasses Factory (Pingban Boli 
Chang) is now divided into a self-reliant factory and Zhoupu Prison.687 Of course, during the 
course of the implementation of such a national policy, there might be some persistent objectors 
to place some prisoners in China at the disposal of some privately owned companies. At any rate, 
however, it is no longer a widespread phenomenon in today’s China. In this sense, to deny the 
value of the Chinese convicted labor reform system merely based on some sporadic violations 
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and illegal practices inconsistent with the ILO fundamental conventions that prohibit forced labor 
might be unfair. 
 
v. Concluding Remarks 
Although the convicted labor reform system in China, by its nature, is forced labor, it is believed 
to be qualified as a permissible exception to prohibited forced labor practice in light of four 
criteria provided by ILO Convention No.29 and No.105. It is undeniable that some current 
practices and certain former policies in relation to prison labor are conflicting with the four 
criteria. Some of its products do enter into foreign market, therefore, play a role in making 
foreign currency to support national economic development. However, phenomena as such are 
argued not to be systematic with institutional support. The existence of certain illegal practices 
does not necessarily negate the value of the convicted labor reform system and its related 
legislation. To be objective, in general, China’s current convicted labor reform system is designed 
to educate and cultivate criminals into self-supporting workers through means of labor. Above 
and beyond this, the relevant legislation is indeed consistent with ILO conventions and other 
international laws in general. There are a few inconsistent incidents, but no systematic violation 
of international labor law against forced labor. In fact, the problem lies in how to improve the 
implementation of relevant domestic laws in China rather than denying the value of the Chinese 
convicted labor reform system. As for improving implementation of laws, it mainly depends on 
the capacity building of rule of law in China that is beyond the reach of this thesis 
 
C. The Third Type of Forced Labor in China: Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) System 
in China (Laojiao) 
In this part, the writer will provide a comprehensive study on the Chinese RTL system. 
 
i. RTL System in China 
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China’s RTL system, by its definition, is an administrative sanction 688  with no judicial 
involvement and a mechanism for punishing law-breakers (excluding criminal law breakers). For 
a better understanding, at the very beginning, the writer is going to give a brief comparison 
between the RTL system and the Chinese convicted labor reform (Laogai) system. Although both 
systems limit recipients’ freedom, they are applied in a different way. As for convicted labor 
reform system, it is applicable to criminals convicted by courts, whereas to RTL recipients who 
have committed offence that is not serious enough to be punished by the Chinese penal code will 
be sentenced by a special RTL committee instead of a court, and to work in RTL institutions 
instead of prisons. Simply put, the RTL recipients are not criminals in nature. 
 
a. Major Legislation in Charge of the Chinese RTL System 
To date, RTL system in China is mainly governed by three administrative regulations.689 As the 
foundation legislative document of the RTL system in China, the 1957 "Decision on the Question 
of Reeducation through Labor" (Guowuyuan Guanyu Laodong Jiaoyang Wenti De Jueding) 
(“1957 Decision”) authorized RTL to be imposed for an uncertain period of time for the purposes 
to reform those loafers, law and discipline breakers, or persons who are able to work but choose 
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to lead an idle life into self-supporting socialist new persons, and further maintain public order to 
facilitate socialist construction.690 
 
Another administrative legislation is the “Supplementary Provisions for Reeducation through 
Labor” (Guowuyuan Guanyu Laodong Jiaoyang De Buchong Guiding), which was promulgated 
by the State Council in 1979 (1979 Supplementary Provision). The 1979 Provision specifies that 
the administrative commission for reeducation through labor (hereinafter RTL committee) shall 
be composed of the persons responsible for civil affairs, public security and labor departments 
and they shall be responsible for directing and administering the work of reeducation through 
labor.691 In other words, there is no involvement of judicial process. As for the term of RTL, it 
shall be one to three years with one year extension if necessary. 692 It further provides that rest 
shall be allowed on Sunday and public holidays.693 
 
The third related legislation is the “Trial Methods for Reeducation Through Labor” (Laodong 
Jiaoyang Shixing Banfa), which was passed in 1982 by the Ministry of Public Security with the 
approval of the State Council (1982 Trial Methods). This document extends RTL to anyone who 
commits misdemeanor, join criminal organization for murder, robbery, rape, arson, or involve in 
prostitution, theft fraud etc. where the circumstances of such crimes are not serious enough to be 
punished by criminal law. 694  
 
In addition to these three administrative regulations either promulgated by State Council or 
approved by it, there are numerous administrative rules, enacted either by Department of Public 
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Security, or Ministry of Justice, regulating and guiding various aspects of the RTL system. For 
example, based on almost five-decade practices of RTL, the  “Detailed Regulation on the 
Administrative of Reeducation Through Labor” (Laodong Jiaoyang Guanli Gongzuo Zhifa Xize) 
promulgated by the Ministry of Justice in year 1992 is considered a relatively detailed legislation 
to guide the RTL management process. It covers almost every aspect of the RTL management 
work, including its general principles695, rules of acceptance696, classification of laborers,697, 
laborers’ communications698 and meeting families699, vacation and leave permission700, reward, 
punishment 701  and medical treatment outside RTL camp 702 , confinement under certain 
circumstances703 and release704 etc.  
 
Above and beyond this, there is some other relevant administrative legislation belonging to the 
category of administrative rules as well. To name but a few, they are “Measures on RTL 
Recipients’ Life and Sanitation Management” （Laodong Jiaoyang Renyuan Shenghuo Weisheng 
Guanli Banfa (1991), “Several Systems on Management Work of RTL”（Laodong Jiaoyang 
Guanli Gongzuo Ruogan Zhidu）(1992), “Code of Conduct of Recipients of RTL” (Laodong 
Jiaoyang Renyuan Shouze）(1992), “Rules on RTL Education Work” (Laodong Jiaoyang 
Gongzuo Guiding) (1993) etc. serving as supplementary rules in guiding the operation of RTL 
system in China. In addition, there are other regulatory documents under the name of 
interpretation, reply, answer, joint notice and even a host of internal document (Neibu Wenjian), 
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although not law in nature, but nevertheless having certain binding force in regulating the daily 
operations of the Chinese RTL system.705  
 
b. Historical Review of RTL System and Its Development  
1. Birth 
The birth of RTL system could be traced back to 1955, when the CCP government planned to 
suppress counterrevolutionary elements (they were believed to be remnants from the former KMT 
government) to protect the newly established socialist state. In terms of 1955 “Order to 
Thoroughly Wipe Out Counterrevolutionary Elements in Hiding” (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guanyu Chedi Suqing Ancang De Fangeming Fenzi De Zhishi), to those counterrevolutionary 
elements whose crimes are not serious enough to be sentenced to jail by court, whereas leaving 
them in their original positions or releasing them to society may cause potential danger to the 
stability of the newly established socialist country and increase unemployment rate, the CCP 
government decided to concentrate them in a specific place to work for the state and get payment 
from government.706 Right after the 1955 Order, another order under the name of “Order for all 
Provinces and Municipal Governments to Make Immediate Preparations for the Establishment of 
Institutions for RTL” (Guanyu Geshengshi Junying Liji Zhuoshou Chouban Laodong Jiaoyang 
Jigou De Zhishi) was promulgated in 1957, to require the governments at provincial or municipal 
level to establish RTL institutions. As such, the RTL system was given birth in China. During this 
period, the purpose of the RTL is to suppress “counterrevolutionary elements” and other so called 
“bad elements” (Huai Fenzi) and arrange employment for them.  
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It shall be noted that during the initial period, the main task for RTL recipients was to be educated 
rather than laboring. Besides, now that there was an official guiding principle, i.e., “yi nong wei 
zhu”, when they were arranged to work, they were mainly engaged in farm work.707  
 
2. The First Stage of Development (1957-1966) 
The first regulation on RTL -- 1957 Decision was promulgated by State Council on August 1, 
1957. In light of the first legislation, the RTL recipients were extended from the former two 
elements -- “counterrevolutionary elements” and “bad elements”, to loafers, law and discipline 
breakers, or persons who are able to work but choose not to but lead an idle life.708 In fact, 
beginning from this administrative regulation, RTL recipients were no longer limited to two 
elements inside governmental agencies and enterprises but anyone, as long as he/she could be 
classified into one of the four types, i.e., “(1) those who will not engage in honest pursuits, 
involve themselves in hooliganism, commit larceny, fraud or other acts for which they are not 
criminally liable or violate public security rules and refuse to mend their ways despite repeated 
admonition; (2) Counterrevolutionaries and anti-socialist reactionaries who commit minor 
offences and are not criminally liable and who have been given sanctions of expulsion by 
government organs, people's organizations, enterprises or schools, and as a result have difficulty 
in making a living; (3) Employees of government organs, people's organizations, enterprises and 
schools who are able-bodied, but have refused to work for a long period, violated discipline or 
jeopardized public order, and have been given sanctions of expulsion, and as a result have 
difficulty in making a living; or (4) Persons who refuse to accept the work assigned to them or the 
arrangement made for their employment and settlement after their demobilization from military 
service, or who decline to take part in manual labor and production despite persuasion, keep 
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behaving disruptively on purpose, obstruct public officials from performing their duties and 
refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonition.”709 Besides, the Decision makes it clear 
that the purpose of RTL was to reform the recipients into self-supporting socialist new persons, to 
maintain public order as well as to facilitate socialist construction. Due to the negative influence 
from leftist thoughts and the incompleteness of such legislation, inter alia, no clear time limit for 
the term of RTL is provided710, at that time once people became subjects of RTL, chances for 
them to work in RTL institutes for several years, sometimes even decades, are high.711 In fact, 
the Chinese official statistics712 show that there were 499,523 RTL recipients in the year 1960713, 
which is claimed to reach the maximum in China’s RTL history.714  
 
At the first stage, the main labor task was still focusing on farm work, though, industrial work 
started to be involved. Take Guangdong Province as an example, generally speaking, most RTL 
recipients there were still engaged in farm work; however, around 20 to 30 percent of them were 
arranged to work in factories making bricks, fans, machines etc.715  
 
3. The Second Stage: Period of Suspension (1966-1978) 
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During Cultural Revolution when rule of law was neglected in general, the whole nation was 
undergoing a political and social disaster. Naturally, RTL system could not be immune from its 
impact. During this stage, government officers who were in charge of RTL were largely 
oppressed and persecuted by the Red Guards and Rebels.716 The whole RTL system was 
purposefully misinterpreted as a system for the purpose of “supporting and cultivating enemies” 
(Zi Di Yang Di)717.  
 
4. The Third Stage of Development: Recovering from Chaos (1978 to 1991) 
After the collapse of Gang of Four and the third plenary session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CCP, the system of RTL started to recover. Two important administrative 
regulations -- 1979 Supplementary Provision and 1982 Trial Method were promulgated at this 
stage with the effect of further expansion of the scope of RTL not only to those who lived in large 
and medium-sized cities, but also those having habitual residence in rural area whilst still 
choosing to wonder into cities, regions along railroad routes, large factories and mines and be 
involved in illegal activities there.718 In fact, this Trial Method extended RTL to anyone who 
commits misdemeanor, joins criminal organization for murder, robbery, rape, arson, or is 
involved in prostitution, theft fraud etc., where the circumstances are not serious enough to be 
punished by criminal code.719 Besides, the terms of RTL has been fixed from one to three years 
with one year extension if necessary.720 As such, the former practice -- RTL recipients would 
have to stay in the RTL camp forever (zhi jin bu chu) -- was changed completely.721  
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A special committee in charge of the management composed of heads of civil administration 
organs, public security bureaus and labor departments, is established by People’s Government at 
the provincial level, at the level of municipalities or at the level of large and medium-sized cities 
in accordance with 1979 Supplementary Provisions and 1982 Trial Method722. As such, in theory 
a specific government agency (ad hoc by nature) came into stage in dealing with relevant issues 
of RTL.  
 
Above and beyond this, a new improvement was also made during this stage, i.e., well-managed 
RTL institutions can convert to RTL schools subject to the RTL management committee’s 
approval.723 At the end of 1988, the Ministry of Justice made a decision to completely separate 
the RTL management system from that of the convicted labor reform system.724 From that day 
onwards, theoretically, a clear dividing line has been drawn between the RTL system and the 
Laogai system. However, it is nonetheless criticized by many a scholar that in practice the 
treatment of the RTL recipients is still much more like that of prisoners.725 From the writer’s 
point of view, considering that for decades, the system of RTL and prisons failed to be well 
separated by any legislative documents, it may take a long time for the officials in charge of RTL 
to change their mindset and truly manage the RTL system in a way that is different from prisons. 
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In the recovering period, the guiding principle for RTL labor had been changed from the former 
“farm work based” to “industrial production based”.726 Most recipients were arranged to work in 
labor intensive industries, such as architectural materials production.727  
 
5. The Fourth Stage of Development (1991-Present) 
During this stage seven administrative rules 728  particularly targeting RTL system were 
promulgated by Ministry of Justice, which provide more specific rules on the management of 
sanitation work of RTL subjects, code of conduct of guards who are directly in charge of RTL 
recipients, management work of RTL and education of RTL recipients etc. For example, to those 
“who have committed a minor crime only once, or have been dealt with for the criminal offence 
in the past and committed no new offence, or have confessed on their own initiative and showed 
sign of repentance; and those who have not reached the age of 16, or are disabled, mental patients, 
pregnant women, etc. are expressly exempted from RTL sentence”.729 In addition, in 1995 State 
Council promulgated a “Notice on Further Strengthen the Management of Prison and RTL Work” 
(Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Jianyu Guanli He Laodong Jiaoyang Gongzuo De 
Tongzhi). At the same year, the very first local regulation on RTL based on the RTL legislation at 
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 These seven administrative regulations include “Measures on RTL Recipients’ Life and Sanitation 
Management” (1991) (Laodong Jiaoyang Renyuan Shenghuo Weisheng Guanli Banfa), “Code of Conduct 
of Guards of RTL and Convicted Labor Reform” (1991) (Laogai Laojiao Gongzuo Ganjing Xingwei 
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the national level, was introduce by Anhui Province, which stipulates more details on how to 
operate RTL system within its region.730   
 
An official statistics from China’s Bureau of RTL Administration shows that there are more than 
300 RTL institutions with total 260,000 laborers working and being educated there. 731 
Admittedly, compared with its initial period where only very few administrative regulations were 
available in providing general principles on RTL without operative details, through the rules 
mentioned above the Chinese RTL system is heading towards a relatively bright future, 
 
ii. Evaluating RTL in Terms of International Core Labor Standards 
To evaluate RTL system is mainly to assess it in accordance with the four criteria 
abovementioned that are required for a permissible prison labor, namely, (a) convicted via 
judicial procedure, (b) controlled and supervised by public authority, (c) no private sector’s 
involvement and (d) not serving as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purpose of 
economic development.732  
 
From the very first day of RTL’s birth, its main purpose is to cultivate its subjects into 
self-supporting socialist new person. During its recovering period, CCP once again emphasized 
the guiding principle of RTL is through means of education and labor to change those recipients 
into valuable persons with the capacity to contributing to the socialist China.733 In addition, the 
RTL camps are classified as special state owned institutions (or schools) by 1982 Trial Method 
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with no private elements’ involvement734. As such, the last two criteria provided by ILO 
fundamental Convention No.29 and No.105 have been met. In terms of the second criterion -- 
“supervised by public authority”, it is true that there was a period --from its birth to year 1966 -- 
the RTL system was relatively free from any public authority’s supervision, whereas, with the 
development of the RTL system and relevant legislation, today both in law and in practice, 
generally speaking, it is People’s Procuratorate’s obligation to supervise the daily operations of 
RTL institutions.735  
 
Indeed, the problem is mainly embodied in the first criterion -- “convicted via judicial procedure”. 
Theoretically, a special but ad hoc committee composed of heads of civil administration organs, 
public security bureaus and labor departments, is established by People’s Government at the 
provincial level, at the level of municipalities or at the level of large and medium-sized cities to 
control RTL’s approval and management.736 Due to the ad hoc nature of the RTL committee, 
however, in practice the whole process for the decision of RTL cases is under the control of 
public security department. Therefore, some Chinese scholars describe such situation with a 
specific term -- the same governmental agency with the same employees under two chapeaus 
(Liangkuai Paizi，Yitao Banzi,)737. Put specifically, Ministry of Public Security is in charge of the 
RTL’s approval nationwide, whilst at provincial level, the local police bureau controls the 
investigation and approval of RTL cases. 738  In sum, it is a normal phenomenon for public 
security department under the name of RTL committee to see to the investigation, its final 
approval as well as the dismissal of an appeal of the RTL case.739 It should be pointed out that 
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the practice as such was formed gradually in the process of the work of RTL per se without any 
legislative support. Therefore, either based on law in paper or based on de facto practice, the 
recipient of a RTL sentence has no right to public hearing, to counsel, nor has right to any kind of 
judicial determination of his/her case.  
 
The Convention No. 29 provides that an allowed exception of prison labor shall be “a 
consequence of a conviction of a court of law”, which implies that two requirements shall be 
satisfied simultaneously: ① “neither an administrative decision, by however high an authority, 
nor a decision by any other authority” is sufficient; and ② the person concerned must be found 
guilty of a crime, which is the typical and usual literal meaning of the word “conviction”. In this 
sense, the RTL system fails to meet the first criterion to become a legitimate exception to 
prohibited forced labor practice. Due to this defect, it is fair to say that the Chinese RTL system 
by nature is an institutionalized forced labor system with official support.  
 
Some might argue that although there was no judicial involvement in RTL system, through the 
promulgation of “Administrative Procedural Law” (Xingzheng Susong Fa) in 1990, there was 
judicial element of RTL decision procedure ever since. According to article 11 of Administrative 
Procedural Law, the court must hear the lawsuit relating to an action against any administrative 
sanction to limit the subjects’ personal freedom.740 Logically, now that RTL seriously limits its 
recipients’ freedom by confining them working in a RTL camp or school, its recipients are 
eligible to apply this clause in their cases. In addition, the 1991 judicial interpretation from SPC 
on several provisions of Administrative Procedural Law (with the same legislative power as law) 
makes it clear that if a recipient of RTL does not agree with the RTL committee’s decision, 
he/she has the right to bring the case to a court and the court must accept this administrative 
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lawsuit against RTL Committee’s decision.741 Admittedly, the legislative development as such is 
a progress of the Chinese RTL system. However, it nevertheless cannot be understood as the kind 
of judicial involvement under the sense of ILO Convention No.29. What the Convention requires 
is that a legitimate “forced labor” shall be “a consequence of a conviction in a court of law”742. 
In other words, it actually requires the judicial involvement to be incorporated into the course of 
RTL’s decision making and approval procedure, rather than merely be a means of afterwards 
relief as what the SPC’s interpretation provides -- recipients have been enforced to work 
immediately after the decision of RTL committee for a certain period of time.743 Besides, the 
condition -- a legitimate forced labor shall be a consequence of a conviction in a court of law -- 
implies that the judicial involvement shall be a compulsory procedure rather than an optional one. 
Given the contingent nature of the afterward relief under the 1991 judicial interpretation, it is by 
no means the kind of judicial involvement required by the ILO Convention No.29, article 2(2)(c). 
In fact, even if the judicial involvement discussed above is compatible with the very provision of 
the Convention No. 29, the RTL by its nature is merely an administrative sanction rather than a 
penal one. As such, the person concerned is not found guilty of a criminal offence, but an 
administrative offence. For that matter, both requirements implied by the first criterion -- 
“convicted via judicial procedure” are not satisfied. 
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iii. How to Fill the Gap between the Chinese RTL System and the ILO Fundamental 
Conventions at the Legislative Level? 
As analyzed above, among the four criteria, the problem mainly lies in the first criterion -- 
convicted via judicial procedure, which seems to be the critical criterion with a re-emphasis by 
ICCPR’s relevant provisions -- a legitimate forced labor practice shall be a consequence of a 
lawful order from a court.744 In other words, as long as RTL committee is substituted by people’s 
court and the RTL is categorized as penal sanction rather than administrative one, the RTL 
system is therefore consistent with the requirements under ILO fundamental conventions No.29 
and No.105. However, after so many years, despite facing various criticism from western media 
that terms RTL as the Chinese gulag contravening international human rights law, and from UN 
High Commission for Human Rights that calls for its abolition,745 China as a state famous for 
cherishing its reputation, nevertheless chooses to ignore such criticism and refuses to make a 
seemingly small step -- subjecting RTL to a criminal court’s decision. It is believed that there 
must be some deep reasons behind. 
 
a. Commitment to Rule of Law746 (ROL) with Reservation -- Ideal Level 
1. CCP’s Commitment to ROL 
Despite that some orientalists and static view holders are likely to deny the existence of the 
Chinese legal system or the possibility of constructing ROL within “authoritarian” China, 
considering China’s legal history, its past 10 years national disaster, its current rapsid economic 
development, its increasing interaction with the outside world and especially its being the official 
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member of WTO, the sincerity of China’s commitment to constructing a state with ROL and its 
progress in building a modern legal system shall not be denied.   
 
In China, “law has traditionally equated with the concept of criminal law and related 
punishment”747. For thousands of years, feudal China was under the rule of man, to be precise, 
rule of only one man -- the emperor.748 The initial reform on traditional Chinese legal system 
could be traced back to the late Qing Dynasty (the early 20th century), where the first time in the 
Chinese history, its traditional practice of combination of various departments of laws into one 
body (Zhufa Heti) was transformed into a variety of codes, modeled after the legal system of 
Japan and the continental European system, for the ultimate goals to “secure the emperor’s 
position permanently, to alleviate foreign aggression and to quell internal disturbance”749. Despite 
the collapse of the last feudal empire and the frequent changes of government and constitutions in 
the early period of the Republic, the pace of westernization of the Chinese law was not suspended 
but accelerated. 750 The promulgation of Six Codes (Liufa) by the then KMT government 
covering major aspects of social life, which included constitutional law, civil law, criminal law, 
civil and criminal procedural law as well as administrative law, officially established a 
Continental-style judicial system in China.751 A commentator comments as follows: 
 
Through these revolutionary changes, “for the first time, Western law and legal systems were 
introduced into China. As a result, they broke down traditional systems, values and practices and 
separated private law from public law, civil law from criminal law, and the legal system from the 
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administrative hierarchy. Most importantly, they laid down a foundation for Western law and 
legal systems to be further studied, developed and adapted in China. In this sense, the late Qing 
and KMT legal reforms may well be said to have brought about a revolution in Chinese legal 
thought and to have provided a foundation upon which modern Chinese law is being developed in 
the PRC. [Of course, this] does not necessarily mean the total disappearance of the influence of 
traditional conception of law on contemporary development of law. Indeed, the instrumentalist, 
utilitarian and authoritarian approach to law and law reform, both under Qing and the KMT, 
clearly reflected and continued the influence of the traditional conception of law as an instrument 
of the authoritarian state, with its focus on state interests as defined by the state itself.”752 
 
After CCP came into power, KMT’s Six Codes were abolished without realization of the 
potential legal vacuum. Under Mao’s leadership, the use of law was regarded as “a terroristic 
means for class struggle”. 753 In Cultural Revolution, rule of law was heavily criticized as 
interfering with class struggle and the necessity of a legal system was widely denied.754  
 
The present Chinese legal system is mainly a product after Deng Xiaoping came into power. 
Learning from past lessons, China began to understand the idea of citizens’ rights and freedoms 
and the meaning of ruling the country in accordance with law.755 “Party leaders repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of law for providing a social order conducive to economic 
development”.756 The promulgation of the 1982 Constitution and its four amendments, the 
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enactment new civil and economic legislation, the promulgation of an unprecedented white paper 
under the name of “the situation of human rights in China”, all reflect CCP’s serious commitment 
to ROL. In 1997, as a significant political milestone, the Chinese government pronounced its goal 
to govern the country according to law and to build up a socialist country with rule of law, which 
is the first recognition at the Chinese senior levels that the modernization of China depends on 
laws rather than programs, policies or plans.757 In its third constitution amendment, the concept 
of rule of law is officially incorporated into the current Chinese constitution. It is observed that all 
these reflect a conscious move from the ideology of “rule by man” or "rule by law"758 to "rule of 
law", and an improved understanding of the rule of law, especially its value towards market 
economy and sustainable development of the Chinese society.  
 
2. Serious Commitment to ROL with A “Reservation” 
In spite of various competing thick versions of rule of law, such as “statist socialist”, 
“neo-authoritarian”, “communitarian and liberal democratic”, there is a general agreement by 
most scholars all over the world (including the majority of the Chinese legal scholars) that rule of 
law requires at minimum that laws shall be general, published, prospective, clear, consistent on 
the whole, capable of being followed, relatively stable, fairly applied, and “there must be 
procedural rules for law making and laws must be made by an entity with the authority to make 
laws in accordance with such rules to be valid”, (hereinafter the “thin version of ROL”).759 In 
fact, the existence of RTL system not only has an obvious conflict with internationally recognized 
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labor standards against state supported forced labor whose status has arguably become customary 
international law760, but also creates an internal contradiction with CCP’s serious commitment to 
even the thin version of ROL.  
 
First, as an administrative sanction, the legal nature of RTL system is not compatible with the 
degree of its severity.761 Judging from the term and the degree of personal freedom that it takes 
away, considering that RTL is to target law-breakers but not serious enough to be punished by 
penal code, the severity of its sentence seems quite unreasonable. For example, by the Chinese 
criminal law, the term of public surveillance as one of the five principal punishments762 is from 
three months to two years763; as for the case of criminal detention as another principal punishment, 
its terms is from one to six months764. To those criminals who are sentenced to public surveillance, 
they are confined to the city or county where they live and are under the surveillance of public 
security bureau.765 When they are engaged in working, they must be paid as other fellow workers, 
i.e., equal pay for equal work.766 In other words, except for not being able to freely leave for 
other cities or counties, and being restricted when exercising certain civil and political rights, 
such as freedom of speech, of press and of assembly767, the convicted under sentence of public 
surveillance are living just like ordinary citizens. However, in the case of RTL subjects, they are 
required to gather in the special institutions to work and live there with tight guard.768 Even in the 
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public holiday, they can only rest on the premises within the institutions.769 Furthermore, to 
compare criminal detention with the punishment of RTL, the time limit of the former is one to six 
months only (of course, detainees lose their freedom completely), whereas the latter are much 
longer, whose maximum term could reach four years -- eight times longer than the term of 
detention. What is more, the detainees are allowed to go home once or twice a month, whilst, to 
RTL subjects, only half year consecutive good performance could entitle them to pay a visit 
home.770 In addition, probation may be granted to a criminal sentenced to detention or to fix-term 
imprisonment less than three years771; however, no similar grace is available for the sentence of 
RTL. Hence, it is fair to say that the disproportionate severity of the punishment of RTL brings 
about a serious consistency dilemma within the Chinese legislation. 
 
Second, the legal foundation for the system of RTL is problematic as well. As discussed above, in 
spite of the serious limitation of its recipients’ freedom, the major legislation in charge of RTL, 
by its nature, belongs to the category of administrative regulation (Xingzheng Fagui) 772 . 
According to “Law on Administrative Sanction” adopted by the National People’s Congress in 
1996, any administrative penalty that restricts personal freedom could only be provided by law 
(in its narrow sense whose legal hierarchy is only subordinated to the Chinese constitution); 773 
to those laws on administrative penalties promulgated before the said “Law on Administrative 
Sanction”, they should be amended to be consistent with this new law by the end of 1997. 774 
This principle is reconfirmed by the later “Law on Legislation” (Lifa Fa) promulgated in year 
2000 which stipulates that only law (in its narrow sense) can provide punishment to limiting 
                                                 
769
 Ibid. art. 24. 
770
 Ibid. art. 25. 
771
 Supra 763, art. 72. 
772
 For more information, please see text 4.2(C) (i) (a) and note 689. 
773
 Law on Administrative Sanction of PRC, 1996, art. 9. For more information, please see text above part 
2.3 (A) (ii) (c) -- “The Hierarchy of the Chinese Legislation”. 
774
 Ibid. art.64. 
181 
people’s freedom.775 In other words, administrative regulations whose legal authority is lower 
than law (in its narrow sense) are not eligible to provide the administrative sanctions whose main 
function is to limit people’s freedom. For that matter, as administrative regulations promulgated 
by State Council, the 1957 Decision, the 1979 Supplementary Provision, together with the 1982 
Trial Methods, have been proved to be lack of sufficient legal basis for their legitimate 
existence.776 
 
In spite of the disproportionate nature of the punishment of RTL, the validity issue of its relevant 
legislation and the inconsistency they have caused within the Chinese legal system, the CCP none 
the less chooses to support this practice, disregarding its serious commitment towards the 
construction of ROL. Of course, to be realistic, it may take time to reform the RTL system to be 
consistent with the international core labor standards provided by ILO Convention No. 29 and No. 
105; however, this argument still can not justify CCP’s unduly positive praise on the system of 
RTL -- describing it as an indispensable element of China’s construction of ROL with socialist 
characteristics regardless of its problematic nature against the basic principles of ROL777.  
 
In fact, from the writer’s view, one of the reasons for CCP to keep the RTL system as it is is to try 
to use it as a non-legal shortcut to maintain its one party control and to restore social and political 
stability from any kind of turmoil as soon as possible. Back to its birth, RTL was used as a 
political tool to attack counterrevolutionary elements and rightists that were believed to hide 
among people; later, in the 1989 Tiananmen political turmoil, the RTL served as an effective and 
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quick instrument to confine and reeducate political dissenters.778 Since 1999, a worldwide 
attention has been paid to China’s RTL system again, because it was used to deter and punish 
Falun Gong believers.779 Recently, two elderly women both in their late 70s were sentenced to a 
year of RTL sanction due to their request for permission to protest during Beijing Olympics.780 
Without any involvement of the relatively long court procedure, hence, avoiding the dilemma of 
no criminal charges under the Chinese penal code applicable to these political dissenters or Falun 
Gong believers and also avoiding the dilemma caused by the gradual expansion of defendant’s 
rights in the formal criminal justice system in China, thousands of people were quickly and 
quietly sentenced to work and to be educated at RTL institutions for several years -- a fairly long 
cooling period. It shall be pointed out that among these political dissenters, some of them have 
merely expressed their discontent or concerns of the current political system and certain social 
problems, such as corruption, in a non-violent way. To sentence people as such to the RTL 
institutions is inconsistent with the spirit of ILO Convention No. 105 where an immediate and 
complete abolition of forced or compulsory labor for the mere expression of political or 
ideological opinions is required.781  
 
The second reason for CCP to keep RTL is to prevent CCP from being criticized for certain 
human rights abuses.782 For instance, based on the UDHR, “no one shall be subject to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile” and “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of 
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any criminal charge against him”. 783  Apparently, now that RTL is emphasized to be an 
administrative sanction rather than criminal regardless of its disproportionately severe 
punishment, its detention and decision making process will not be subject to the universal human 
rights norms as such. Therefore, RTL system could circumvent the application of the standards 
regarding fair trial provided by UDHR to certain criminals; as such, CCP is able to be immune 
from criticism for human rights abuses to some extent.784 Accordingly, no matter how big a 
contradiction between the system of RTL and the principles of ROL, the non-judicial nature of 
the former that can lead to a quick restore of social and political stability and an efficient 
maintenance of CCP’s one party control, as well as its importance for CCP to be immune from 
criticism for human rights abuses are too valuable to be given up. Indeed, although the current 
legislation of the RTL in paper has nothing to do with “political purpose”, its de facto practice 
implies its unbroken link with “political purpose” -- restoring social and political stability and 
strengthening one party control as soon as possible. In this sense, it is partly right to understand 
the RTL as “a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or 
expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or 
economic system”785, which is required by the Convention No. 105 for a state to “take effective 
measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labor”786 of 
such kind.  
 
3. Where Will the Political Will to Push the CCP to Give Up Its Reservation towards ROL 
Come from? (General Comments) 
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As for how to create the CCP’s motivation to give up its reservation about ROL, it is not an easy 
or short term task. First, it depends on the further development of the ROL inside China to create 
internal public awareness of ROL, including CCP members’ own awareness, together with the 
deeper understanding of human rights by public and government officials,787 a more democratic 
government, as well as a further development of the market economy in China788.  
 
Second, international pressure is also indispensable. Assistance from ILO -- a labor right expert 
international organization (albeit its strategies are mainly limited to moral and diplomatic 
persuasion and embarrassment of government who fail to obey their voluntary responsibilities), is 
nonetheless helpful in cultivating public awareness and understanding of international core labor 
standards against forced labor. From early 2003, the ILO has been providing assistance for the 
reform of RTL via technical seminars held in China and study tours overseas.789 Besides, now 
that China has joined WTO -- “the only global trade organization dealing with the rule of trade 
between nations”790 and famous for its trade related international rule of law capacity building -- 
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at the end of year 2001 after fifteen years arduous negotiations, from an optimistic point of view, 
it is believed that in spite of its limitation to trade related area, WTO’s impact on the ROL 
construction in China would be unprecedented as well as profound, and China’s entry to the trade 
related rule of law regime would “call for higher standards for China’s judicial system”.791 As 
such, China’s entering into the WTO would be helpful for cultivating a legal habit of the Chinese 
governmental officials to obey the principles of ROL, at least to obey the principles of its “thin” 
version -- principles of transparency, judicial review and uniform, impartial and reasonable 
administrative legislation.792 Despite that the improvement as such is currently limited to the area 
of the trade related law, its potential for spreading to other non-trade-law areas, and therefore 
indirectly improving the CCP’s ROL construction shall not be underestimated. Hopefully, 
through the cooperation between the internal and external impulse, the CCP’s political will of 
giving up its reservation to ROL, in particular its RTL system might be created gradually.  
 
b. Suggestions on the Future Development of the Chinese RTL System  
In this section, the writer categorizes various academic suggestions in terms of the future 
development of the RTL System into three major groups and is going to analyze them one by one 
as follows: 
 
1. Retain and Strengthen the RTL System 
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The first one is to retain and strengthen the RTL System.793 Some Chinese scholars insist that 
RTL, as a system with unique Chinese characteristics, has educated and reformed about three 
million people for more than four decades. Hence, it has contributed a lot to the stabilization of 
the Chinese society, especially during the transitional period.794 However, considering RTL’s 
conflicts with certain basic principles of ROL795 as well as its serious inconsistency with 
international core labor standards and principles of human rights against state-supported forced 
labor, there is no excuse for CCP to keep RTL as it is, let alone to strengthen it. 
 
2. Completely Abolish the RTL System 
The second suggestion is to completely abolish RTL on an urgent basis.796 Supporters of this 
view have several reasons as follows:  
 
(1) Considering that the RTL system fails to satisfy the tests required by the prison labor 
exception provided by the Convention No. 29 as well as its controversial nature -- an 
institutionalized forced labor system partly served as a means for punishing people for their 
expression of political or ideological opinion, it is incompatible with China’s obligation 
under the customary international law against forced or compulsory labor; 
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(2) RTL system is against certain basic principles of ROL, i.e., the related legislation is lack of 
legitimacy,797 and the related punishment is unreasonably harsh compared with the other 
principal punishments under the Chinese penal code, such as criminal detention and public 
surveillance798;  
 
(3) In practice, this system lacks effective monitoring mechanism on its investigation, decision 
making and appeal. It can easily bring about power abuses by public security department to 
violate citizen’s basic rights; 
 
(4) The rules and regulations on RTL are numerous, sometimes conflicting between each other 
and some are out of dated. For example, in the 1957 Decision, it provides that RTL shall be 
applied to those “counterrevolutionary” elements (Fan Geming), which is a term being 
amended into persons “endangering national security” in the first amendment of the Chinese 
Criminal Law in 1999.799 Besides, some RTL related rules and codes of conducts are not 
promulgated to the public but only serve as “internal documents” (Neibu Wenjian).800 
Without proper publication, the conflicts among various internal documents appear to be 
inevitable. 
 
3. Gradually Reform the RTL System 
The third suggestion is the so called “gradual reform approach”, i.e., gradually reforming RTL to 
make it more consistent with the principles of ROL and international core labor standards.801 To 
be precise, the “gradually reforming” approach can be divided into several steps as follows: 
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First and foremost, the non-judicial nature of RTL’s decision making process is suggested to be 
changed. Considering that there might not be enough judges who are experts on RTL decision 
making at present, an alternative serving as a transitional mechanism could be designed as 
follows: allowing RTL committee to make an initial decision, however, its decision must be 
subject to court’s final approval before being publicized and applied to relevant persons. It is also 
suggested that the procedures on the final approval must follow the basic principles of the 
Chinese laws in charge of administrative processes, especially those about the participation of the 
relevant persons and due process. Through practice as such, a judicial examination and 
monitoring mechanism is guaranteed during the process of decision making on RTL cases, which 
not only makes up the non-judicial nature of RTL’s decision making, but also serves as a safety 
valve against discretion of RTL Committee. Of course, the way of the final approval by judges 
shall not be as complicated as usual judicial procedure. Generally speaking, a simplified 
procedure might be introduced -- they might be paper work based in principle. As such, it will be 
able to avoid the dilemma of lack of manpower in the current Chinese court system. As for those 
hard cases or when the relevant person applies for a hearing, judges nevertheless reserve the right 
to hold open hearings with both sides’ as well as their lawyers’ attendance (just like usual 
administrative judicial procedures in China). Gradually, those judges who are assigned to sit on 
RTL’s final approval will become experts in the said area. When time is mature, the whole 
procedure of RTL decision making could be incorporated into the Chinese judicial system, i.e., 
the RTL Committee’s role will be completely substituted by courts with judges who are experts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fazhan), Current Legal Study (Dangdai Faxue), the first issue of 2001; Liu Renwen, “Reeducation 
Through Labor and Its Reform” (Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu Jiqi Gaige), Administrative Law Study 
(Xingzheng Faxue Yanjiu), fourth issue of 2001; Liu Zhongfa, The Reform of Reeducation Through Labor 
(Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu De Gaige Chulu), Sino-Foreign Legal Study (Zhongwai Faxue), sixth issue of 
2001. 
189 
Second, in order to be consistent with the said consistency principle of ROL, the degree of the 
punishment of RTL system shall be generally consistent with the severity of its offences. As 
mentioned above in part -- “Serious Commitment to ROL with A ‘Reservation’”, the severity of 
RTL’s punishment in nature is more serious than one of the principal punishments under the 
penal code -- public surveillance. In addition, although the punishment of the RTL system only 
limits its recipients’ freedom to some extent whereas detainees of criminal detention have 
completely lost their freedom, given its unreasonably long term -- maximum of four years, 
sometimes one would rather choose to be punished by criminal detentions than by the 
administrative sanction under the RTL. It is suggested by some scholars that the term of the 
punishment of RTL shall be shortened substantially so that the disproportionately severe nature of 
the RTL’s punishment could be made up to some extent. Above and beyond this, probation is 
suggested to be introduced to RTL; otherwise, it does not make sense for those convicted by 
penal code to be granted probation802, whereas, for less severe offenders -- RTL subjects, they are 
enforced to work and live in a confined place without any opportunity to be pardoned. Of course, 
as probation is not allowed to apply to recidivists in the Chinese penal code, by the same token, 
for offenders who are subject to RTL punishment more than one time, probation should not be 
allowed either. 
 
4. The Writer’s Position 
To be objective, there are some merits of this “gradual reform approach”. After adjusting the 
disproportionate punishment of the RTL, this system will be more consistent with the basic 
principles of the ROL. In addition, via introducing the judicial examination and monitoring 
mechanism as such, one of the two requirements under the first criterion of the permissible prison 
labor exception to forced or compulsory labor provided by the Convention No. 29 -- “decided by 
a court of law” could be satisfied thereafter. However, as long as the nature of the RTL system is 
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classified as a means of administrative sanction and the person concerned is not “convicted”-- 
found guilty of a criminal offense, according to the Committee of Experts, “in the absence of such 
a finding, compulsory labor may not be imposed, even as a result of a decision by a court’.803  
 
In sum, after discussing the pros and cons of the three available suggestions on the reform of the 
RTL system, the best way available would be to abolish the RTL so that China could fulfill its 
obligation under the CIL against forced labor, in particular the obligation crystallized by the ILO 
fundamental Convention No. 29 and No. 105,804 as well as make a great progress on its way to 
the construction of ROL. 
 
iv. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the writer conducts a comprehensive case study on the Chinese RTL system. First, 
the writer introduces this system from its birth, its gradual development to its present situation. 
To be objective, the current Chinese RTL system has been improved substantially compared with 
its beginning status and what it was during the Cultural Revolution. Later on, an evaluation on 
RTL system in relation to international core labor standards against forced labor is made. From 
the writer’s analysis, mainly because of lack of judicial involvement and the person concerned is 
not “convicted”, the Chinese RTL system fails to meet the requirement of legitimate prison labor 
exception under the ILO fundamental convention No. 29 and No. 105. As such, RTL system is 
not able to be qualified as a permissible exception to prohibited forced labor. Accordingly, the 
writer tries to provide her comments on the three approaches on the reform of the Chinese RTL 
system under the framework of the ILO Fundamental Conventions against forced labor. The 
writer starts with analyzing the hidden reasons for CCP’s refusal to reform its RTL system, 
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regardless of the fact that the CCP is aware of its problematic nature. And then the writer talks 
about the driving force that is able to help create CCP’s political will to engage into reforming 
RTL system. Finally, after a critical review on the three available approaches, the writer supports 
the approach of a complete abolition of the RTL system to make the Chinese labor legislation 
much more consistent with both the international core labor standards and the basic principles of 
ROL. 
 
4.3 Conclusion on Chapter Four 
In chapter four, at the beginning, the writer introduces the general international law against forced 
labor and proves that practice against forced labor has obtained the legal status as CIL. And then 
the writer starts analyzing the three types of forced labor in China. As for the first type, its 
subjects are ordinary workers. In fact, the Chinese legislation against the first type of forced labor 
is competent and provides proportionate liabilities for law breakers. The inadequacy lies in the 
implementation of the related legislation. Therefore, the writer provides the suggestions on how 
to sort out the problems as such: (1) improvement of judicial independence, and (2) 
professionalization of judges in China to reduce the chances of corruption during the procedure of 
decision making and enforcement of court decisions against such type of forced labor.  
 
In terms of the second type of forced labor -- the convicted labor reform system, from the writer’s 
view, it is undeniable that some past and present practices and certain former governmental 
policies on prison labor in china is inconsistent with the relevant requirements under the ILO 
fundamental conventions No. 29 and No.105. However, it is proved that the inconsistency as such 
is no longer systematic. Indeed, both the present legislation and the governmental policies are 
consistent with the ILO Conventions No. 29 and No.105. As such, it is fair to say that today’s 
Chinese convicted labor reform system is designed to educate and cultivate criminals through 
means of labor instead of adopting it as a means to develop national economy. A few incidents 
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conflicting with the international core labor standards should not be used as the evidence to deny 
the value of this system. After all, no matter how elaborately planned, each system will inevitably 
carry some problems, in particular in the course of its implementation.  
 
It is worthy to be pointed out that some Human Rights NGOs have accused China for its adopting 
forced labor as a punishment for having participated in strikes.805 They argue that China has 
sentenced a certain amount of leaders, organizers and other active participants to work in the 
convicted labor reform camps. Be that as it may, accusation as such suffers at least one defect. 
The said NGOs have admitted that in most cases, if not all, the reasons for the strikers to be 
sentenced to prison labor are not directly because of their behavior of organizing or participating 
a strike, but due to the destruction of property or public order during the course of a strike.806 If 
following the literal explanation of the requirement provided in Convention No. 105 -- 
“immediate and complete abolition of forced labor … as a means of punishment for having 
participated in strikes”, it only prohibits a direct causal relationship to be established between 
behavior of having participated in a strike and forced labor instead of including a remote causal 
relationship as what has happened in the Chinese context. As such, different from the statement 
made by certain overseas NGOs, forced labor as a means of punishment for having participated in 
strikes is by no means a serious problem in China and there is no hard evidence to prove that 
practice as such is with institutional support. 
 
As far as the third type of forced labor in china is concerned, it might be where the most serious 
violation of ILO conventions against forced labor lies. After a comprehensive introduction to the 
Chinese RTL system, a comparative study between the Chinese RTL system and the ILO 
Convention No. 29 and 105 is conducted. Through the analysis as such, the Chinese RTL system 
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has been proved to be a prohibited forced labor practice under the ILO fundamental conventions. 
Accordingly, the writer provides her support on a complete abolition of the RTL system and 
points out that only via such an approach could the Chinese labor legislation be more consistent 
with the international core labor standard against forced labor as well as the basic principles of 























Chapter 5: Studying Child Labor in China from the Perspective of Relevant International 
Core Labor Standards  
 
5.1 What is Child Labor? 
A. General Definition of Child and Child Labor in Accordance with International Law 
As for the definition of child, except for some extreme cases, where childhood might be viewed 
biologically instead of chronologically, most states all over the world would be willing to define 
child by his/her age. Under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (the 
“UNCRC”), a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless domestic 
law provides otherwise.807  According to the ILO Convention No. 138 -- the Convention 
Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (Minimum Age Convention), the 
minimum age for work must not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, 
in any case, shall not be less than fifteen.808  Of course, the convention allows countries 
“insufficiently developed” to temporarily lower the minimum age to 14.809 For work that is likely 
to “jeopardized the health, safety or morals of young persons”, the minimum age for employment 
is 18.810 When “the health, safety and morals of the young persons concerned are fully protected 
and that the young persons have received adequate specific instruction or vocational training in 
the relevant branch of activity”811, the minimum age for dangerous work can be lowered to 16.812 
Besides, the convention also permits “the employment or work of persons 13 to 15 years of age 
on light work”, which is not likely to harm their health or development or prejudice their chances 
to get appropriate education and training.813 Once again, some member states could reduce this 
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age by one year. 814  In sum, although there are various exceptions based on different 
circumstances, at international level, the general line of demarcation to define child labor is 15 
years old. 
 
B. Distinguishing Acceptable and Unacceptable Child Labor 
Obviously, not all work is bad for children. In limited amounts and under certain circumstances, 
children’s involvement of certain kinds of work could be beneficial for them to develop a sense of 
responsibility, to exercise their bodies, to earn a little pocket money and even to prepare them for 
a mature and successful adult life in the future. Hereinafter, child labor as such would be called as 
child work in the later part of this thesis. To distinguish child work from unaccepted child labor, 
the key point is to draw a dividing line between them. After a research on various definitions 
provided by different international organizations, NGOs and other relevant groups,815 the writer 
will provide a comparison between child work and child labor in the following table: (table 4) 
 
 Child Labor Child Work 
Purpose The purpose is to economically 
exploit children; 
The purpose is to improve children’s 
quality of life; 
Nature The nature of it tends to bind 
children to poverty, and therefore 
create a vicious circle for endless 
misery such as unemployment when 
The nature of it is mainly to cultivate 
and help children, such as to help them 
have a sense of responsibility, a better 
understanding of the world and to 
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they grow up; prepare themselves for future; 
Work The work is usually prohibited by 
legislation, and child laborers have 
no chances to be covered by social 
security as well as benefits for 
ordinary adult workers; 
The work is regulated by suitable 
legislation or governed by community 
values and norms; 
Rewards No fair rewards provided for these 
child laborers; 
Child workers are paid reasonably 
according to their contribution; 
Workplace 
Environment 
The working environment is 
hazardous to child laborers’ healthy 
development either psychologically 
or physically; 
Workplace is safe and child friendly, 
not hazardous to children’s healthy 
development; 
Supervision No suitable supervision or guidance 
is provided by responsible and 
well-trained adults; 
Appropriate supervision and guidance is 
provided by responsible and caring 




Unreasonably long working hours 
jeopardize child laborers’ right to 
education and right to rest, and cause 
harmful memories of their childhood 
as well; 
Limited working hours without 
interfering children’s right to education, 
rest and right to a childhood with nice 
memories; 
Workload Considering children’s age and 
capabilities, the workload is too 
heavy to be carried out by an 
immature body, such as working as 
construction worker, machinist and 
coal breaker etc;  
The work is suitable for children’s age 
and physical and mental capabilities, 
such as newspaper delivery, washing 
dishes, other light chores etc; 
Impact on 
Children 
Child laborers are easily to be 
subject to verbal, psychological and 
physical abuses. 
Rather than being negatively 
influenced, children’s physical and 





C. The Evil Nature of Child Labor 
Among many serious crimes, “none is more brutal, horrible, disastrous, insane” than the 
exploitation of children, because exploitation as such is equivalent to the deprivation of “health, 
vitality, childhood and education as well as the destruction of the body and the soul of future 
generations”.816 Generally speaking, the types of harm caused by child labor can be divided into 
four categories: (1) physical harm; (2) psychological harm; (3) developmental harm; (4) harm to 
society. 
 
i. Physical Harm 
Obviously, children are more likely to suffer workplace accident than adults due to fatigue, poor 
judgment and insufficient knowledge and experience of work process.817  In addition, the 
machinery, tools, and other layout of most work places are designed particularly for adults. 
Accordingly, it not only adds difficulties for children to operate them, but enhance the risks when 
children are using them.818 The rates of occupational injury and death reveal the consequences of 
the hazards faced by child laborers.819 Although statistics appear to be patchy, evidence still 
could be found in studies conducted in the developed world, where hospital records and awards 
under workers’ compensation schemes have been investigated.820 For example, in US, “the rate 
of injury per hour worked appears to be almost twice as high for children and adolescents as it is 
for adults”.821 Worse still, when child laborers get injured, because their bodies are still in the 
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process of development, they tend to be hurt more seriously than adult workers.822 Besides, an 
increasing number of academic research and writing on child labor have provided empirical 
evidence on its negative physical impact on children in general.823 For instance, a study of the 
working children in Tel Aviv shows that 42 percent of them had visible signs of poor health, 
including poor teeth, paleness, short stature and a malnourished appearance.824  
 
ii. Psychological Harm 
Being denied a chance of education and a normal childhood, child laborers are easily subject to 
incurable psychological harm when they grow up.825 Exposed to the child unfriendly working 
environment, child laborers lose the chance to improve their learning skills necessary for their 
future development, as well as the chance to become increasingly mature, able and confident to 
assume greater responsibilities in the school, in the community and generally in life.826 In 
addition, as almost known to all, traumatic experience either physical or psychological that 
happened during childhood, which is easily caused by child labor, might lead to morbid even 
self-destructive pattern of behavior in a person’s future life.827 For example, a victim of child 
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prostitution is inclined to suffer an inability to trust others in his/her adulthood.828 As such, a 
person with an unusual childhood caused by child labor will be likely to be emotionally needy, 
unstable, aggressive, suspicious and distrustful of society.829 
 
iii. Developmental Harm 
Even where child labor is not physically dangerous, it is nevertheless harmful when it interferes 
with a child’s opportunity to get appropriate education or vocational training.830 Considering that 
most work involving child labor is dull and repetitive with no elements of professional skills, it is 
not able to help a child laborer develop any special skills that might be useful for improving the 
chances of employment in his/her adulthood.831 In other words, lack of education along with no 
special skills is equivalent to exploiting a child’s opportunity to break the vicious circle between 
poverty and child labor so that he/she will be able to have an opportunity to enjoy a decent life in 
the future.832 
 
iv. Harm to Society 
Child labor is not only harmful for an individual child laborer, but is able to bring about 
damaging effects on a society in general.833 As the future of every country, if children have no 
chance to receive necessary education but have to work for the sake of their or their families’ 
survival instead, the general quality of a state’s population will decline gradually as a logical 
consequence. With an undeveloped or underdeveloped human capital resource, it is hard to 
imagine a state as such is able to have a sustainable booming future. Indeed, no nation can 
maintain economic development in the long run if it keeps a blind eye on child labor, because 
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child labor “retards the development of human resources, reduces lifetime earnings of the 
individual, and lowers the level of productivity and economic growth for the society at large”.834 
 
5.2 Introduction to International Law against Child Labor 
It is not exaggerated to declare that governments all over the world carry almost universal 
agreement on the idea that children are not only entitled to all the rights guaranteed by the 
fundamental human rights conventions, but also entitled to special protection and care from both 
their families and states. Starting from UDHR, special attention has been paid to children already 
-- “childhood [is] entitled to special care and assistance”.835 Later on, in the international bill of 
rights, every child’s right to get protection from family, society and the state as required in 
accordance with his status as a minor is secured.836 In ICESCR, it explicitly prohibits economic 
and social exploitation on children and requires states to punish the paid employment of child 
labor below age limits through national legislation.837  
 
The very first international document promulgated by UN, expanding and amplifying the theme -- 
“Childhood [is] entitled to special care and assistance”838 within UDHR is the 1959 Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child.839 However, it only provided a general moral framework to arouse 
people’s attention rather than a legal obligation with binding force. Thirty years after the 1959 
Declaration, the UNCRC came into stage and it is the most comprehensive and the only human 
rights treaty specialized in the rights of a child, covering all spectrums of the civil, political, 
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economic, social and cultural rights of a child.840 It was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in year 1989 and entered into force in the year after.841 Indeed, the UNCRC has been 
signed and ratified by almost all the UN member states, except for Somalia where there is no 
internationally recognized central government and United States who has signed but not ratified it 
due to concerns by the US Senate of some national sovereignty issues.842 As one of the very few 
international conventions obtaining near-universal support, UNCRC “guarantees children the 
right to be free from discrimination, to be protected in armed conflicts, to be protected from 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, to be free from arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, to receive age-appropriate treatment in the justice system, and to be free 
from economic exploitation and other abuses, among other rights”.843 In particular, state parties 
are under the obligation to take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to 
ensure the rights of a child to be protected from economic exploitation and to protect a child from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with his/her opportunity to 
enjoy education, or to be harmful to child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social 
development.844 Besides, state parties shall provide for a minimum age or ages for admission to 
employment and enact appropriate legislation on the hours and conditions of employment as well 
as proportionate penalties and other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of the 
legislation as such.845  
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The expert international institution for protecting child laborers’ rights is the ILO. It has passed 
over twenty-five conventions846 relating to child labor, among which Convention No.138 -- 
Minimum Age Convention 1973 (the “MAC”) and No.182 -- Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention 1999 (the “WFCC”) are the fundamental ones. Considering that the time has come to 
establish a general instrument with the view of achieving total abolition of child labor, 847 the 
MAC provides that each member shall specify a minimum age for admission to employment or 
work within its territory to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of 
young persons.848 Although article 2(3) of MAC sets the general minimum age at fifteen, article 
2(4) states that countries with insufficient developed economies, after consultation with the 
organizations of employers and workers concerned, could set minimum age for fourteen. Where 
the type of employment or work by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is 
likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons, a blanket ban on employment 
or work of persons less than eighteen years is set.849 Under certain circumstances, however, 
where national laws or regulations provide otherwise, or by the competent authority after 
consultation with the organizations of employers and workers concerned, the age could be 
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lowered to 16.850 In terms of WFCC, considering the need to adopt new instruments for the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as the main priority for national and 
international action,851 this convention further provides that member states shall take immediate 
and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor 
as a matter of urgency.852 The term of the worst forms of child labor compromises; 
 
“(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, 
debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; 
 (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or 
for pornographic performances; 
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production 
and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; 
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the 
health, safety or morals of children.”853 
 
So far, China has ratified all the said conventions in relation to the protection of children or child 
laborers. 
 
5.3 Child Labor in China -- Rearing Its Ugly Head Again  
A. Historical Review on the Issue of Child Labor in China 
i. Child Labor in the Early Twentieth Century’s China 
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During the early part of the twentieth century, it was because of the development of the capitalist 
economy, the lack of relevant legislation and the social instability caused by warlords’ conflicts, 
colonization and Sino-Japanese War immediately followed by Civil War, the number of child 
laborers in China back then was increasing year by year. Although there was a lack of official 
statistics on the nationwide problems of child labor, according to some non-governmental sources, 
it was estimated that young workers under the age of eighteen accounted for one fourth of the 
total Chinese work force back then.854 In accordance with an official investigation made by the 
KMT government in 1930, in nine provinces, including Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Shandong etc., the 
number of industrial workers was around 1,204,317, inter alia, 55,605 workers were child 
laborers.855 The investigation also showed that child laborers were involved in the metal and 
construction materials production as well as chemical and textile industries etc.856 The data 
reflected by the table below which includes both number of adult workers and that of child 
laborers involved in Shanghai’s textile industry is just the tip of the iceberg: (table 5) 
 
 No. of Male 
workers 
No. of Female 
workers 
No. of Male 
Child Labor 
below age of 12 
No. of Female 
Child Labor 















219 (3.9%) 2,650 (48.4%) 372 (6.8%) 2,227 (40.9%) 
Textile 235 (3.4%) 3,618 (52.6%) 55.2 (8.0%) 2,469 (35.9%) 
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[source: Yin Minmin & Lu Yungeng, “Study on Chinese Child Labor in the Early Twentieth Century” 
(Ershi Shijichu Zhongguo De Tonggong Wenti Yanjiu), Journal of Shangdong Teacher-Training University 
(Shangdong Shifan Daxue Xuebao), the third issue of 2003] 
 
Although the table above only reflects the situation in textile industry in Shanghai, at the 
minimum, it implies that the child labor problem, in particular, the female child labor problem 
was serious at that time.  
 
As for the terms and working conditions for the child laborers, generally speaking, they were 
miserable. Before 1912, the usual working hours in China was between 12 and 14 and there was 
almost no night work.857 However, statistics showed that after 1912 (the founding of Republic of 
China)858, things had changed dramatically -- the longest working hours had been extended to 17, 
sometimes even 18 hours per day.859 Meanwhile, phenomenon of night work started spreading. 
In fact, for relatively large factories in the urban areas, almost all of them adopted night work 
system after year 1912.860 A 1933 investigation report on the Chinese textile industries disclosed 
that the average working hours for child laborers were 12 but sometimes it could be extended to 
16 even 18.861 In terms of working environment, most of the factories at that time did not provide 
suitable working safety equipment even for adult workers, let alone for those vulnerable child 




 Since the founding of the Republic of China, its history was marked by numerous conflicts among 








laborers.862 From 1919 to 1923, almost 17 percent of the work related injury cases that were sent 
to hospitals in Shanghai were child laborers (without taking into consideration the injured child 
laborers who have no chance to get medical treatment).863 It was reported that most child laborers 
in the textile factories were bony, pale, obviously malnourished, and most of them had been 
infected by tubercle bacillus.864 Worse still, some reports discovered that some child laborers 
were not only subject to torture-like treatment, but became the victims of sexual abuses as well.865  
 
ii. Child Labor in the Socialist China 
After CCP came into power in 1949, especially in Mao Zedong’s time, based on the 
understanding that child labor is the capitalist dregs and the children are the future of the 
nation,866 the socialist government at that time made a decision to completely eradicate child 
labor. One of the policies to reach the said goal is the policy of compulsory education. “Shortly 
after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government took education as a 
matter of primary importance, and made enhancing the cultural quality of the people the basis of 
the construction of the nation.”867 At that time, it was estimated that only 20 percent of the 
Chinese population was literate.868 The CCP made an ambitious decision to establish universal 
public education for a large population around the whole nation. For example, from 1949 to 1951, 
“more than 60 million peasants enrolled in winter schools, or sessions, which were established to 
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take advantage of the slack season for agricultural workers”.869 At that time, there was a 
nationwide belief that everybody in China, regardless of his/her family background, had the right 
and the obligation to be educated. It was also believed by most Chinese that education could 
change a person’s life. As such, there was a thirsty desire for knowledge permeating the newly 
founded socialist state.870  
 
In addition, at that time, a large scale of nationalization movement was spreading all over China. 
In 1960s, the government had finished the process of socialization of means of production subject 
to public control, which implied that almost all the enterprises were state owned.871 With strict 
governmental control, there was little chance for a child laborer to work in the SOEs. Indeed, 
from the date of CCP’s birth, its position on child labor was always clear and consistent, i.e., to 
protect the child laborers from economic exploitation, physical or mental abuses and to adopt 
universal compulsory education for every child in China.872 In the CCP’s “Declaration of 
Secondary Nationwide Representative Conference” (Zhongguo Gongchandang Dierci Quanguo 
Daibiao Dahui Xuanyan), it had explicitly pronounced its goal to abolishing bonded labor, 
adopting eight hours working time, and establishing special sanitary as well as care system for 
child laborers.873 In its “Labor Law Outline”, it reemphasized the eight hours working time and 
its blanket ban on children below 16 to be employed.874 For children between age of 16 and 18, 
only light work without harming their health and development was allowed.875 In sum, with strict 
governmental control on the SOEs and partly because of the strict migration control from rural 
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areas to urban ones as well876, together with a clear party’s guiding policy, it is fair to conclude 
that there were very few cases in relation to child labor in the Chinese industrial sector back 
then.877  
 
However, this evil started to reemerge together with China’s rapid economic development and 
there is a trend of spreading. Below are some examples relating to child labor in China in recent 
years: in Wuhan City, reports showed that there were more than twenty garment factories 
employing child laborers and one the children was confirmed dead due to calenture;878 also in 
Wuhan City, a small private garment factory hired more than two hundred child laborers working 
there for more than ten hours per day;879 in Neihuang county of Henan Province, through a three 
days’ investigation, the local government discovered that seven private enterprises within its 
region had employed twenty-two child laborers (aging from 13 to 15);880 in Zhenzhou City, 
Henan Province, during a one month’s investigation, the local government found twenty-eight 
cases in relation to the employment of child labor, and more than fifty child laborers were sent 
back to their hometowns;881 in Jiangxi Province, an explosion at one of its rural schools killed 
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forty-two people and most of them were third and fourth grade students who were making 
fireworks at the time of the blast;882 among 160 glass factories located in Qi County, Shanxi 
Province, 20 of them had been found to employ child laborers; 883  in Shanghai, a 
Japanese-invested garment factory was found to employ child laborers who were working as hard 
as adults but receiving much less pay;884 the recent forced labor scandal in Shanxi Province 
involved some forced child laborers as well -- the youngest was only eight years old.885 
 
As for the working condition of these child laborers, it is usually child unfriendly. Sometimes 
child laborers are required to work more than ten hours a day without any appropriate supervision 
from adults. Below are a few examples: ① a female child laborer’s description of her working 
condition in a small garment factory is that: “we had been working from Sep. 29th to Sep. 31st for 
three consecutive days without any sleep and in the morning of 31st, I was too tired to work and 
fell asleep when I was working. The machine destroyed my nails. It was really painful…”886; ② 
in late 2003, a reporter from Guangzhou Southern Metropolis Newspaper visited a local textile 
factory and found that some workers there were as young as twelve but worked around sixteen 
hours a day and slept at a 200 square meter workshop filled with heaps of leftover textiles scraps 
mixed with trash;887 ③ it was reported that due to substandard condition of a private company 
located in Luancheng County, Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province, five female child laborers were 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.ce.cn/law/over-bottom/hot-news/200605/26/t20060526_7109878.shtml> (date accessed: 
March 10, 2007). 
882
 LA Times, “China Use of Child Labor Emerges from the Shadows”, online: 
<http://www.laborrights.org/press/childlabor_china_0505.htm> (date accessed: March 10, 2007). 
883
 Child Labor Bulletin, “Report on Child Labor in China” (Guanyu Zhongguo Tonggong Xianxiang De 
Shidi Kaocha Baogao), amended version of September 2006, online: 
<labor.org.hk/gate/gb/big5.clb.org.hk/fs/view/downloadables/Child_Labor_Report_Chinese_updated.pdf > 
(date accessed: May 27, 2007). 
884
 Supra 601. 
885
 “Confirmation of Employing 12 Child Laborers Working in the Illegal Brick Kilns of Shanxi, 9 of 
Them Are Still Being Investigated” (Shanxi “Hei Zhuanyao” Yi Queren Shiyong Tonggong 12 Ren, 9 Ren 
Renzai Heshi), online: <http://news.sohu.com/20070622/n250722060.shtml> (date accessed: August 21, 
2007). 
886
 Supra 879.  
887
 Infra 930. 
210 
found unconscious from inhaling charcoal fumes at the end of 2004. Without calling for any 
medical assistance or at least checking whether they were still alive, the owner of the company 
put them into coffins for cremation. Indeed, two of the girls apparently alive in the coffins died of 
asphyxiation;888 ④ an investigation on child flower sellers in the Chinese cities reflected that at 
the bottom rung of the Chinese labor market, the young flower sellers “must endure economic 
exploitation, physical mistreatment and other cruelties at the hands of their employers, who place 
little if any priority on the rights and personal safety of the children in their employ”.889 
“Working long hours, these children usually ply their trade at night, usually from around 
sundown until the hours before dawn. In northern cities, the child flower sellers often wear thin 
clothing and are forced to endure the cold winter weather. These children have very little adaptive 
capacity, lacking the ability to cope with dangerous circumstances; disappearances and traffic 
accidents are common among child flower sellers in large cities. Abused by customers, 
persecution from police and even sexual assault are common. Far from being able to turn to 
authorities for help, these children must avoid at all cost city authorities, which can subject them 
to expulsion or detention.”890 
 
As for the number of child laborers in today’s China, different sources provide with conflicting 
numbers. According to the estimation of ILO, based on the 1995 Chinese Population Census, 
there were about 8.34 million child laborers in China by the end of 1995 and the number was 
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going to rise to 10 million soon.891 The response from the officers of the Chinese Labor Ministry 
was that the ILO number was exaggerated.892 However, to date there is no official statistics on 
the number of child laborers in China published by the Chinese authority. Although the extent of 
child labor remains hard to estimate due to the lack of official statistics, some other related 
statistics nevertheless imply the severity of the child labor in China and its tendency of spreading. 
For example, China’s famous nationwide “Hope Project” (Xiwang Gongcheng) is trying to help 
above 30 million children to return to school,893 inter alia, more than 60 percent of them have 
started engaging in various kinds of work894. One fourth of the 14 million Chinese farmer workers 
working in the construction areas are below age of 16.895 In addition, according to the fifth 
nationwide population census of China, at present there are more than 0.1 billion floating 
population all over china, 19.37 percent of which are children.896 Among these children, 9.3 
percent of them have no chance to get any education and almost half of them could not receive 
proper education in time.897 Besides, according to a survey conducted by the China Association 
for Promoting Democracy, the rate of dropouts in the rural junior high schools has reached nearly 
40 percent on average.898 Above and beyond these shocking data, the Asian-American Free 
Labor Institute (the “AAFLI”) affirmed that violations of minimum age standards occur more 
commonly in sub-contracting factories producing for export in China.899 Some reviews of current 
literature suggest that child labor in China is found in the export industries such as fireworks, 
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garment/textiles, and toys.900 Of course, there are allegations of child labor in the Chinese 
electronics, handicrafts (artificial flowers), coal mines, and gun factories as well, though they are 
not documented.901 A regional investigation undertaken by the government agency in charge of 
monitoring labor conditions in Jinan City, Shandong Province shows that child labor is most 
prevalent in the following industries: toy production, textiles, construction, food production, and 
light mechanical work where child laborers are particularly in demand due to their smaller hands 
and undamaged eyesight.902 
 
Admittedly, in light of both the ILO and the US experts’ investigation on the problem of child 
labor in China, compared with the other developing countries, child labor in China is not as 
serious a problem as in the others -- the proportion of child labor in terms of the whole Chinese 
population is relatively lower.903 Nevertheless, due to the large population base, the absolute 
number is by no means neglectable.904 From the writer’s position, it might be true that child labor 
in China has not reached the crisis proportion yet; however, it might be merely a matter of 
time.905 
 
B. The Reasons for Child Labor in China: Poverty -- the Root Cause? 
There might be various reasons for child labor’s reemergence in China; however, poverty is 
always cited as the major sometimes the root cause of the child labor by both the Chinese 
academia and the government.906 Just like the view of the majority of the other developing 
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countries, the Chinese scholars believe that there is a causal relationship between poverty and 
child labor, and children cannot be rescued from child labor unless their economic plight and that 
of their families is improved.907 Following this logic, it seems that there is an unbroken link 
between poverty and child labor, and only when China enters an era of economic prosperity, will 
child labor be eradicated. From the writer’s position, this plausible argument suffers several 
defects as follows. 
 
This argument presumes that there is a causal relationship between poverty and child labor. As 
such, economic development will lower the rates of child labor. It is a pity that statistics have 
shown some counter-evidence. Although the international economy has kept its positive trend of 
development for decades, the number of child labor has not decreased at all. On the contrary, it is 
increasing rapidly. In 1986, the ILO’s estimated that the number of child laborers all over the 
world was only 88 million, whilst the number dramatically raised to 200 million after 12 years.908 
Moreover, the empirical evidence in China also defeats this child-labor-poverty link. During 
Mao’s time, China had just experienced eight years Sino-Japanese War followed by four years 
civil war coupled with the scar left by colonization, the Chinese people and the nation were in the 
extreme poverty909. Even in such a hard time, the CCP nevertheless tried to eradicate child labor, 
and achieved a substantial progress as mentioned above. In the 21st century, nobody will deny 
China’s miracle in its economic development and the rapid improvement of its people’s living 
standards; however, child labor reemerged as a creeping plague. It is believed that poverty is no 
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longer the primary reason for child labor in China; instead, the degradation of public morality 
together with the change of belief system plays a vital role.  
 
After years of disastrous socialist policies and revolutions, such as the Great Leap Forward 
(Dayujin), the creation of People’s Communes (Renmin Gongshe) and the Cultural Revolution,910 
there was a disillusioned reaction to social injustice -- a view tolerating social inequalities, 
combined with a new pragmatic and utilitarian attitude to moving away from the former concern 
with communal well being, but only focusing on personal interests.911 As some commentators’ 
description, the CCP’s new mission is money and power rather than “commitment to world 
revolution, international brotherhood, national liberation and the communist utopia”. 912  
Ironically, “even the political dissenters jump on board to raise funds for their future fight for 
democracy”.913 A direct result of the feverish pursuit of wealth is that exploitation, in the event of 
child labor, is no longer such an abhorrent evil in the minds of some Chinese citizens, in 
particular from some businessmen’s point of view. Even worse, a report published in 
Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Newspaper about a primary school headmaster in Huizhou 
City, Guangdong Province, revealed a rather depressing story. 914 This headmaster was found 
employing students from his school to work in a private toy factory owned by him without 
realizing the illegality of his behavior. On the contrary, he thought he was helping his students by 
offering them an opportunity to earn some pocket money.915 
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As the great rush for improving the standards of life accelerates, values emphasizing exploitation 
as inevitable, even necessary are starting to gain public recognition. As some scholars observed, 
“so fundamental and far-reaching have been the social economic changes in China in the last 
decade that if chairman Mao were to return for a visit, he would be stunned beyond belief by 
what he would see”.916 Communist ideology and Maoism are largely ignored in practice, whereas 
the entrepreneurial spirit fills the air, and the new religion is money.917 For example, many local 
economic policies of Guangdong Province and those of the SEZs have transformed the southern 
part of China into a dynamic region of growth, as well as the major destination for the migration 
of skilled and unskilled laborers from other parts of China.918 Abundant opportunities in the labor 
market in those places are creating a misconception that education may not be that important. 
“School dropout rates have risen as state investment in education has continued to decline.”919 It 
is a popular slogan in coastal areas that primary school pupils make big money while college 
students make much less.920 Surprisingly, the mindset as such was further proved during the 
writer’s field study in Shanghai, China, where she interviewed 12 child laborers who were selling 
flowers in the streets, inter alia, nine children mentioned that they would rather earn wages than 
returning to school.921 Contrary to what happened in Mao’s time, education has lost its charm in 
many persons’ hearts. Worse still, education, particularly its non-compulsory part, has become a 
de facto business. A spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Education states publicly that 
non-compulsory education has become a sheer market product in today’s China, and students as 
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well as their families should buy what they can afford.922 Via such a depressing official statement, 
students from poverty-stricken families might deliberately choose to discontinue their studies 
before they finish their nine-year-compulsory education, as there is no need to waste time in 
school since they cannot afford higher education anyway. It is observed that when China is 
experiencing perhaps the rapidest rate of economic development in its history, its public ethics 
are falling at the same time, perhaps with the same speed. As some scholars point out, the absence 
of a publicly accepted set of moral values to define proper behavior in today’s China caused by 
the steady decline of Maoism and Communism and its concomitant rise of commercialism has 
marked the intellectual and spiritual crisis, which might be China’s core problem. 923 
Confucianism lost its place as China’s state ideology and had become the target of a deliberate 
attack especially in the 1960s and 1970s;924 by the 1990s, Marxism and Maoism had fallen to an 
even lower place in popular acceptance.925  The short-term ideology with the potential to 
temporarily fill the moral vacuum in China is “making money”.926 “In the money-first ethos, the 
underlying cultural values of education and proper behavior are receding”.927 A pun--Xiang Qian 
Kan, “which homonymously means ‘looking forward’ or ‘looking to money’”, becomes 
popular. 928  The idea of profit-orientation has started permeating in people’s mind. The 
enterprises, in particular those privately owned ones, in order to maximize their profit, 
deliberately recruit children under 16, sometimes even recruit abducted children and force them 
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to work929 due to the lower labor cost and the vulnerability of the child laborers;930 some so 
called labor export companies or job agencies purposefully recruit workers without checking their 
ages as their main concern is to charge both the workers and the enterprises;931 some police 
stations’ household registration management sections offer under-aged people forged 
identification card just for money;932 some local governments keep a blind eye on the problem of 
child labor within their region;933 some parents ignore the importance of education and require 
their children to find a job as early as possible so that they can contribute to the family income;934 
and many kids from relatively poor rural areas deliberately drop off from schools and fly to cities 
to find jobs or other chances to make money.935  
 
In sum, as the writer observes, the mammonistic ideology is corrupting people’s morality and 
causing them to tolerate the intolerable in China. Rather than arguing poverty as the primary 
cause of child labor in China, the writer believes that the corrupted public morality and the new 
religion of money play the major role. Of course, the writer is aware as well that causes such as 
poverty, poor quality of education and the lack of access to education, the process of privatization 
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without proper legislation and monitoring system, rural-to-urban migration wave, the growing 
economic disparity have added to the increase of child labor incidents in the urban areas of 
China.936  
 
5.4 Regulation against Child Labor in China 
A. Constitution 
The Constitutional provisions explicitly dealing with welfare of children are provided as follows:  
 
(1) The Constitution provides the universal, compulsory and free education in China.937  
(2) The Constitution stipulates that people in China not only have the right to education, but are 
under the obligation to receive education as well.938 
(3) The Constitution provides that the state shall guarantee its children to have a healthy 
development (both psychologically and physically).939 
(4) The Constitution obligates the state and parents to protect children; and children are 
prohibited from any abuses.940 
 
As such, China’s Constitution does guarantee special protection to its children and provide a 
strong legal foundation for the future legislation on children’s rights. 
 
B. Labor Law 
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The Labor Law prohibits the employment of people below the age of sixteen941, except in some 
extraordinary circumstances, such as in the area of sports and certain special arts and crafts.942 
Even under these specials cases, the state’s approval is a precondition, and the employers shall 
guarantee these employed minors’ rights to the nine years free and compulsory education.943 This 
article, prima facie, not only complies with China’s obligation under the Convention No.138 and 
No.182, but also raises the standard under the said Conventions -- the minimum age for 
employment is raised from 15 to 16. However, the exception -- “certain special arts and crafts” -- 
provides the leeway.944 The law does not elaborate the special fields, nor does it provide the 
minimum age of employment for these special circumstances.945 By law, the minor workers 
(from age 16 to 18) shall not be arranged to engage in work down the pit of mines, work that is 
poisonous or harmful, work with Grade IV physical labor intensity as stipulated by the State, or 
other work that they should be avoiding in consideration of their special nature.946 Besides, the 
employers are under the statutory obligation to provide them with regular physical 
examinations.947 Though the Chinese Labor Law has not borrowed the exact wording from 
article 3 (1) of the ILO Convention No. 138 -- “the minimum age for admission to any type of 
employment or work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to 
jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons shall not be less than 18 years”, it is 
believed that the said provisions have achieved a similar legislative fruit. 
 
C. Compulsory Education Law 
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The Law on Compulsory Education, which took effect on July 1, 1986, specifies requirements 
and deadlines for attaining universal education in China and guarantees school-age children the 
right to receive education. Generally speaking, any child in China above age six, regardless of its 
gender, nation and race, has the right to universal education; for those less developed areas, the 
schooling age can be delayed to seven.948 According to the Implementation Rule on Compulsory 
Education Law, however, it seems that the provisions in the Law on Compulsory Education have 
been adjusted. In terms of this Implementation Rule, provincial government can take steps, based 
on the status of its local economic and social development, to achieve progressively the full 
realization of the right to nine-year- compulsory education.949 Indeed, this provision provides a 
leeway for some local governments to take a gradual step instead of immediate action to 
universalize the nine-year-compulsory education without a clear deadline.950 Considering that the 
Chinese Constitution, together with its Compulsory Education Law, has already provided the 
universal compulsory and free education in China without any exception, it is unconstitutional for 
the Implementation Rule to stipulate otherwise. 
 
D. Minor Protection Law 
The Minor Protection Law of PRC is specifically drafted for the welfare of the people under the 
age of eighteen.951 It obligates the state to protect the minors. Indeed, it is not only the state’s 
responsibility but that of the whole society to protect minors.952 It also provides in detail as to 
how families, schools and other social groups shall protect the minors.953 However, what is 
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missing in this law is that it fails to incorporate any direct provisions in relation to the prohibition 
of child labor.  
 
E. Criminal Law 
There was no provision directly linking to the prohibition of child labor in the Chinese Criminal 
Law until the promulgation of the fourth amendment of the Chinese Criminal Law954 at the end 
of 2002. Before the promulgation of the fourth amendment, there were several provisions under 
the Chinese Criminal Law directly linking with the protection of the children’s rights (below age 
14) and therefore indirectly related to the prohibition of the child labor. To name but a few: ① 
whoever has sexual relations with a girl under the age of 14, no matter whether the girl has agreed 
or not, is to be deemed to have committed rape and is to be given a heavier punishment than rape 
a woman (above the age of 14);955 ② whoever molests a child, including both boy and girl, is to 
be sentenced to fix-term imprisonment or criminal detention;956 ③ those who visit young girl 
prostitutes under 14 are to be sentenced to at least five years’ inprisonment together with a certain 
amount of fine.957 
 
With the coming into effect of the fourth amendment, the Chinese Criminal Law has explicitly 
provided that nobody is allowed to employ child laborers (under the age of 16) to overwork; nor 
is he/ she allowed to employ child laborers to work in the high altitude, under the mine, or expose 
them to explosive, flammable, hazardous surroundings. Otherwise, he/she would be publishable 
by three to seven years’ imprisonment.958  
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Admittedly, the amendment as such has essentially improved the standards of the Chinese 
criminal legislation against child labor. However, this improvement appears far from adequate. 
Except for the case of employing child laborers to work under a dangerous condition or overwork, 
it is not a crime if one just employs child laborers to work as long as the working condition is not 
dangerous and working hour is not longer than normal period. Clearly, the criminal code fails to 
cover all incidence of child labor. Above and beyond this, except for the criminal offence under 
the name of “molestation of a child” (including not only girls but boys as well), other criminal 
provisions in protecting children’s rights, such as “having sexual relations with a girl” or “visiting 
girl prostitutes”, only cover girl’s interests without taking boy’s rights into consideration. In other 
words, in spite of the evil nature of visiting boy prostitutes or having sexual relations with boys, 
behavior as such is nevertheless not a crime in China. 
 
F. The Order of the State Council of People’s Republic of China (No. 364) -- “Rule on 
Prohibiting Employment of Child Laborers”959 
There are fourteen articles in total under this Rule. It mainly provides that the whole society, i.e., 
the families, various civil societies, enterprises whatever their ownerships and governments (both 
central and local), shall fight against the employment of child laborers. The employer who is 
discovered to employ child laborers will be fined RMB 5,000 Yuan960 for every child laborer 
employed.961 Moreover, it also criminalizes the behavior of employing child laborers to work in 
the dangerous environment under its article 11, which echoes the fourth amendment of the 
Chinese Criminal Law abovementioned. To date, it is the only comprehensive legislation 
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particularly targeting incidences of child labor in China. However, when reading its article 11 
carefully, the writer finds out a problem as follows. 
 
Article 11 provides that if  anyone  abducts  child laborers, coerces child laborers to work, 
uses child  laborers  to  work  high  above the ground, under the well, in radioactive, highly 
toxic,  inflammable  or  explosive  environment,  or  to  engage  in  the work of fourth 
level  physical  labor  intensity  provided for by the state, uses child laborers under 14 years  
old,   or   causes   death   or  serious  disability  to  child  laborers,  the  criminal  
responsibilities  shall  be  imposed in accordance with the relevant provisions under the 
criminal  law  on  the  crime  of  abducting children, the crime of coercing another person 
into  labor or other crimes.962 
 
Following the logic of this clause, the behavior of abducting child labor shall be sentenced under 
the name of “crime of abducting children”. According to the interpretation of the Chinese 
People’s Supreme Court on the “crime of abducting children”, “child” in this context is defined as 
person under the age of 14963. However, in the case of child laborer, the age is under 16964. If a 
child laborer is abducted under the age of 14, it can be considered under the coverage of the 
“crime of abducting children”; whereas, if a child laborer is abducted between the age of 14 and 
16, the chapeau of “crimes of abducting children” is no long suitable. It might be argued that in 
the case of abducting female child laborers between age of 14 and 16, it shall be sentenced under 
the name of “abducting women”.965 However, as for the crime of abducting male child laborers 
between age of 14 and 16, there is no provision under the PRC Criminal Law dealing with it 
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directly. In other words, there is a loophole in the case of abducting male child laborers between 
age of 14 and 16 under the Criminal Law. In spite of its evil nature, this crime fails to be 
criminalized to date.  
 
G. Summary of Findings 
1.   Generally speaking, China’s legislation in prohibition of child labor is consistent with ILO 
Conventions -- both No. 138 and No. 182. 
 
2. There is some leeway both in Labor Law and Compulsory Education Law. 
 
3. Minor Protection Law fails to incorporate any provisions directly relating to child labor. 
 
4. There are some internal controversies within the Chinese criminal legislation and it fails 
to cover all types of child labor. 
 
 
5.5 Suggestions beyond Legislative Reform regarding Curbing Child Labor in China 
As clearly suggested in the previous part, generally speaking, the Chinese legislation against child 
labor is competent and the relevant sanctions are proportionate. However, as the writer observes, 
merely depending on competent domestic legislation may not be able to solve this social illness. 
To solve the problem as such, some other suggestions beyond legislative reform particularly 
targeting this issue are going to be discussed as below. The driving force from outside china and 
private sector is going to be weighed in the following text as well. 
 
A. The Role of the Chinese Government  
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Considering child labor is not only a legal problem but a social one, the role of the Chinese 
government in eradicating it shall be emphasized, especially when China is undergoing a 
fundamental social and economic transition. After all, a government has the greatest 
responsibility for eliminating child labor as well as the broadest resources for addressing this 
social problem.966 
 
First and foremost, it is necessary for the Chinese government to adjust its own understanding on 
the cause of child labor. After doing some researches via the internet and going through the 
leading newspapers in China, it is not difficult to find out that the the Chinese government and its 
leading media are inclined to believe that there is an unbroken link between child labor and 
poverty.967 Therefore, they are not that surprised by the spreading of the child labor in today’s 
China.968 What they believe is that only via rapid and sustainable economic development, can 
child labor be eradicated finally.969 Following this logic, in order to eradicate child labor, the 
priority is to develop national economy.970 It is a pity that both the Chinese government and its 
media are not able to figure out that corrupted people’s morality with no publicly accepted set of 
moral values to define proper behavior intertwined with mammonistic thoughts is indeed the root 
cause of the spreading of child labor in today’s China; whereas, economic development per se 
will not necessarily bring about an eradication of child labor if other causes remain, such as 
inadequate social protection, under-resourced and poor quality of educational system, and 
particularly the continuously degrading public morality.   
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Second, it is important to understand that when the Chinese governments at various levels are 
expressing their concerns towards child labor, they shall avoid, even only rhetorically avoid, 
linking poverty with child labor directly. Sometimes, the language, especially statement from 
authority, may exert a subtle influence on people’s attitude. “Terms used to describe phenomena 
reveal varying perspective.”971 The linkage of the term child labor and poverty not only provides 
a blank excuse for inaction, or at least, inactive response from government’s side, but also creates 
an illusion to the public that child labor cannot be stopped without eradicating poverty and 
developing national economy first. By the same token, if the Chinese government is able to 
positively link child labor with the ideas of right to education, sustainable development and 
development of national human resources, the ground for that blank excuse for inaction will 
hardly exist any more. Very possibly, a slight change in way of expression by government 
officials to describe a phenomenon may create a subtle influence not only on people’s 
understanding of child labor, but their response to it as well.  
 
Third, it is not only necessary for the Chinese government per se to understand child labor 
problem, but also important for government to take the responsibility to educate its people, 
especially the media, to have a right attitude towards the said social illness. China used to be 
famous for its strict governmental control especially in the area of the public morality against any 
thoughts from the capitalist world.972 Of course, for quite a long time, policies as such have been 
heavily criticized not only by the outside world but also by the internal commentators. However, 
to date, it seems that the government’s policy is moving towards another extreme -- an extreme 
paying no attention to guide public morality to develop towards a healthy direction, no matter 
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how degraded it is going to be.973 It is observed that the same release of controls that has allowed 
the Chinese economy to grow rapidly has also created space for a variety of serious social 
problems: “corruption is practically taken for granted; crime rates, including those for robbery 
and murder, have risen sharply; prostitution has returned and is flourishing again; in some areas a 
market has developed in kidnapped peasant women and children; and fraudulent products and 
services have appeared in the marketplace”.974 Although John Stuart Mill975 offered a strong 
argument against a paternalistic society in the sense that it interferes in people’s liberty, the writer 
nevertheless argues that a paternalistic society in a less degree, i.e., government does not control 
the direction of public morality, but guide it towards a positive direction to reach a common good, 
might have a role to play in a transitional society like China. When Mammonism started invading 
people’s mind, it is the duty of the government to guide its people to deviate the negative 
influence as such. Just like a father has the responsibility to appropriately teach and guide his son 
to correctly respond to the temptations from the degraded part of this world during his 
adolescence, the Chinese government has the duty to educate its people to understand the 
immorality and intolerability of child labor practice, especially when its people’s mind is 
occupied with profit-oriented ideas. 
 
Fourth, the Chinese government shall invest more to the nine-year-compulsory education. In 2006, 
China only spent 2.86 percent of its GDP in education,976 which was much lower than the 
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average level of the developing states, let alone the standard of the developed world that invested 
an average 6 to 7 percent of their GDP in education.977 Actually, such low public spending on 
education is not in line with the Chinese government’s own 1994 policy guideline -- “Outline of 
Chinese Government’s Own Policy”, which stipulates that public expenditure on education shall 
be gradually raised to 4 percent of GDP by year 2000.978 The Chinese Development Research 
Center of the State Council also pronounced that, in order to maintain sustainable national 
development, China must deal with the country’s shortage of investment in education and 
training.979 According to the present Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, education is the foundation of 
a country; however, he admits that during his past years’ work, he has not been able to better sort 
out the problems that a government should concern about the most, in particular education.980 
Considering that China is able to be the top five military spender all over the world,981 its 
powerful financial capacity has been proved beyond doubt. In other words, if the state is really 
willing to, it has the potential to raise its education investment, at least, to the average level of the 
developing world. In addition, as for how to spend the education expenditure, it is another issue 
worthy to be studied. Generally speaking, the urban areas have a large amount of education funds 
compared with the amount invested in the rural educational system;982 the percentage spent on 
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the university education is disproportionately higher than that on primary and secondary 
education. Consequently, despite that there is a huge income gap between rural residents and 
urbanites in China, 983  the proportion of payable tutorial and miscellaneous fees to total 
operational funding in rural primary and junior secondary schools is disproportionably higher 
than that in urban areas.984 How to readjust the limited amount of education investment to reach a 
reasonable balance is worthy to be studied in the future. Once the universal-free-nine-year 
education provided by the Chinese Constitution is realized, not only the chances of a child to 
work will be reduced, but also those that are already working will be attracted to leave their work 
places and return to school. Moreover, when a child laborer is saved from a sweatshop, an 
appropriate follow-up measure -- access to school shall be guaranteed so that child laborers will 
not end up with changing his/her work places from one sweatshop to another. After all, “the 
importance of providing free and compulsory primary education cannot be underestimated in the 
fight to end the economic exploitation of children”985. “Education opens up the whole future to a 
child, offering the chance for improved health, safety, and greater economic opportunity, and the 
full enjoyment of their rights”.986 
 
In sum, considering child labor is a complicated issue, it requires comprehensive solutions.987 
The multi-faceted and comprehensive programs guided by government are always the most 
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effective in eliminating and preventing the economic exploitation of children. 988  Public 
awareness and education programs initiated by the official sector can also play an essential 
role.989 Ultimately, the participation of all social actors, including families, public officials, trade 
unions, industry groups, NGOs and international community are necessary for the final success of 
the fight against child labor in China.990 
 
B. Seeking Driving Forces from both External and Private Sector to Catalyze Change from 
Inside China 
In the previous part of this chapter, emphasis has been mainly put on analyzing domestic 
legislation and the role of the Chinese government in curbing child labor. In this part, the driving 
force against child labor from the participation of international community and movements 
initiated by private sector will be evaluated. 
  
i. Child Labor and Trade Sanction? 
 
a. Proposals Pro Linking Child Labor and Trade Sanction under the WTO Regime 
Currently, the interrelationship between international trade policy and labor standards is perhaps 
one of the most controversial issues that the world trading regime is confronting.991 Back to the 
very date of its birth, a linkage between labor standards and multilateral trade rules has been 
repeatedly proposed992 under the former GATT regime and today’s upgraded WTO993, which 
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covers not only trade in goods as was in GATT era, but in services, intellectual property as well. 
Many scholars, trade unions994, NGOs and western countries have suggested that since “labor is 
an input in the production of goods that entered the international trading system, violation of 
international labor standards should be enforced through trade sanctions”.995 Some scholars 
believe that “well-established rules of international law compel the harmonization of international 
trade rules with international labor and human rights norms that prohibit the most exploitative or 
extreme, forms of child labor”;996 Some heatedly criticize both the persistent resistance within 
the WTO to any formal linkage between trade and the core international labor standards and the 
idea that labor rights issues are simply a matter for the ILO. It is argued that views as such 
“ignore the existing and continuing role the WTO has been playing in constraining one important 
instrument available to improve compliance with core labor rights: trade measures aimed at 
punishing noncompliance with core labor rights”;997 Some try to reinterpret several GATT 
clauses so that trade sanction under the WTO regime can be justified. For example, some scholars 
argue that the shrimp/turtle case, which overturns some human rights unfriendly dictums of the 
case of Tuna/Dolphin, creates a chance for the broad interpretation of GATT/WTO article XX – 
General Exception. As such, free trade is no longer considered as the singular objective of the 
WTO regime and chances allowing countries to unilaterally discriminate products made by child 
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laborers under the WTO rules are thereby increased.998 Article VI on dumping is also cited when 
contending that suppressed labor rights, such as the incidence of child labor, in export industries 
constitute social dumping;999 some even try to justify the link through re-interpreting the basic 
principles of the WTO. It is argued that goods produced via unfair labor practices, such as the 
exploitation of child laborers should not be treated as the like products that manufactured in the 
“usual” course of production, and therefore not entitled to one of the WTO basic principles -- 
trade without discrimination.1000 
 
In sum, justification for the linkage between child labor and trade sanction includes but not 
limited to the reasons that: (1) abusive labor standards, such as the case of child labor, are a form 
of “social dumping”1001 which may cause unfairness in international trade;1002 (2) emergence of 
an increasingly integrated global economy requires an integrated world labor market that is based 
on a set of universally applied minimum labor standards, including prohibition of child labor;1003 
(3) the existence of the unfair comparative advantages partly because of the problem of child 
labor paid by very low wage and subject to poor working conditions is arguably one of the 
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reasons for the increasing jobless rate in the industrialized countries;1004 (4) since child labor is 
regarded as “the most heinous human rights violation”1005, the view of using international trade as 
a coercive tool to eradicate child labor is therefore justified.  
 
Based on the reasons abovementioned, as some scholars conclude that trade-based approaches to 
the problem of child labor might be theoretically justified on the basis that one can establish link 
between human rights regime and trade on the grounds as follows: 
 
“(1) normative (because linkage is demanded by justice and fairness1006); (2) coherence (because 
a free trade regime simply would not make sense if human rights are ignored); (3) 
consequentiality (because free trade will adversely affect human rights); (4) strategic (because 
linking these issues in creative package deals leads to more effective negotiations as to both); or 
(5) effectiveness (because the more effective WTO approach to dispute settlement can be usefully 
‘borrowed’ to the benefit of human rights).”1007  
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people? How about compensating China’s loss during the Opium War first and then returning to talk about 
the “unfair” comparative advantage that China have in the present international market?   
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b. Critically Evaluating the Efficacy of Trade Sanction against Child Labor  
In theory, it might be justified for trade to be used as a “stick” to address the issue of child labor, 
the prohibition against whom might be one of those very few things that an almost universal 
agreement has been reached; however, it does not necessarily mean that trade sanction is the best 
way, especially in practice. “Being able to justify a trade measure as legitimate under the trade 
regime is not the same as showing that the trade measure will be helpful for the child labor 
regime.”1008 In order to answer the efficacy query, it is necessary to move beyond the theoretical 
justification to evaluate some practical stumbling blocks.1009  
 
First, as for trade sanction which is already been described by WTO as a “conventional form of 
penalty” 1010  in the WTO, it is indeed a complicated issue whose efficacy shall not be 
overestimated. The arguably self-punishment nature1011 of trade sanction under the WTO may 
end up with “collateral damage to innocent victims” and is likely to “raise barriers to trade, which 
is generally detrimental to the interests of the country that does so”.1012 After all, sanction will be 
inevitably perceived as an attempt to impose sanctioning state’s will, standards of conduct and 
value structure on the sanctioned one.1013 As such, trade sanction may lead to domestic distortion, 
half-hearted commitment, or even generate resentment and resistance1014 from the targeted 
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governments.1015 Accordingly, the final victims of the trade sanction might be the very workers 
and their families inside the targeted state that the sanction intends to protect. In the case of 
sanction against child labor, degraded public morality, misguided social understanding,1016 a lack 
of affordable schooling together with poverty leave many children in developing countries with 
no choice but to work. As such, if a link between child labor and trade sanction under the WTO is 
established someday -- a general ban on products made by child labor is officially permitted 
within WTO framework without other constructive mechanisms available, such as education 
facilities etc., those youngsters would be enforced to leave factories before they have better 
alternatives. Indeed, they might be pushed to engage in more dangerous jobs, such as child 
prostitution, drug trafficking and production of pornography.1017 In fact, empirical evidence has 
shown that when the Bangladesh garment industry was threatened by US boycott, the 
manufacturers there fired almost all the child laborers.1018 It is a pity that far from helping the 
working little creatures, this drastic trade approach made things even worse because these 
children’s families were abruptly deprived of necessary income.1019 Worse still, the alternative 
income sectors available for these kids would likely to be the informal sector which can often be 
worse than working in a factory.1020 The logic behind this phenomenon is that “exports produced 
in the formal sector are the products most [easily] hit by trade measure, the effect will be to force 
child laborers into the informal sector where working conditions are worse”1021. In this sense, 
mere trade sanction without positive capacity building mechanism, even well intended, may end 
up with doing more harm than good.  
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Second, the scope of trade sanction is limited. After all, there are only 5 percent of child laborers 
all over the world involved in export-related jobs.1022 In the case of China, given the fact that 
China’s foreign trade record is improving year by year, although there is no clear statistics 
available, the percentage of child laborers’ involvement might be slightly higher than the average 
5 percent. Even if trade sanction does drive the children out of those jobs, at most, it is only able 
to save around five percent of them. However, things are far from that simple. It is observed that 
“abolishing child labor in one economic sector may be accompanied by its re-emergence in 
another”.1023 Very possibly, these kids are just moving from export-related industries to some 
other formal or informal domestic sectors. Considering the phenomena as such as well as the “not 
just unproductive, but also counterproductive”1024 nature of trade sanction, trade sanction is by no 
means a properly targeted trade policy against child labor. 
 
Third, a targeted country’s capacity to resist the trade sanction, such as Iraq1025 who refused to 
bend after so many years’ all-dimensional sanction instead of mere trade one, might be beyond 
the bounds of any intelligent planner’s expectation. UN Resolution 661 did not achieve its goal of 
driving Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and finally gave way to the First Gulf War.1026 “Nor have 
sanctions succeeded in forcing full compliance with Gulf War cease-fire Resolution 687 (1991), 
especially its disarmament mandate for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq’s 
weapons for mass destruction”.1027 Worse still, the consequence of this coercive tool combined 
with the destruction caused by the war, “created one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 
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decade, resulting in hundreds of thousands of premature deaths among Iraqi children”.1028 As the 
most populous country with its comprehensive national power ranking No. 4 all over the 
world1029, China’s capacity to resist the trade sanction shall not be underestimated. In this sense, 
once the sanction applies to China, a lose-lose situation is likely to happen with very few chances 
for China to voluntarily propose a compromise. 
 
Fourth, sanction approach, as an outgrowth of John Austin’s command theory of law, carries 
certain in-born conundrums which may lead people to go astray. From John Austin’s view, law is 
the general command or order with a sanction attached.1030 “Sanction is part of law which the 
command constitutes; it is the sanction, i.e., the likelihood of evil consequences from breach that 
imposes the duty on the subjects of the law: duty and sanction are corrective terms.”1031 Despite 
the fact that certain people obey law due to the threat of sanction, as Hartian description on his 
rule based thesis and his criticism on Austin’s theory, most people obey law because of their 
“critical reflexive attitude”1032, i.e., “members of the social group will share a criticism including 
a self criticism of those that deviate from the rule”1033. By the same token, trade sanction is likely 
to overemphasize the significance of “command” to drive a state to follow certain standards and 
values, though, unduly neglect what shall deserve more attention, such as means of internal 
capacity building to offering better alternatives via external assistance and other constructive 
engagement ways, which might help a state and its government, such as the Chinese government 
create an internal “reflexive attitude” or, at any rate, a “spark” to obey certain international 
standards.  
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Fifth, considering the causes of child labor in China, especially its root cause -- corrupted public 
morality intertwined with the new religion of money, sanction is hardly a suitable means to touch, 
let alone to alter these profit-oriented minds, in particular those shortsighted parents’ views to 
regard education as wasting money and only wish their kids to work as soon as possible. After all, 
mental aberration needs more psychotherapy than physiotherapy. By the same token, considering 
that public morality is not constituted overnight, but is gestated gradually through decades, to 
expect to adopt a relatively short-term coercive trade method to target the said root cause formed 
under the influence of various trends of thoughts, values by decades is hardly a wise or effective 
proposal.  
 
Sixth, the consistent opposition against the labor-trade link from the developing world implies 
their concern that such link might open a flood gate to generate too many risks of abuse and 
protectionism.1034 Given the fact that the link proponents are mostly governments, NGOs, trade 
unions in the North and a lack of specific rules regulating a permitted trade sanction under the 
WTO,1035 suspicion as such is reasonable. In fact, WTO -- as a trade expert is obviously 
unsuitable to solve the problems in relation to labor standards’ identification, surveillance and 
enforcement etc. In other words, the involvement of ILO -- the international labor expert seems 
inevitable. How to cooperate between these two international organizations in practice -- either 
through establishing a new joint regime or via mutual reporting system or other means might 
become another complicated issue necessary to be sorted out in the first place.1036 Much detailed 
rules and procedures need to be considered, negotiated, discussed, drafted, amended, and finally 
get approval before officially introducing a fair link -- a well designed link excluding the chance 
of maneuvering trade sanction as a disguised protectionist ploy. 
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 Indeed, “several commentators have proposed a regime for labor rights enforcement built upon a 
combination of the ILO and the WTO.” Cited in Katherine Van Wezel Stone, “To the Yukon and Beyond: 
Local Laborers in A Global Labor Market”, 1999, 3 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 93. 
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Of course, the purpose of analyzing the efficacy of trade sanction in practice is not to deny its 
value, especially its threatening power, but to point out that a speculative analysis on its potential 
impact on a targeted country particularly like China need to be carefully studied before the 
coercive trade tool is emotionally proposed to impose on member states accused of violating 
international core labor standards against child labor.1037 
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ii. Initiative from Private Sectors against Child Labor 
a. Corporate Code of Conduct (the “COC”)and Child Labor 
“The eve of twenty-first century is marked by economic globalization, expansion in the number 
of free enterprise economies, and by privatization.”1038 There were some seven thousand MNCs 
all over the world in seventies, whilst the number now has become more than five times of the 
former.1039 It is estimated that the three hundred largest MNCs now control about one fourth of 
the world’s productive assets.1040 Indeed, some UN member states have economies smaller than 
the annual revenues of some large MNCs.1041 For example, Ford’s economy is larger than Saudi 
Arabia’s and Norway’s,1042 let alone that of those small states in Africa. With the increasing 
power of MNCs, the real power of national governments is shrinking accordingly.1043 As such, 
there is a trend of shifting social responsibility from the public sector to the private one.1044 Not 
until the early 1990s, there were very few COCs aiming at moral “issues raised by the behavior of 
                                                                                                                                                 
are greatly disproportionate, however the amount of fine and its subsequent effect is relatively easy to 
estimate and control; ③ Incentives. (Even when a certain country is punished, it may still have chance to 
regain its fine when it improves its practice, sometimes, even get more than the amount it is fined, i.e., 
rewarded. In this sense, more governments from the developing world might prefer to improve its labor 
practice within its regime; ④ compared with the abovementioned MEA, the system proposed by the 
writer herself has avoided the intrusion of sovereignty of the wrongdoers since it is completely within the 
own control of the state in question to use the reward. To be honest, when there are persistent rejecters, this 
fine system may not work effectively either. Thus, in terms of the writer’s design, once a state has 
committed to join this fine regime, trade sanction shall be banned forever because the suggested Fine 
Agreement under the writer’s design is supposed to provide a clause that completely abolishes the trade 
sanction as the last resort. In this sense, the member states, especially the developing ones would feel 
relatively safe. However, the Fine Agreement shall also incorporate another clause which provides that if a 
country persistently rejects to pay the fine, it would be regarded as an autonomous withdrawal from this 
Fine regime. After its withdrawal, the trade sanction might be imposed. It is believed that on the basis of a 
fine system as such, the chances for the developing government to choose to join this fine regime are much 
higher than a fine system under the NAALC. [From NAALC, art. 39 & 41 and NAALC Annex 39 (1) & 
(3)]. 
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the company and its vendors in the supply chain except for prohibition on bribery and favors”.1045 
Labor issues such as child labor came a long way behind.1046 In fact, for a long time, labor issues 
were not regarded as the issues of corporate ethics at all, “but were kept at arm’s length behind 
the veil of subcontracting”.1047 However, for the sake of a company’s own image, as well as 
partly because of the awakening of its social conscience, coupled with the pressure from various 
consumer associations, “code of conduct for labor rights are taking shapes as part of a broader 
movement of corporate social responsibility”.1048 At present, it is observed that more and more 
MNCs have adopted company policies against child labor through its COC that governs their 
labor practices and those of their outsourcing suppliers.1049  
 
Generally speaking, COC can be categorized into two types. The first is the internal one -- they 
are generated and drafted by the MNCs themselves. Most Fortune 500 companies in US have 
adopted codes of conduct as such, many of which deal with core labor standards.1050 Indeed, 
other non-US MNCs also adopted codes as such, including Honda, Sony, Siemens and 
SmithKline Beecham etc.1051 In terms of the estimation made by the Institute of Business Ethics, 
60 percent of the top 500 companies in UK have COCs, whose percentage was only 18 percent 
decade ago.1052 COCs as such mainly aim at regulating labor standards which cover issues of 
payment, forced labor, employment discrimination, freedom of association and the bargaining 
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collectively etc.1053 The second type is the external COCs -- COCs generated externally by 
multilateral government like United Nations, international organizations such as OECD and the 
labor specialist ILO, and by NGOs such as Social Accountability International (SAI), which 
“seek to create an ‘auditable’ COC [offering for company’s acceptance] that can be applied 
across consumer products industries”1054. 
 
It is believed by some optimistic scholars that the practical solution of the labor rights abuses, in 
particular in the case of child labor, is finally on these private shoulders.1055 Admittedly, COC 
movement does encourage most corporations around the world to do “good”1056 business and 
regulates corporate behaviors. Indeed, it serves as an important moral indicator of the will of the 
international society.1057  Despite such positive functions, COC movement has nevertheless 
attracted lots of criticism. According to some critics, codes especially internal codes are rarely in 
the interests of workers.1058 “They view codes as a vehicle for corporations to ① distract and 
confuse conscience-laden consumer, who have demanded that the goods they buy not be made or 
handled by exploited workers, ② distract and confuse workers regarding their fundamental 
rights, and ③ distract and confuse national policy makers.”1059 In sum, COCs are believed to be 
“nothing more than public relations shams and subterfuges for avoiding real efforts to improve 
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workers’ lives”.1060 Statement as such might be too extreme; however, some empirical evidence 
based on various studies of numerous voluntary COCs samples does show that most COCs are 
encumbered with some inborn flaws. It is believed that “despite the apparent agreement that 
prohibition against child labor represents a minimum in any corporate code, few COCs address 
them”.1061 Even when this minimum standard is addressed, it is always inadequate because the 
appropriate ILO core standards reflected in its fundamental conventions No. 138 and No. 182 are 
not explicitly referenced.1062 These empirical studies conclude that “only a few codes contained 
any mention of human rights, and even fewer contain explicit references to ILO standards”.1063 
Worse still, to those very few codes where human rights are mentioned and explicitly references 
are given to appropriate ILO standards, they “offer virtually no details or explanation as to the 
precise nature of these fundamental rights”.1064 Indeed, a study conducted by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, involving both “S&P 500 companies and 80 major retailers” and 
121 internal codes indicates that among all the codes investigated, only one defined child labor in 
accordance with “United Nations standards or local laws, whichever are higher”.1065  
 
Above and beyond this, the implementation and enforcement of the COCs bring about lots of 
practical conundrums. In terms of implementation, theoretically, workers, all levels of 
management and all departments within an enterprise, as well as its subcontractors and suppliers 
shall not only be informed, but understand the content of the very COC as well.1066 Unfortunately, 
in practice, it is found that in most cases, to those who should understand the code and should 
















have the knowledge of the code and, at the least, a basic understanding of the concepts, rights 
included in the code are totally absent.1067  
 
As far as the issue of enforcement is concerned, one method necessary for increasing the 
effectiveness of enforcement is the mechanism of monitoring. 1068  In the case of internal 
monitoring, very often, its credibility and objectiveness are questionable.1069 After all, internal 
monitors usually have strong ties to the company in question.1070 To external monitoring, only a 
limited number of corporations adopt it.1071 Even if companies do use external monitors, many 
auditing firms and NGOs neither have necessary experience in applying fundamental rights in the 
workplace, nor have enough neutrality -- many of them more or less have a previous relationship 
with the corporation that they are monitoring.1072 For example, the New York based Council on 
Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA) which developed the famous Social 
Accountability 8000 (SA 8000) has been perceived as being “too close to business” and “too 
cozy” with some consultants in the field to neglect workers as well as NGOs’ views.1073 The 
Labor Rights in China comments that the whole business of SA8000 smacks too much of 
self-appointed regulatory mechanism or even “insider-trading”.1074 Besides, other issues, such as 
meaningful remedies available when corporation violates its own code or the code it subscribes to 
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obey, termination of business relationship between subcontractors or suppliers breaking the code 
(this might be especially relevant to the Chinese context because China is becoming the world 
factory and many suppliers’ subcontractors originate from China)1075, public disclosure and 
transparency etc.1076 shall be carefully and seriously studied before the COC movement could 
develop in a healthy way -- to serve as a de facto protector of labor rights, in particular 
prohibiting the incidence of child labor, rather than serving as a window dressing only.   
 
b. Social Labeling and Child Labor 
“A label is information that the manufacturer or marketer of a product provides to the consumer 
at the point of sale”.1077 Social labels are intended to inform consumers about the social 
conditions of production, i.e., whether the products to be purchased are produced under fair and 
equitable working conditions.1078 The proponents of most social labeling initiatives against child 
labor “are trying to initiate change by starting from the consumer and moving back through the 
market chain to affect modes of production and improve the lives of working children, either by 
pressing for the complete removal of child laborers from the production process or the 
amelioration of their working and living conditions”.1079 To date, there are several famous social 
labeling programs especially targeting child labor involved in the textile production process, 
including but not limited to Rugmark campaign, Kaleen label, Care & Fair label, STEP Label for 
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carpets and ABRINQ labeling etc.1080 Considering that ecological and “green” labels have 
proliferated in many markets and are now easily recognized by consumers, there is a ground to 
believe the opportunity for the “child-label-free” labels to win enough adherents and meet with 
success in the consumer markets of the developed world.1081  
 
Despite the influential power of the labeling initiatives, almost all the labeling programs as such 
carry several weak points that are worthy to be discussed in this paper. First, most famous social 
labeling initiatives are based in the developed states to influence the export industries in the 
developing countries. In other words, only about 5 percent child laborers that are involved in the 
export industries of the developing world might have the chance to be saved.1082 Given the 
situation of child laborers in China -- there are more than 90 percent child laborers are working in 
the domestic industries, the influence brought about by the social labeling programs as such shall 
be only marginal. As such, even if a social labeling program is effectively tackling child labor 
problem in China, the labeling program per se shall not be limited to export related industries 
only. 
  
Second, considering social labeling initiatives finally depend on the choice made by consumers 
themselves, it is not clear whether the majority of them are really willing to buy 
“child-labor-free” labeled products with higher price. After all, personal taste plays a very 
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important role in deciding whether to buy or not to buy a product no matter socially labeled or 
not.1083 Should personal taste dictate a preference for an unbalanced price, there must be very 
compelling reasons to reject it.1084 Some small and informal surveys concerning consumer’s 
attitude to social labeling done in the US and Europe indicate consumer’s willingness to bear the 
slightly higher retail cost of socially labeled products.1085 However, a small survey carried out by 
the writer herself before 2006 Chinese New Year in Shanghai, one of the largest and most 
developed cities in China shows that only less than 10 percent of the consumers have heard of 
social labeling programs, inter alia, less than 5 percent would buy a socially labeled product with 
relatively higher price.1086 The conflicting results at least imply two points: ① the evidence of 
consumer receptivity is scattered and inconclusive; ② if the social labeling program is hoped to 
enlarge its influence rather than only limited to the export related industry, the domestic 
consumers’ attitude in a developing country like China will not be easily altered without enough 
preparatory work conducted in the first place. In addition, as mentioned in the previous parts of 
this thesis, the root cause of the reemergence of child labor in China is because of the degrading 
of public morality; therefore, to educate the Chinese consumers to have the understanding and to 
create their moral aspiration to sacrifice part of their limited salary to buy the socially labeled 
products with relatively higher price is by no means a short term or easy task. Indeed, it may take 
decades to change the consumers’ attitude and make them socially aware enough to purchase the 
“child-labor-free” labeled products so that the labeling system is able to develop in the future to 
touch the rest 90 percent of the child laborers in China.1087  
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Third, the majority of the famous labeling programs are originated from the developed world -- 
Rugmark from Germany, Care & Fair from German and STEP from Switzerland. Considering 
that a social labeling initiative based on the developed world would have a substantial effect on 
production practice in an entire export industry in a large country like China,1088 it surely will 
affect certain stakeholders’ feelings of national and personal independence.1089 To some, social 
labeling is perceived as one form of restraint of trade -- the imposition of social costs and the 
restraint of freedom in the pursuit and practice of business.1090 For that matter, in order to use 
labeling programs to tackle child labor in China, social labeling initiative originating from China 
would be more attractive and effective. Take Kaleen program as an example. It is a labeling 
program initiated by the Indian government to eradicate child labor and the welfare of weavers in 
the Indian carpet industry.1091 It is observed that the Kaleen label not only attracts almost the full 
support of the carpet industry, but also satisfies the demands of some carpet exporters who regard 
social labeling initiative originated from the west, such as Rugmark, as unnecessary foreign 
intervention in the domestic commercial affairs due to its partly German affiliations. 1092 
Following the Kaleen approach, it might be desirable and feasible for the Chinese government 
and society to develop its own social labeling system to target the problem of child labor in China. 
Of course, it is a long-term task to arouse the public awareness and ultimately trigger the public 
will to initiate a labeling system as such. 
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Above and beyond this, the credibility of labeling programs, such as the practical difficulty like 
corruption involved in the monitoring procedure, is not an easy problem to sort out.1093 In sum, in 
spite of the good idea and intention embraced in a social labeling program to target child labor, its 
practical effect is merely marginal in the Chinese society at the current stage.1094 At present, 
considering that the social labeling program is a relatively new phenomenon in the Chinese 
society and both the government and the consumer’s awareness is not mature enough to accept it, 
and the labeling program per se, in general, is only in its infant period and limited to certain 
industry represented by textile, its efficacy and potential influence to curb the child labor in China 
shall not be overestimated. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, at the beginning, the writer tries to distinguish child labor and child work and 
points out the evil nature of child labor. Through a historical review of the child labor 
phenomenon in China, the writer argues that the root cause of child labor in contemporary China 
is not poverty, but the corrupted public morality and the new religion of money. In order to 
effectively fight against this evil in China, first, the writer tries to evaluate the major relevant 
Chinese legislation -- Constitution, Labor law, Compulsory Education Law, Minor Protection 
Law, and Criminal Code etc. under the framework of ILO Convention No. 138 and No. 182. 
From her view, although the domestic legislation still leaves something to be desired, generally 
speaking, it is competent and consistent with the ILO fundamental conventions No. 138 and No. 
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182. Besides, considering child labor is a social ill and the relevant domestic legislation is 
generally competent, the writer proposes certain suggestions beyond legislative reform including: 
① a proper government role in curbing child labor under the Chinese context; ② critically 
evaluate child labor social clause under the WTO; and ③ evaluate the influence from private 
sector, i.e., COC movement and social labeling program -- it may not be panacea1095 and its 
efficacy might only be marginal in the Chinese context. As a complicated legal and social issue, 
child labor needs a comprehensive solution, including but not limited to the aspects 
abovementioned. Indeed, other multilateral instruments, such as the ILO Convention guidelines 
(cooperation between the Chinese government and the ILO), certain legal solution in regulating 
the second generation of the migrant workers in China,1096 along with other international or 
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Chapter 6: Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation in China under the 
Framework of ILO Convention No. 100 and No. 111 
 
6.1 Overview on ILO Fundamental Conventions No. 100 and No. 111 
A. Introduction to ILO Fundamental Convention No. 100 
Having decided upon the adoption of proposals regarding the principle of equal remuneration for 
men and women workers for work of equal value,1097 ILO convention No. 100 stipulates that 
men and women workers for work of equal value are entitled to equal remuneration, including 
“the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever 
payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and 
arising out of the worker's employment”1098. The Committee of Experts has stressed that the 
purpose for a very wide terms of the definition of “remuneration” is to ensure that the right to 
equal treatment is not limited to the ordinary wage, and that it cannot be restricted in any way by 
semantic arguments.1099 For instance, the phrase “any additional emoluments” is considered to 
include, inter alia, “seniority raises, marriage benefits, cost of living raises, use of dwelling and 
family subsidies paid by employers, as well as payment in kind such as cleaning work 
clothing”.1100 As for the principle of equality without discrimination based on sex established by 
this Convention, it is worthwhile pointing out that principle as such “does not require the 
abolition of differences in the general level of wages between regions, sectors or even 
undertakings, so long as these differences apply equally to men and women”.1101 When problem 
concerning implicit discrimination based on sex -- “cases where apparently objective criteria such 
as performance or job difficulty are explicitly defined or applied with reference to worker’s sex” 
                                                 
1097
 ILO Convention No. 100, preamble para.3. 
1098
 ILO Convention No. 100, art. 1(2). 
1099




 Ibid., at 245. 
252 
-- arises, the Convention’s attitude is that it covers not only open discrimination against either sex, 
but also cases concerning implicit discrimination as such.1102 In particular, it is submitted by the 
Committee of Experts that it is not sufficient at all to merely replace separate wage scales for 
“male” and “female” jobs by similar scales worded in neutral language but preserving the 
inherited job profiles and existing wage differentials alike.1103  
 
When dealing with the application of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value 
based on sex, every member “shall, by means appropriate to the methods in operation for 
determining rates of remuneration, promote and, in so far as is consistent with such methods, 
ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women 
workers for work of equal value”.1104 Put concretely, means for application of the principle 
include: ① national laws or regulations; ② legally established or recognized machinery for 
wage determination, such as arbitration tribunals or wage councils1105; ③ collective bargaining; 
and ④ a combination of these various means listed above.1106  
 
In addition, article 3 of the Convention provides that it is also an obligation to promote objective 
appraisal of jobs on the basis of the work to be performed regardless of sex and the scope of the 
obligation to promote such objective appraisal shall be with no limitation as to the undertakings 
and workers concerned.1107 According to the Committee of Experts, obligation as such has been 
necessarily implied by the very concept of paying remuneration to men and women according to 
the value of their work.1108 “It considers that such a technique is essential in determining whether 
jobs involving different work may none the less have the same value for the purpose of 
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remuneration, and that a technique to measure the relative value of jobs with varying content is 
critical to eliminating discrimination in the remuneration of men and women.”1109  
 
B. Introduction to Convention No. 111 
Convention No. 111 further requires member states to eliminate any discrimination -- distinction, 
exclusion or preference, made on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction, social origin or results after consultation with representative employers' and workers' 
organizations, which has the effect of nullifying, or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment 
in employment or occupation.1110 In terms of “race or color”, though the Convention refers 
separately to these two ideas, these two grounds for discrimination were actually considered as 
two parts of the same idea.1111  
 
As for discrimination based on sex, according to the Committee of Experts, “it includes those that 
are made explicitly or implicitly, to the disadvantage of one sex or the other, though it has noted 
that it is relatively rare to find cases in which discrimination on the basis of sex prejudice 
men”.1112  
 
When dealing with employment discrimination on the basis of religion, the Committee of Experts 
has found that such discrimination “often arises from an absence of religious freedom, or from a 
climate of intolerance and, in many cases, from the existence of a state religion”.1113 Under the 
circumstances where religious considerations hold a large place in public and social life, and 
especially where one religion has been established as the religion of the state, the Committee 
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points out that action has to be taken to ensure that situation as such will not lead to 
discriminative consequence regarding employment and occupation.1114 
 
As far as employment discrimination on the basis of political opinion is concerned, in a 
democratic and pluralistic society, the political opinion of candidates for employment in the 
public sector are not taken into account, except for policy-making posts.1115 As a general 
principle, in accordance with the Committee of Experts, the Convention implies that this 
protection against employment discrimination based on political opinion shall be afforded in 
respect of activities -- expressing or demonstrating opposition to the established political 
principles in a peaceful way, such as expressing liberal or capital ideas in a communist state or 
vice versa.1116  In addition, the Committee has endorsed the comments made by an ILO 
Commission of Inquiry that mere membership in a political party, whatever its program, cannot 
be a valid reason to discriminate against the member in relation to employment.1117 Although the 
employment discrimination based on political opinion happens most often in the public sector, it 
none the less has a possibility to appear in the private employment.1118 Therefore, the Committee 
has indicated that “the Convention contains no restriction or limitation as to the economic sectors 
concerned, and therefore applies also to discrimination on the basis of political opinion which 
may take place in the private sector”.1119  
 
In terms of the criterion of discrimination -- “national extraction”, it was actually a subject of 
long discussions.1120 During the course of preparation of the Convention, the expression used was 
“national origin” which was intended to cover both distinction on the basis of foreign ancestry 
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and the legal point of nationality.1121 However, this idea is not acceptable to many governments 
as it might oblige a ratifying State to grant equality of treatment to foreigners, i.e., to workers 
who were not nationals of the ratifying state.1122 The term “national extraction” was thus 
suggested and finally introduced to the final version of the Convention so that it could have no 
implication referring to nationality.1123 In the Report of the Committee on Discrimination, it is 
clarified that “distinctions, exclusions or preferences made on the basis of national extraction 
meant distinctions between nationals of the ratifying country made on the ground of foreign 
ancestry or foreign birth”.1124  
 
To the employment discrimination based on social origin, the Committee of Experts in its 1988 
General Survey has commented that “the problem of discrimination on the basis of social origin 
arises when an individual membership in a class, a social-occupational category or a caste 
determines his or her occupational future either by denying access to certain jobs or activities or, 
on the contrary, assigning him or her to certain jobs”.1125  
 
To date, China has ratified both Conventions No. 100 and Convention No. 111. 
  
6.2 Brief Review on China’s Legislation with Regard to Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation 
 
The Chinese labor law has provided explicitly that with regard to employment, the workers shall 
not be discriminated in aspects of national extraction (Minzu), race (Zhongzu), sex and religious 
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beliefs.1126 It emphasizes that women enjoy the equal labor rights as men1127 and adopts the same 
terms as provided in the Equal Remuneration Convention -- “equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal value” (Nannv Tonggong Tongchou)1128. In addition, it also 
provides special protection to female workers,1129 including but not limited to prohibition of 
arranging underground work for women workers at mines, or any labor with Grade IV physical 
labor intensity as stipulated by the state,1130 prohibition of engaging women workers in work at 
high places, under low temperatures, or in cold water during their menstrual periods or labor with 
Grade III physical labor intensity as stipulated by the state,1131 and prohibition of engaging 
women workers in work with Grade III physical labor intensity as stipulated by the state or any 
other work that is bad for the health of a pregnant worker1132. Moreover, the “Woman Rights and 
Interests Protection Law” (Funv Quanyi Baozhang Fa) guarantees special protection on the 
welfare of female workers and re-emphasizes the principle of non-discrimination based on sex in 
terms of occupation and employment. In accordance with this legislation, any distinction, 
exclusion or preference based on sex during the course of decision making of employment, 
payment, appraisal of jobs on the basis of the work to be performed and the additional emolument 
such as housing subsidy, job security system financed by the employer, promotion and so on shall 
be forbidden all together.1133  
 
When dealing with the employment discrimination based on race, it is true that the Chinese labor 
law regarding this point has not provided enough subsequent regulations and rules to crystallize 
this principle. However, given that virtually 100 percent of the Chinese population belonging to 
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the mongoloid race, it is fair to conclude that the employment discrimination based on race is 
hardly a problem.  
 
In the case of employment discrimination based on religion, a constitutional principle of 
non-discrimination on the ground of religious attitude was established in 1982 -- “Citizens of the 
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization 
or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they 
discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects 
normal religious activities”.1134 In addition, other laws, including but not limited to Law on 
National Regional Autonomy (Minzu Quyu Zizhi Fa), General Principle of the Civil Law (Minfa 
Tongze), Labor Law (Laodong Fa), Compulsory Education Law (Yiwu Jiaoyu Fa), Electoral Law 
of the People’s Congresses (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui He Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao 
Dahui Xuanju Fa), Advertisement Law (Guanggao Fa), have crystallized the constitutional 
principle of non-discrimination based on religious belief by stipulating that “all citizens, 
regardless of their religious beliefs, have the right to vote and stand for election; the legitimate 
property of religious bodies is subject to legal protection; education is separate from religion, and 
all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, enjoy equal educational opportunities in 
accordance with the law; the people of all ethnic groups should respect each other's languages, 
customs and habits, and religious beliefs; citizens shall not be discriminated against in terms of 
employment because of different religious beliefs; and no advertisements or trade marks shall 
include discriminatory contents against any ethnic group or religion”1135. Above and beyond this, 
judicial and administrative guarantees have also been offered. For example, persons unlawfully 
depriving Chinese citizens of their freedom of religious belief, when the circumstances are 
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serious, are to be sentenced to two years fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention.1136 With 
respect to administrative guarantee, government at various levels have set up religious affairs 
departments to administer and supervise the implementation of the laws pertaining to religion and 
to put the policy ensuring the freedom of religious belief into effect without interfering in the 
internal affairs of religious organizations and sites.1137 As a result, statistics have shown that the 
number of believers in Christianity had increased from 700, 000 in 1949 to 10 million in 2000, 
and the annual increase of Catholic was 50,000 in recent years.1138 Therefore, it is fair to 
conclude that the Chinese constitution and other fundamental laws have given statutory effect to 
the principle of non-discrimination based on religion.  
 
What might be a problem is that such a principle may not be very well implemented in practice, 
which has led to consequences contrary to the established constitutional principle against 
discrimination on the basis of religion. Problem as such may need comprehensive solutions such 
as the further development of ROL, educations of both the Chinese average citizens and its 
officials, which are not the focus of this thesis. As for the relatively recent case of Falun Gong, 
to be fair, the Chinese government’s attitude towards this “religion” was “noninterference” at the 
very beginning. Only after the events of more than 3,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathering at 
the campus of Tianjin Normal University to protest against the publication of an article by the 
journal of this university about a postgraduate student’s developing mental disorder through 
practicing Falun Gong as well as more than 10,000 Falun Gong believers’ surrounding the central 
government’s office at Zhongnanhai (the compound housing the headquarters of the Communist 
Party of China Central Committee in downtown Beijing) on April 25, 1999,1139 the CCP finally 
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decided to take measures to crackdown what is regarded as an “evil cult” (Xiejiao) rather than a 
typical religion.  
 
After listening to the news reports from the media based on the western world, for instance VOA, 
BBC, CNN etc., many foreigners especially from western world, would be inclined to believe that 
the Chinese government was and is persecuting the Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion, and 
therefore the constitutional principle on religious freedom was in fact terribly implemented in 
China. It is a pity that most westerners have no chance to get access to the responses from inside 
China. In fact, to many common Chinese citizens, the nature of Falun Gong is suspicious in the 
sense that this so called religion is actually a plagiarism from various teachings from Daoism, 
Buddhism, even Chinese superstitious folk including but not limited to weasel and fox sprits 
etc.1140 As such, to classify it as an “evil cult” is not that surprising in the eyes’ of many Chinese, 
particularly after many terrible cases released, such as believers’ refusing to receive medical 
treatment, fasting to death, or even committing suicide via way of brutal belly-cutting etc.1141 
Indeed, opinions to criticize Falun Gong as an unstable element blended with foreign interference 
which endangeres the healthy development of the Chinese society and its solidarity are quite 
common and available in many famous Internet Discussion Forums based in both China and 
overseas alike such as Tsinghua BBS, Fudan BBS, Wenxuecity, Zhengqing BBS etc.1142  
 
When talking about the employment discrimination based on “national extraction”, from the 
Chinese Constitution all the way down to the rules and regulations promulgated by the local 
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governments concerning ethnic minorities in China, it is fair to conclude that the principle of 
equality and special protection for ethnic minorities has been well incorporated. The Constitution 
stipulates that: “all ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal. The state protects 
the lawful rights and interests of the ethnic minorities and upholds and develops a relationship of 
equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's ethnic groups. Discrimination against ... 
any ethnic group are prohibited.” The 1952 “Decision about Employment” (Guanyu Laodong 
Jiuye Wenti De Jueding) promulgated by State Council emphasizes that any ethnic groups in 
China have the right to equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation, and 
special favor shall be offered to them because of their special social status as minority.1143 
Among 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in China, 15 of them have 
promulgated local rules or regulations dealing with issues of ethnic groups living within its 
region1144 and almost all these local legislation have provided a specific clause explicitly 
prohibiting employment discrimination based on race. Below are a few examples. According to 
the “Rule of Protection of the Interests of the Dispersed Ethnic Minorities in Jilin Province” (Jilin 
Sanju Shaoshu Minzu Quanli Baozhang Tiaoli), when under the same condition, a citizen 
belonging to a minority group has the privilege to be employed.1145 In terms of the “Rule of 
Protection of the Interest of the Dispersed Ethnic Minorities in Liaoning Province” (Liaoningshen 
Sanju Shaoshu Minzu Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli), governmental agencies at various level, 
enterprises whatever their ownership and public units are prohibited from refusing to employ a 
citizen who belongs to a minority group on the ground of his/her different customs, language 
etc.1146 
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As discussed above, compared with the ILO Convention abovementioned, the Chinese labor law 
keeps silent on the issues of discrimination with regard to color, political opinion and social 
origin.  
 
In the case of discrimination based on color, it is hardly a problem given that almost 100 percent 
of the Chinese population is with yellow skin.  
 
In the case of discrimination based on political opinion, it is decided by China’s special political 
environment -- one party control. Before China’s economic reform, almost all the employees in 
the governmental agencies and managers in SOEs were members of CCP. 1147  Thus, the 
government had adopted a de facto preferential policy to members of CCP.1148 However, with the 
prosperous of market economy in China, “political opinion” is no longer that relevant in terms of 
employment especially in the case of non-public sector which is going to play a more and more 
important role in Chinese economy.1149 Although preferential treatment to CCP members is none 
the less a de facto practice in some governmental agencies and SOEs, this problem is much more 
a political issue rather than a legal one and not that serious vis-à-vis employment discrimination 
based on social origin. Indeed, merely depending on legislation to change it is unrealistic and 
unfeasible given that a necessary political premise for the principle of non-discrimination based 
on political opinion to work effectively is that the state in question shall be a democratic and 
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pluralistic one, which unfortunately seems to be not the case in the contemporary Chinese 
context.1150 Accordingly, the writer is not going to pay much attention on the said issue in this 
thesis.1151  
 
As far as employment discrimination based on social origin is concerned, according to the 
writer’s research, it might be the most serious aspect of discrimination with regard to employment 
in China, which involves at least more than one tenth of the Chinese population. Therefore, the 
writer will give an all-round case study on this issue in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Discrimination in Respect of Employment Based on Social Origin in China -- A Case 
Study on the Chinese Farmer Workers (Mingong) 
A. The Situation of Farmer Workers in Contemporary China 
i. The Scope and General Description on the Chinese Farmer Workers 
The definition of the Chinese “farmer workers” can be understood in this way: a Chinese citizen 
with rural origin but involved in non-agricultural industry.1152 It is reported that there are at least 
130 million1153 “farmer workers” (one tenth of Chinese total population) in China today, whose 
                                                 
1150
 Supra 58, at 262. 
1151
 The writer wishes to re-emphasize here that she is fully aware of the existence and severity of the 
discrimination based on political opinion in China. However, as it is more a political issue rather than a 
legal one, merely depending on legislation to change it is unrealistic and unfeasible given that a necessary 
political precondition for the principle of non-discrimination based on political opinion to work effectively 
is that the state in question shall be a democratic and pluralistic, which unfortunately seems to be not the 
case in the contemporary Chinese context. As such, due to the limitation of space, the writer is not prepared 
to focus on the issue in this thesis. 
1152
 Please see generally in Ge Zhihua, Resolution for Chinese ‘Three Agricultural Problems’-- Rural 
Society in Transformation (Wei Zhongguo De Sannong Wenti Qiujie-- Zhuanxing Zhong De Nongcun 
Shehui) [Jiang Su: Jiang Su People’s Press (Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe), 2004], at 131; Du Lirong, Report 
on Farmer Workers Living Condition in Urban Area (Chengshi Mingong Shengcun Baogao), [Beijing: 
China Time Economy Press (Zhongguo Shidai Jingji Chubanshe), 2004], preamble, at 1. 
1153
 In fact, this number is increasing year by year, some statistics even show that by the end of 2005, the 
number of Chinese farmer workers have increased to 200 million. Zhou Xiaoyan, “From the Protection of 
Farmer Workers--Discussion on the Defect and Improvement of Social Policy” (Cong Nongmingong 
Quanyi Baohu -- Tan Woguo Shehui Zhengce De Quexian Yu Baohu), online: 
<http://www.sachina.edu.cn/Htmldata/article/2005/11/522.html >(date accessed: February 6, 2006); online: 
<http://www.cnr.cn/news/t20051026_504120408.html> (date accessed: February 17, 2006). 
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number is much larger than settled urban workers and has constituted China’s majority industrial 
workforce.1154 The reason for them to be called “farmer workers” (Mingong) is mainly because 
of their social origin, i.e., “farmer” rather than “urban dweller”. They migrate from rural areas to 
cities to work and then remit money that they earn in cities back to their families in rural areas. 
Different from contemporary western understanding where farmer is usually a profession taken 
up by well-educated person and involves large-scale mechanical operation, the term “farmer” in 
China is the synonym of poor, dirty, rude and uneducated person with rural origin.1155 In the 
early 1980s, the term “farmer worker” mainly referred to those laborers from rural areas engaging 
in major public projects such as building bridges, dams and skyscrapers.1156 Though their jobs 
still are inclined to be unskilled or semi-skilled, their occupations are no longer limited to 
construction works.1157 Indeed, they could be skyscraper window washers in large cities such as 
Shanghai, assembly line workers in Dongguan, or shop assistants in Lhasa.1158 Of course, the 
majority male farmer workers are nevertheless likely to be construction workers; however, there 
are significant numbers of them working in manufacturing, transportation, commerce, food 
service, and maintenance industries.1159 According to the fifth nationwide Population Census 
conducted by the Chinese authority in 2000, 46.5 percent of the workers involved in the 
secondary and tertiary industry are from rural origin.1160 Put specifically, 52 percent of the 
workers in service industry were constituted by farmer workers; in manufacturing industry, more 
than 60 percent of its workers were with rural origin; in terms of construction industry, only less 
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 Marilyn Bechtel, “China’s Union and Farmer workers: Building A Better Future Together”, People’s 
Weekly World Newspaper, November 9, 2004. Online:<www.pww.org/article/articleview/5753/1/231> 
(date accessed: November 17, 2004). 
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 Du Lirong, Report on Farmer Workers Living Condition in Urban Area (Chengshi Mingong Shengcun 
Baogao), [Beijing: China Time Economy Press (Zhongguo Shidai Jingji Chubanshe), 2004], preamble, at 
2. 
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 Ling Li, “Towards A More Civil Society: Mingong and Expanding Social Space in Reform-Era China”, 
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than 20 percent of the workers were not farmer workers.1161 Besides, it is observed that the 
population of farmer workers is predominantly young and male. A survey found that “81.8 
percent of those on the move were men, and 58 percent were between the ages of 18 and 30, 
whereas 25 percent were between 31 and 40 years old”.1162 As the major constituent of the 
Chinese migrant workforce, the Chinese farmer workers have been widely discriminated based on 
their social origin -- farmer, in spite of being hard working taxpayers and cheap, efficient and 
indispensable laborers for China’s ongoing economic development.1163 
 
ii. Discrimination in Payment 
Generally speaking, farmer workers take on heavy and dirty work from which their urban 
counterparts tend to distance themselves, and even when there are rural and urban workers 
working on the same job, usually they do not receive the same benefits. In spite of the same 
contribution, farmer workers are paid much less than their urban counterparts.1164 For example, 
in Changchun, the capital city of Jilin Province, a cleaner from urban origin is entitled for RMB 
ten yuan for cleaning a window, whereas her counterpart from rural area could only get RMB five 
yuan;1165 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, compared with those cleaners with urban origin who are 
protected by long-term labor contracts and paid more than RMB1,000 yuan per month, cleaners 






 Supra 1160. 
1164
 Please see generally in Lian Jun,  “Being Nice To Farmer Workers Equals to Being Nice To 
Yourself” (Shandai Nongmingong Jiushi Shandai Ziji), online: 
<http://www.cnradio.com/luntan/t20050911_504104294.html> (date accessed: February 5, 2006);  “Issue 
of Farmer Workers and The Establishment of Harmonized Labor Relationship” (Nongmingong Wenti Yu 
Jianxi Hexie Laodong Guanxi), online: 
<http://www.acftu.net/template/10001/file.jsp?cid=195&aid=31095> (date accessed: February 5, 2006); 
online:< http://www.people.com.cn/GB/huanbao/1072/2687588.html> (date accessed: February 5, 2006); 
“A Knife Above Farmer Worker’s Head: Same Job, Different Payment” (Nongmingong Touding Yiba Dao: 
Tonggong Bu Tongchou), online: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/30/20030320/947509.html> 
(date accessed: February 5, 2006)； Liu Weijia, “Investigation on Issues of Chinese Farmer Workers” 
( Zhongguo Nongmingong Wenti Diaocha), online: 
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with rural origin not only have no chance to be covered by the said long-term labor contracts, but 
are paid only RMB 400 yuan per month on average.1166 Indeed, discriminated treatment as such 
happened in other cities of China as well, such as Nanjing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing 
etc.1167 Although the same job, same contribution, they are awarded differently merely because 
of their rural origin. 
 
Moreover, issue of wage arrears is another widespread problem faced by farmer workers in China. 
It is observed that wage arrear on farmer workers has become such a normal phenomenon 
particularly in private enterprises that people even governmental officers started to get used to 
it.1168 A survey published by the official New China News Agency found that nearly 75 percent 
of the farmer workers had difficulties in collecting their salary.1169 As a matter of fact, some 
farmer workers even had never been paid as promised.1170 A majority of the polled shared a 
common view, i.e., begging from, bargaining with or intimidating their employers were the best 
ways to get their money back, while only one fourth considered seeking help from the 
government and less than 20 percent believed going to court was a good choice.1171 A survey 
conducted by the writer herself reflected a darker picture.1172 Among the forty interviewed 
Chinese farmer workers working in various construction sites in Shanghai, none of them was 
immune from the nightmare of wage arrear; all of them preferred to adopt self-relief method 
when they met problems as such; and none of them believed that seeking help from governmental 
                                                 
1166
 Online: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/huanbao/1072/2687588.html> (date accessed: February 5, 
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 Philip P. Pan, “Suicide Threats Rise as Employers Deny Wages”, Washington Post Foreign Service. 
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 From January 14, 2006 to January 24, 2006, the writer visited various construction sites in Shanghai, 
China, and interviewed totally forty Chinese farmer workers there.  
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agencies or through the court system could really help them out.1173 As a Chinese labor 
researcher specialized in studying the issue of payment arrear estimated, at least 100 farmer 
workers, mostly in construction industry, threatened to commit suicide due to unpaid wage issue 
each year in the Pearl River Delta.1174 Indeed, according to the official statistics from Shanghai 
Labor Monitoring Department, in 2004 alone, there were more than 2702 cases in relation to 
wage arrear of farmer workers in Shanghai, and about 176,300 workers were involved.1175 The 
statistics provided by ACFTU showed that the cumulative amount of wages in arrears owed to 
farmer workers was around RMB 100 billion as at end December 2004.1176 
 
iii. Discriminatory Local Legislation and Policies 
As for occupations available for farmer workers, they are usually divided artificially by biased 
local legislation and policies.1177 For example, in Shanghai, one of the local legislation has 
provided that more than twenty kinds of occupation are only available for urban citizens.1178 In 
Wu Han, according to “Order of Employment of Farmer workers in Wu Han”, occupations are 
divided into three types, i.e., farmer worker permitted, farmer worker limited and farmer worker 
prohibited.1179 From 1998, Beijing local government started to enact a series of local policies in 
limiting the number of farmer workers that could be employed by almost twenty kinds of 




 Supra 1169. For more information, please see generally in “Chinese Household Registration System: 
The Shame of the City” (Zhongguo Huji Zhidu: Chengshi De Chiru), Chinese Economic Daily (China), 
April 30, 2005, cited from online: <http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=4142> (date 
accessed: January 17, 2006); Gao yifei, “Tragedy on Wage Arrears, Who Push Farmer Workers to the 
Serbonian bog?” (Taoxin Quanju Pingfa, Sheibi Nongmin gong Zoushang Juelu), online: 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2005-09/27/content_3550492.htm> (date accessed: April 2, 2006). 
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occupations. What is more, in Beijing, before a farmer worker could be legally employed, he/she 
must get three certificates and one card (Sanzheng Yika) issued by local government, including 
Certificate of Temporary Residence (Zanzhu Zheng), Employment Certificate (Beijing Shi Wailai 
Renyuan Jiuye Zheng), a special registration certificate for female farmer workers on their marital 
status (Hunyu Zheng), and a Card on Migrant’s Floating Employment (Waichu Renyuan Liudong 
Dengji Ka).1180 In addition, farmer workers there must pay more than RMB 300 yuan per year for 
the renewal of the aforesaid certificates and card.1181 Not only Shanghai, Wu Han and Beijing, 
but also some other relatively small cities of China such as Shenzhen, Zhenzhou, Qingdao and 
Fuzhou etc. enacted discriminatory local legislation as such.1182 For example, in Qingdao, 
Shandong Province, the local occupation reservation law deprives residents with rural origin of 
the chance to seek the same employment opportunities as their urban counterparts.1183 In fact, the 
only difference between these local discriminatory policies and legislation enacted by various 
cities of China is the matter of degree. As a Chinese scholar used to commented, the Chinese 
local government was not the opponent against the discriminatory policies, but became the 
“talented” creator as well as loyal supporter of the policies as such.1184 As such, it is fair to 
conclude that discriminative treatment to the Chinese farmer workers has been institutionalized 
and legalized to some extent. As a logical consequence, what is left for farmer workers are mainly 
those occupations with hazardous working conditions, or those that urban citizens are unwilling 
to do -- a typical example is construction work.1185 
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iv. Discrimination in Terms and Conditions of Employment 
 
Based on the survey made by the writer herself on forty Chinese farmer workers,1186  a 
comparison on the terms and conditions of employment between workers with urban origin and 
farmer workers is reflected by the table as follows: (table 6) 
 
Workers with urban origin (excluding 
retrenched workers) 
Farmer workers (40 farmer workers 
interviewed by the writer herself working in 
the construction sites of Shanghai, China) 
Average daily working hour is around 8 and 
there is at least one day off each week; in fact, 
most of them employed in the public sector 
have two days off per week (violation of the 
workers’ right to rest happens but there is no 
systematic violation); 
Average daily working hour is around 121187 
and there is not a single day off per week; 
indeed, among these 40 farmer workers, 35 of 
them(87.5 percent of them) had the experience 
of working at least two consecutive days 
without sleep;1188 
Generally speaking, overtime working is with 
certain kind of extra payment, though not 
always in accordance with the relevant Chinese 
labor legislation; 
None of them had been paid any overtime 
allowance; 
Wages are paid on a monthly basis usually. 
(Reports show that there are some cases of 
wage arrear happening to them in the North 
Eastern part of China, but such phenomena do 
not happen on a large scale); 
All of their wages are paid on a yearly basis, 
which has become a standard practice, though 
it is clearly against the labor legislation.1189 
(Each month, they will have to borrow some 
money from the employers to cover their living 
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 The State shall adopt a working hour system wherein laborers shall work for no more than eight hours 
a day and no more than 44 hours a week on the average. And the work hours to be prolonged, in general, 
shall be no longer than one hour a day, or no more than three hours a day if such prolonging is called for 
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1188
 The employer shall guarantee that its laborers have at least one day off a week. Labor Law of PRC, art. 
38. 
1189
 Wages shall be paid to laborers in the form of currency on a monthly basis. Labor Law of PRC, art. 50.  
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expenses in advance, and this amount will be 
deducted accordingly from their final payment 
at the end of each year); 
They are usually protected by the local 
minimum wage standards; 
None of them are protected by the local 
minimum wage standards;1190 
Most of them have signed labor contracts with 
the employer; 
Only two workers (merely five percent of 
them) have signed the labor contract with their 
employers;1191 
The majority of them have participated in the 
social insurance program financed by their 
employers. 
None of them was covered by any medical 
insurance, subsidies or social security 
insurance, let alone housing subsidy financed 
by their employers.1192 
 
In sum, as reflected by the table above, it is clear that farmer workers have no chance to enjoy the 
same rights as workers with urban origin are entitled to in practice. Despite the degrading social 
status of the Chinese working class and the fact that the rights and interests of the urban workers 
are not that well protected nowadays as mentioned in the previous chapters, compared with the 
situation of the Chinese farmer workers, the working conditions of the workers with urban origin 
are much better off. It was reported that in Beijing, in the first 11 months of 2003, 86.7 percent of 
the victims caused by industrial accident were farmer workers.1193  A nation wide survey 
conducted recently also showed that more than 90 percent of the victims of occupation related 
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 The State shall implement a system of guaranteed minimum wages. Specific standards on minimum 
wages shall be stipulated by provincial, autonomous regional and municipal peoples governments and 
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death due to unsafe working conditions were farmer workers.1194 Indeed, working overtime 
without extra payment and being chosen to do dangerous work without personal protection 
equipment seem to be too common to them.1195 If they are sick or get injured, very possibly, they 
are simply fired without any compensation.1196  As such, it is high time for the Chinese 
government and its academia to confront the employment discrimination against its farmer 
workers, to try to discover the reasons behind, and to search for solutions with feasibility against 
such unfairness. 
 
B. Analysis on Reasons for Employment Discrimination Based on Social Origin 
i. Root Cause -- Rigid Household Registration System with Chinese Characteristics (Hukou 
System) 
 
Before discussing the Chinese hukou system, some historical facts of the Chinese history are 
worth mentioning in advance. It is submitted by most historians that the idea that the city 
represents either a distinct style or, more substantial, a higher level of civilization than the 
countryside is a cliché of the western cultural traditions; however, it had not been so in traditional 
China, where the sharp division into distinct urban and rural civilizations disappeared very early 
in China, although it remained characteristic of much of the rest of the world until recent times 
and produced distinct urban attitudes in other civilizations.1197 Indeed, the conditions to allow the 
existence of the attitude as such in China have vanished by the beginning of the imperial era -- 
202 B. C.1198 
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a. Overview on the Chinese Household Registration System 
The socialist China used to completely prevent farmers from working in the cities.1199 The major 
mechanism adopted by the government back then to control the internal movement of its people 
is the rigid household registration system -- called “hukou” in mandarin, through which each 
citizen in China is registered either with urban or with rural origin.1200 In other words, people in 
China are artificially divided into two categories. Based on this dual system, there are dual social 
security system, dual medical insurance system, dual educational system, dual taxation system, 
dual organizational system, and even dual power supply system.1201 Although there is certain 
sign indicating that the state is going to reform the residence registration system as such so that 
people will be able to have more freedom of movement within China, the reform speed seems to 
be very slow.  
 
b. Historical Review on the Household Registration System in China (Hukou System) 
 
To have a better understanding on the current migration wave from rural to urban areas in China 
and the root cause of the employment discrimination against the migrating Chinese farmer 
workers in urban areas, a historical review on the Chinese hukou system is necessary. Throughout 
most of the PRC history, the hukou system played a critical role in controlling internal 
migration.1202 Initiated in 1953,1203 popularized in light of an instruction of the State Council, 
legalized by the Regulation Regarding the Hukou Registration in 1958 and substantiated as well 
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as fine-tuned by numerous, often ad hoc, regulations, provincial rules, directives, decrees, and 
documents,1204 the hukou system has been existing in the PRC history for six decades.1205  
 
During the first decade of CCP’s coming into power, more than 20 million Chinese farmers 
rushed into the cities due to the allure of the urban areas coupled with the poverty and economic 
devastation pervading the rural areas caused by decades of wars,1206 despite that the urban 
industry back then had no capacity to absorb them at all.1207 Indeed, the influx of migrants from 
rural areas exacerbated the dilemma of urban unemployment and also caused social instability for 
the newly established socialist regime.1208 Moreover, influenced by the Soviet Model, despite the 
economy was largely agrarian and there was a desperate shortage of capital investment during 
those days, the state nevertheless placed the priority on heavy industry to speed up its 
industrialization at the cost of the interests of its agricultural industry -- “the state under-priced 
agricultural products and overpriced industrial products to induce an unequal exchange between 
the agricultural and industrial sectors”.1209 In doing so, the state obtained the necessary original 
accumulation of capital, which was generally called the “scissors balance” (Gongnong Jiandao 
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Cha), to achieve the goal of industrialization focusing on its heavy industries located in its urban 
areas.1210 In order to maintain the artificial unbalance as such and the social stability, hukou 
system was introduced to block free flow of resources, especially labor force between industry 
and agriculture as well as between city and countryside.1211  
 
Under the hukou system, every family has a permanent residence booklet (Hukou Bu), which lists 
a family’s place of permanent residence, temporary residence, births, deaths, out-and in- 
migration, race, native place (Jiguan), educational level, class status, political labels as well as 
military record if any.1212 In terms of the 1958 Regulation Regarding the Hukou Registration, 
every citizen must report any change of domicile to the local authorities.1213 For example, if a 
citizen resided temporarily outside his permanent residence over three days, he/she or a 
household head (Huzhu) should report and register for his/her temporary residence at the 
authority in charge of the local household registration within three days, and before leaving 
he/she would have to report again and nullify the temporary residence registration 
accordingly;1214 if a citizen wanted to move from rural area to city, first of all, he/she must hold 
proof from the urban labor department, proof of a school’s admission notice, or proof of an 
immigration permit issued by the institution responsible for registering permanent residency of 
that city.1215 As a matter of fact, procedure as such was just the beginning. He/she had to go to 
the institution responsible for registering his permanent residency and applied to go through 
various complicated emigration procedure before his migration goal could be finally achieved.1216 






 Ibid. This is also double checked by the writer herself during her filed study in Shanghai via checking 
several permanent residence booklets.  
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 Supra 1205. Please also see Regulation Regarding the Hukou Registration in 1958, art.10 & 13. 
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In fact, with the implementation of such rigid internal movement control, it was almost 
impossible for most residents with the rural origin to move to and reside in urban areas.1217 Thus, 
it was observed that a pyramid-shaped social hierarchy was created, with ordinary grain-growing 
farmers (more than 0.9 billion) strictly bound to the rural land at the bottom of the Chinese 
society and residence of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai at the top.1218 Indeed, horizontal 
movement between places at the same level was sometimes not easy to accomplish, let alone 
upward mobility.1219 Some scholars even state that “the urban-rural gap has been likened to the 
distance between heaven and earth” -- changing from rural hukou to urban hukou is much more 
difficult than “climbing to heaven”.1220 Above and beyond this, the hukou system was actually 
playing a more comprehensive function than merely controlling the Chinese citizens’ internal 
migration. A person registered with urban origin is entitled to free compulsory education, basic 
food supply, urban unemployment relief, urban minimum wage protection, medical insurance, 
                                                 
1217
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with the urban hukou will not marry a young female with the rural hukou because their children would 
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with the rural hukou because of the poor living conditions in the rural areas. Therefore, the marriage 
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hukou.” Cited from Zhu Lijiang, “The Hukou System of the People's Republic of China: A Critical 
Appraisal under International Standards of Internal Movement and Residence”, 2003, 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 
519. 
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social security protection, housing subsidy and pensions etc.1221 On the contrary, farmers -- 
people registered as rural population, are not only denied all of the benefits abovementioned, but 
are locked to the land to take care of their own subsistence and consumption needs.1222 It is 
observed that the majority of the Chinese rural residents have not benefited from China’s 
dramatic economic development over the past two decades; some even do not have the chance to 
“enjoy elementary conditions for their basic livelihood”.1223 Clearly, via the rigid internal 
movement control mechanism coupled with the domestic differential treatment as such, there is 
an intangible wall with institutional support between the urban and the rural areas in China.1224 
Despite the fact that they are all Chinese citizens and shall be entitled to enjoy the same 
citizenship under the Chinese constitution1225, urban dwellers are inclined to feel much superior to 
the people with rural origin.  
 
Admittedly, many countries around the world adopt the residential registration system internally, 
though under different names, including Japan, Thailand, Iran, Mongolia, France, Belgium and 
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Romania etc.1226 Compared with the domestic residential registration systems as such, China’s 
hukou system shows several unique features as follows: 
 
First, the principle purpose of the Chinese hukou system is to control its own citizen. The 
adoption of the household registration system is to prove its citizen’s identity, maintain social 
security, control a citizen’s movement area, in particular serve as a safety valve in controlling 
rural-to-urban migration.1227 Yet the main goal for the other countries’ residential registration 
system is for the sake of the convenience of its own people -- serving its own people rather than 
controlling their movement. 1228  Second, the Chinese hukou system serves a relatively 
comprehensive function, i.e., ① serving as a main basis in distributing social interests and 
resources, which covers all kinds of state-subsidized benefits like food supply, unemployment 
relief, medical insurance, housing subsidy etc.1229, ② controlling citizen’s internal movement, 
③ proving citizen’s identity.1230 Whilst the others’ function is relatively simple -- to prove a 
person’s identity. 1231  Third, through the introduction of the Chinese hukou system, a 
hereditary 1232  and dual system that artificially divides the Chinese agricultural and 
non-agricultural populations, and effectively binds the farmers to the land was erected.1233 It 
might be a fact of life that each society is hierarchical as each society has the poor and rich 
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division, the minority and majority division as well as the powerful and less powerful division; 
however, different from other countries’ residential registration systems where the creation of 
which is not to maintain the social hierarchy among its own people but to avoid it, or at the least 
ameliorate the status quo, the Chinese hukou system not only fails to mitigate the already-existed 
hierarchy, but creates as well as maintains a new division with strong institutional support.1234 
 
c. Loosening Hukou System 
Since the late 1970s when China launched its economic reform, the internal rural to urban 
migration has risen up to an unprecedented scale.1235 It is concluded by several Chinese scholars 
that the major reasons for such unusual internal movement are as follows:1236 ① the success of 
the agricultural reforms1237 under Deng Xiaoping era not only improved agricultural efficiency, 
but also set large surplus of nearly 200 million laborers in rural areas free from the land; ② the 
rapid economic development in the cities, especially the light labor-intensive industry, 
engendered great need for a large amount of cheap laborers and craftsmen, whereas the hukou 
system has negatively influenced on the progress of China’s urbanization1238  and healthy 
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 Please see generally in U.S. Library of Congress, “Migration”, online: 
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collectives.” Cited from Supra 1202. 
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economic development; ③ the emergence of a private market as well as the dismantling of food 
rationing and other relevant structures have necessitated the adoption of more flexible policies on 
rural-to-urban migration. Considering the inevitability of the urban-to-rural migration tendency, 
certain policies were adopted to loosen the former over-rigid internal movement control in some 
degree.  
 
At the regional level, the typical reforms in the household registration system have been the 
adoption of two special types of residential registration mechanism to allow increased yet 
controlled labor mobility.1239 One is called “Certificate of Temporary Residence” (Zanzhu 
Zheng), the other is named “Blue-Stamp Hukou” (Lanyin Hukou).1240 Via paying a certain 
amount of money at first, and later on an annual registration fee, as well as finding a valid local 
job, or buying some properties in the urban areas, a Chinese citizen with rural origin might be 
entitled to apply for the special residential registration in the urban areas.1241 In fact, via 
introducing the blue-stamp hukou system, the former hukou system is commercialized.1242 With 
the precondition of paying certain amount of money or purchasing some properties before 
applying the urban blue-stamp hukou, some rural governments are actually indirectly selling the 
urban hukou.1243 In some other areas of China, it is reported that some more radical reforms are 
being considered. Take Jiangsu Province as an example. In terms of the Opinions on Further 
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Deepening the Reform of the Hukou System (Guanyu Jinyibu Shenhua Huji Guanli Zhidu Gaige 
De Yijian), 1244 Jiangsu has proposed to adopt a universal hukou registration system across the 
region. In other words, the former agricultural hukou, non-agricultural hukou, local township 
hukou, blue-stamp hukou etc. are going to be substituted by only one type of hukou system 
without any further classification.1245  
 
At the national level, reform is taking place gradually as well. For example, the State Council 
approves the reform plan proposed by the Ministry of Public Security to allow a child to be 
registered at the location of hukou of either parent rather than only determined by his/her 
mother’s hukou as before.1246 If a man over 60, or a woman over 55 with rural origin lives alone 
in the rural area whereas he/she has a son or daughter lives in the urban area and is registered 
with urban origin, the elderly is entitled to apply for an urban hukou and live there ever after.1247  
If a rural hukou holder invests in the urban area, sets up enterprises, or purchases certain 
properties in the urban areas, he or she will be qualified to apply for an urban hukou of a relative 
small city.1248  
 
To be fair, reforms both at the national and regional level are making progress. It is observed that 
the latest reform on hukou system as such has, to some extent, relaxed and decentralized China’s 
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internal migration control mechanism mainly in small cities and towns.1249 However, it seems 
that they are unstable, piecemeal-based and superficial in nature. For instance, the blue-stamp 
hukou policy which was adopted by various large cities of China, including Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Wuhan etc. and existing for several years, now has been abolished by 
most of the cities.1250 Besides, the commercialization of the hukou system1251 implies an unequal 
result, i.e., only the rural rich (very few of the rural population) is able to be qualified to apply for 
an urban hukou. In other words, with the establishment of an official money-hukou link, the 
unfairness carried by the former hukou system was indeed strengthened -- urban hukou is 
endowed with more financial meaning than ever before. As far as the relatively radical reform in 
Jiangsu Province is concerned, it merely universalized different types of hukou in name without 
entitled all the people within its region to the same treatment. It is discovered that in spite of the 
alleged universalization of the hukou, rural people still have no opportunity to freely move from 
the rural to the urban areas.1252 To those farmer workers migrating to the urban areas for work, 
they are nevertheless subject to various discriminative local policies and regulations.1253 Worse 
still, the reform has not universalized the state subsidized benefit. In other words, urban dwellers 
are nevertheless enjoying various benefits as before merely based on their social origin, whilst its 
rural counterparts are entitled to none.1254  
 
In sum, neither the reforms at the regional level nor the ones at the national level touched the core 
of the Chinese hukou system -- artificially denying the equality among its own citizens. As 
widely understood that institutionalized inequality leads to unavoidable de facto discrimination, it 
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will not be hard to imagine the quick emergence of discriminatory treatment on farmer workers 
not only by urban employers, but by urbanites in general as well, though the legislation of hukou 
per se might not be designed to reach such an end on purpose. In fact, the empirical evidence 
supports the position as such. For example, a sample survey made by Chongqing Municipal 
Agricultural Bureau shows that 92 percent of the migrant farmer workers there feel that they are 
discriminated by urbanites.1255 Such a conclusion is further confirmed by the writer’s own survey 
on the 40 Chinese farmer workers, all of whom claim that they were born unequally and feel that 
they are discriminated by the majority of the city dwellers.1256  
 
ii. Other Causes 
a. ACFTU’s Excluding Policy 
Because of the artificial division on its people’s social origin created by the Chinese hukou 
system, the identity of Chinese farmer workers working in the urban areas becomes obscure. 
Despite the fact that they are employed and are working in the cities, they are nevertheless 
excluded to the only legal Chinese workers’ organization -- ACFTU. In fact, in spite of its 
constitution pronouncing that the membership of ACFTU is open to “all manual and mental 
workers in enterprises, undertakings and state organs within the territory of China who rely on 
wages or salaries as their main source of income and who accept the Constitution of the Trade 
Unions of the People’s Republic of China”, China’s trade union, for quite a long time, only 
embraced and “faught” for the interests of the workers with city or township resident 
identification; in other words, more than 100 million farmer workers were completely excluded 
simply because of their rural origin reflected in their permanent residence booklet (Hukou Bu).1257 
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Although the ACFTU announced in an August 9, 2003 circular that it was going to recruit as 
many farmer workers as possible and categorized them as members of China's working class, the 
reality is that more than 80 percent of farmer workers failed to be covered yet and chances for 
them to be covered in the near future are unfortunately slight. 1258  In terms of the 40 farmer 
workers interviewed by the writer herself, only 4 had joined the trade union.1259 In other words, 
90 percent of them are excluded from trade unions. Worse still, among these 36 farmer workers 
who have never joined trade union, 4 of them stated that they had never heard of trade union, let 
alone understood its nature and value. 1260  Indeed, some autonomous farmer workers’ 
organizations in the coastal province of Zhejiang have been declared as illegal organization by the 
authority.1261 As such, this vulnerable group, without enough organizational protection (even just 
in formality), is doomed to be subject to unfair treatment in respect of terms and conditions of 
employment. 
 
b. Inadequate Legal Protection 
Albeit the Chinese labor legislation’s protection on its working class is relatively competent,1262 
from the writer’s view, legal protection as such has not been delivered to the Chinese farmer 
workers at all in reality. It is observed that in the view of some experts the Chinese labor 
legislation has provided enough protection on its farmer workers.1263 This argument assumes that 
farmer workers belong to the working class in China, and since working class is relatively well 
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protected by the Chinese labor legislation, so do farmer workers.1264 Theoretically, this position 
is arguably right in the sense that according to ACFTU’s Constitution and the Chinese Trade 
Union Law, a worker is defined as a person (regardless of his/her social origin) doing physical 
and mental work in enterprises, undertakings and state organs within the territory of China who 
rely on wages or salaries as their main source of income, regardless of their nationality, race, sex, 
occupation, religious belief or educational level. 1265  However, if that is the case, better 
explanations probably are needed to address the aforesaid issues, such as social security system 
fails to cover them, trade unions refuse to accept them as members, and they have often been 
subjected to the worst forms of violation of labor standards prohibited by the Chinese labor 
law.1266  
 
According to the writer’s observation, in practice, farmer workers in China belong to a special 
social group, i.e., their identification is “half farmer half workers”. During the busy season in 
farming, their role might be farmers because they are likely to return to their hometown in rural 
areas and work in the field with their families; when the busy farming season ends, they will rush 
into the cities and become workers working in enterprises located there despite that their social 
origin is still registered as farmer. With the rapid development of the Chinese market economy 
coupled with the speedy urbanization pace, this social group is becoming larger and larger. 
Official statistics show that the total number of internal migrating people in 1982 was only 30 
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million, while the number in 1997 had ascended to more than 100 million already.1267 Some 
semi-official statistics show that by the end of year 2005 the number of farmer workers had 
reached 200 million;1268 other sources show that the number had even increased to 250 million 
already by the end of 2005.1269 Whatever the real number is, one thing is for sure, i.e., the 
population of this special social group is increasing exponentially year by year. Based on the 
previous discussion, especially the discriminatory treatment on farmer workers in terms of 
employment, it will not be hard to reach a conclusion that the government both central and the 
local, the law, the employers and the urban dwellers have not recognized them as real workers 
belonging to the Chinese working class in practice. 
 
Admittedly, the central government has started realizing the problem. Within recent years, it has 
called for a nationwide effort to safeguard the rights and interests of farmer workers. For example, 
the administrative document -- “2003 Reply to Questions Relating to the Application of Labor on 
Farmer Workers” (Guanyu Nongmingong Shiyong Laodong Falü Youguan Wenti De Fuhan) 
(2003 Reply) issued by National Labor and Social Security Department states that as long as the 
farmer workers have established the de facto employment relationship with employers, the 
Chinese labor law is applicable to farmer workers;1270 the “2004 Notice Regarding Further 
Improving Employment Condition of Farmer Workers” (Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Nongmin 
Jincheng Jiuye Huanjing Gongzuo De Tongzhi) (2004 Notice) issued by State Council calls for 
various relevant governmental agencies to sort out the wage arrear problem and other 
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discriminative treatment faced by farmer workers in the urban areas;1271 “2005 Notice Regarding 
Strengthening the Management of Labor Contracts of Farmer Workers in the Construction 
Industry” (Guanyu Jiaqiang Jianshe Deng Hangye Nongmingong Laodong Hetong Guanli De 
Tongzhi) (2005 Notice) promulgated by the National Labor and Social Security Department 
requires employers who employ farmer workers to sign labor contracts with them in accordance 
with relevant labor legislation, and the contracts shall be registered at the local labor security 
department for record.1272  To be fair, through the promulgation of various administrative 
documents as such for protecting the interests and rights of farmer workers, the central 
government is taking farmer workers’ rights seriously in a progressive though slow way. 
However, the problem is that both the 2003 Reply and the 2004/2005 Notices are merely 
administrative decisions1273 in nature, and only targeting specific problems faced by farmer 
workers without providing a comprehensive and detailed legislative protection on their labor 
rights in general.  
 
C. Legislative Solutions on Erasing Employment Discrimination of Farmer Workers Based 
on Social Origin 
i. Reform of the Chinese Hukou System 
As discussed above, certain reforms on the hukou system are already on the way.1274 The 
problem is that they are superficial and piecemeal-based in nature.1275 What the writer is going to 
discuss in this part is to propose several guiding principles on how to reform the Chinese hukou 
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system so that its essential core, i.e., artificially denying the equality among Chinese citizens, 
could be shaken and gradually transformed to reach a fair end. 
 
a. Primary Principle: Freedom of Internal Movement as Its Final Goal 
Only through the realization of the right to travel to, reside in, and work in any part of China as a 
Chinese citizen wishes without unreasonable official interference, could those discriminatory 
local legislation and policies be aborted completely; meanwhile, only through realizing the goal 
as such, could the current two-tier, well-segregated labor market between local urban hukou 
holders and migrant farmer workers, which directly leads to inequalities and discriminations, be 
attacked by a fatal blow.1276 
 
1. International Law on Freedom of Internal Movement 
(1) Overview on the International Treaty Law on Freedom of Internal Movement 
 “Freedom to move about and to choose a place of residence within states is intrinsically one of 
the most natural and basic human rights protected by international law.”1277 As stated in the 
preparatory work of the ICCPR, the right to freedom of internal movement and residence 
constitutes an important human rights as well as an essential part of the right to personal 
liberty.1278 It is observed that “freedom of movement at home … is important for job and 
business opportunities -- for cultural, political and social activities -- for all the commingling 
which a gregarious (person) enjoys”.1279 It is submitted that despite freedom of movement may 
seem on the surface to be a fairly minor and obvious human rights, it actually is one of the most 
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basic rights and essential for the effective enjoyment of other human rights,1280 and when 
violated, can lead to profound effects upon other basic human rights outline in the UDHR as well 
as other human rights treaties, and therefore causes numerous problems and cases of suffering.1281 
As such, arbitrary restrictions upon this right is likely to lead to the denial of economic social and 
cultural rights covering employment as well as civil and political rights, such as personal liberty 
and freedom of assembly and association etc.1282 According to some scholars, freedom of internal 
movement is the “hall mark of a democratic society”,1283 and the denial of which is the source of 
much unnecessary suffering throughout the world.1284 
 
Starting from the unanimously adopted UDHR, the freedom of internal movement has been 
gradually strengthened by a series of international treaties, including but not limited to ICCPR, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 
Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrants Workers and Members of Their Families etc.1285 Put concretely, in the 
UDHR, it pronounces that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each state.”1286 In the later ICCPR, one of the most important conventions of 
international bills of human rights, it further translates this principle under UDHR into a more 
detailed legal form by providing that “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, 
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
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residence”.1287 Via a reasonable linguistic explanation, citizens of a state are surely lawfully 
within the territory of a state and the territory of a state shall include all parts of a state no matter 
rural or urban areas.  
 
(2) Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Internal Movement under the Treaty Law 
Of course, freedom of internal movement is not an absolute right since the ICCPR actually 
restricts it within certain demarcation -- it shall be subject to restrictions “which are provided by 
law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals 
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the 
present Covenant”.1288 In other words, restrictions allowed under ICCPR on the right of freedom 
of internal movement shall be in full compliance with the three criteria simultaneously as 
follows:1289 
 
① provided by law; 
② necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others; 
③ consistent with the other rights recognized in the ICCPR per se. 
 
Generally speaking, to date there are three main schools of thoughts on the interpretation of 
treaties, including the school of “founding fathers”, the “textual” school as well as the 
“teleological school”.1290 The ideas as such have been absorbed as well in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which provides that the general rule of treaty interpretation shall be “in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
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context and in the light of its object and purpose”.1291 Accordingly, the first criterion on the 
restriction of the freedom of internal movement shall be legitimately understood in this way: the 
restriction as such shall be provided by the domestic law of a state in accordance with the 
legislative procedure of the state in question and law as such shall be consistent with a state’s 
constitution logically.1292 In addition, theoretically, the domestic law in question shall at least be 
consistent with the basic principles of rule of law, that is general, accessible to the public, 
prospective, clear, consistent on the whole, capable of being followed, relatively stable, fairly 
applied, and “there must be procedural rules for law making and laws must be made by an entity 
with the authority to make laws in accordance with such rules to be valid” as discussed.1293 
Furthermore, Human Rights Committee’s general comments suggest that “in adopting                 
laws providing for restrictions permitted by article 12, paragraph 3, States should always be 
guided by the principle that the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right”.1294  
 
As for the interpretation of the second criterion on the permissible restriction, indeed merely 
based on the context of the ICCPR per se, neither “good faith”, “textual” principles nor 
“teleological” approach could provide a clear definition of the concepts such as “national 
security”, “public order”, “public health or morals” or “the rights and freedoms of others”. Under 
such circumstances, the supplementary means of treaty interpretation in accordance with Vienna 
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Convention shall be eligible to apply.1295 The restrictions considered as legitimate by the Human 
Rights Commission during the drafting of article 12 (3) of the ICCPR were those: ① imposed 
during a national emergency, ② for the control of epidemics, prostitution, and migrant workers; 
and ③  for the protection of indigenous populations. 1296  Clearly, based on the travaux 
preparatoires as such, certain interpretative guiding principles on how to understand those 
concepts embodied in the second test of permissible restrictions on freedom of internal movement 
have emerged. Accordingly, going back to the general rules of treaty interpretation stipulated by 
Vienna Convention, via both the “good faith”, “textual” principles and especially the 
“teleological” approach, even if a state that imposes restrictions on freedom of movement and 
residence on the ground of public interest, such restrictions shall nevertheless act consistently 
with the treaty obligation under the ICCPR and shall be open to scrutiny to the international 
protection mechanism as well.1297 In this sense, in spite of a state’s undoubted sovereign 
discretion to restrict its people’s internal movement and residence for the sake of public interest, 
human rights standards provided by the international bill of rights shall be legitimate to constrain 
the said discretion by providing an external safety valve.1298  
 
Above and beyond this, even the restrictions provided by the law of a state are on the basis of 
public interests, it still shall be “necessary”. In other words, the measures taken to limit the scope 
of freedom of movement and residence shall be in compliance with the principle of 
proportionality -- there shall be a reasonable relationship and balance between an end and the 
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means adopted to achieve that end.1299 As Human Rights Committee states in its twenty-seventh 
General Comment, it is not enough that the restrictions serve the permissible purposes only; 
rather they must be necessary as well, i.e., they must be appropriate to achieve their protective 
function, they must be the least intrusive instruments among those means available to achieve the 
desired goal, and they must be proportionate to the interest intended to be protected.1300 In 
particular, the Committee heavily criticizes domestic legislation “requiring individuals to apply 
for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval of the local authorities of the 
place of destination, as well as delays in processing such written applications”.1301 In addition, it 
is noteworthy that during the preparation of this article of freedom of movement under ICCPR, 
one state delegate suggested that it should be legitimate to forbid movement to an urban area 
where an adequate supply of labor already existed and housing accommodations were 
inadequate.1302 It is controversial whether a state could legitimately require its citizen to have a 
job, certain skill, or a promise of housing as a precondition to move from the countryside to 
city.1303 The conclusion offered by the Commission on Human Rights is that “while the state may 
have a legitimate interest in planned development of its cities, such (pre)conditions would 
severely restrict an individual right to move from country to city and would in effect curtail his 
ability to enjoy other rights guaranteed by the Covenant (ICCPR)”. 
 
For the third criterion on the permissible restriction, it requires that the restriction on the freedom 
of internal movement and residence shall be compatible with other rights guaranteed in the 
ICCPR, such as the right not to be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence,1304 and right to get equal protection of the law without any 
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discrimination on any ground1305, as well as be compatible with fundamental principles of 
equality and non-discrimination.1306 For a better understanding on the third criterion, it might be 
worthwhile mentioning two cases as follows.  
 
The issue of the first case of Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian women v. 
Mauritius is about the legality of the Mauritian Immigration (Amendment) Act, 1977, and the 
Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1977 under the ICCPR.1307 The plaintiff contended that under the 
newly enacted legislation, alien husband of Mauritian women lost their residence status in 
Mauritius and had to apply for a “residence permit” which may be refused or removed at any time 
by the Minister of Interior; whereas, alien women married to Mauritian husbands retaining their 
legal rights to residence in the country without the same legislative interference.1308 The Human 
Rights Committee held that the common residence of husband and wife shall be considered as the 
normal behavior of a family.1309 Hence, the exclusion of a person from a country where close 
members of his family (for example, his wife) were living amounted to an interference within the 
meaning of article 17 (1) of ICCPR which stipulates that no-one shall be subject to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his family.1310 It further stated that the exclusion of residence caused 
by the Immigration legislation in question was “subject to the principle of equal treatment of the 
sexes which followed from several provisions of the ICCPR”.1311 For example, under its article 2 
(1), it was an obligation of a state to respect and ensure the rights entitled by ICCPR without 
distinction of any kind, such as sex, and more particularly under article 3 to ensure the equal right 
of men and women to enjoy all these rights, as well as under article 26 to provide with no 
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discrimination for the equal protection of the law.1312 After applying the third criterion in this 
case, the Committee found that there had been a violation of other rights as well as the principle 
of non-discrimination recognized by the ICCPR.1313 Based on this case, restrictions placed upon 
a person’s rights to move and reside inside a state ought not to negate his/her ability to enjoy 
other rights guaranteed by the ICCPR, and at any rate, principle of non-discrimination shall be 
secured.1314  
 
In the second case of Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee found that 
“statutory restrictions affecting the right to residence ... must have both a reasonable and 
objective justification and be consistent with the other provisions of the Covenant, as a 
whole”.1315 Once again, the Committee emphasized the holistic approach in treaty interpretation. 
In other words, based on whatever “royal” purposes, restrictions on the right of persons to move 
and reside inside a state have to be compatible with the enjoyment of the rights and principles, 
such as principle of non-discrimination, recognized in the ICCPR as a whole.1316  
 
(3) Freedom of Internal Movement -- A Rule of Customary International Law 
Indeed, a host of evidence has showed that the right to freedom of internal movement has been 
recognized widely as customary international law. As mentioned in the text above, generally 
speaking, both state practice and opinio juris -- sense of legal obligation are indispensable 
complementary elements to constitute customary international law. 1317  In order to be qualified 
as “state practice”, the practice shall be constant, uniform as well as passing through a reasonable 
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period of time.1318 As far as this aspect is concerned, there is a rich array of treaties not only at 
international level as mentioned above, but at regional level in guaranteeing this right. Back to the 
1940s, during the preparation of European Convention on Human Rights, right to internal 
movement and residence had been assumed as an inherent component of personal liberty.1319 
Article 2 of its Fourth Protocol concluded in 1963 finally secured this right and its permissible 
restrictions in paper by borrowing almost the same wordings that are used in ICCPR article 12. In 
the American Convention on Human Rights adopted in 1969, it also provides that “every person 
lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject 
to the provision of law”, and the permissible restrictions on this right shall be “necessary in a 
democratic society to prevent crime or to protect national security, public safety, public order, 
public morals, public health, or the rights and freedoms of others”.1320 The later regional 
conventions, such as African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Arab 
Charter on Human Rights, all have recognized right to freedom of internal movement as one of 
the fundamental human rights and indeed the essential part of the right to personal liberty.1321  
 
In addition, this right is not only guaranteed by the abovementioned long-standing regional 
treaties, but also supported by lots of national legislation. For example, in the 1993 Russian 
legislation titled “On the Right of Russian Citizens to Freedom of Movement and Choice of Place 
of Sojourn and Residence within the Borders of the Russian Federation”, its opening article 
clearly grants the right to freedom of movement, choice of place of sojourn and residence -- a 
                                                 
1318
 For more information, please see generally in Rebeccam. M. M. Wallace, International Law: A Student 
Introduction, 2nd edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), from 9-18; D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials 
on International Law, 5th edition (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998), from 23-44; Martin Dixon, 
International Law, 3rd edition (Glasgow: Bell and Bain Ltd, 1990), from 27-35; Mark W. Janis, An 
Introduction to International Law, 4th edition (New York: Aspen Publisher, 2003), from 41-53. 
1319
 Supra 1277, at 13. 
1320
 American Convention on Human Rights "Pact Of San Jose, Costa Rica", art. 22 (1) & (3). 
1321
 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, art. 12; Commonwealth of Independent 
States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1995, art. 22; Arab Charter on Human 
Rights, 1997, art. 20. 
295 
remarkable departure from its traditional propiska.1322 Through adoption of its new Constitution, 
Cambodia, as most other former communist states used to strictly control freedom of movement, 
had progressively lifted the limitations on this right after 1993.1323 The German Constitution 
makes it clear that all Germans enjoy freedom of movement throughout the Federal territory; and 
the only permissible restrictions shall be “pursuant to a statute, and only in cases in which an 
adequate basis of existence is lacking and special burdens would arise to the community, or in 
which the restriction is necessary to avert an imminent danger to the existence or the free 
democratic basic order of the Federation or a Land, to combat the danger of epidemics, to deal 
with natural disasters or particularly grave accidents, to protect young people from neglect or to 
prevent crime”.1324 Indeed, this freedom of internal movement is recognized by many twentieth 
century constitutions, including but not limited to the constitution of Japan, Sweden, Italy, Spain, 
Finland1325 and even the 1954 Chinese constitution1326 etc.1327 Based on the writer’s research, 
the right to freedom of movement, including internal movement, has been officially recognized 
by most states worldwide as a constitutional right.1328  
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Above and beyond this, there are a rich array of both domestic and regional courts’ decisions to 
guarantee the right to freedom of internal movement. For instance, in the case of Kent v. Dulles 
357 U.S. 116 (1958), the US Supreme Court holds that “freedom of movement, both within and 
across our national borders, is basic in its scheme of values”.1329 In Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 
618 (1969), the US Supreme Court contends that for quite a long time, the nature of American 
and its constitution concepts of personal liberty have united to require that all citizens are free to 
travel throughout the length and breath of the land “uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations 
which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement”.1330 Other cases, such as Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (US)1331, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 1332, Aptheker v. Secretary 
of State, 378 U.S. 500,1333 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,1334 Loizidou v. Turkey (by European Court 
of Human Rights, ECHR),1335 and Cyrus v. Turkey (by ECHR),1336 either has directly recognized 
the right to freedom of movement or indirectly referred to this right as the legal foundation of the 
existence of other human rights.1337 Given the existence of so many long-standing international, 
regional conventions supported by the majority states worldwide to guarantee the right to 
freedom of internal movement, as well as the constitutional and judicial recognition of the right as 
such, it is fair to conclude that the said two complementary elements of customary international 
law have been met. Therefore, even if a state like China has not ratified any of the international or 
regional conventions that guarantee the right to freedom of internal movement, it is none the less 
bound by the customary international law that recognizes this right. Accordingly, it is China’s 
                                                 
1329
 Matthew A. Dombroski, “Securing Access to Transportation for the Urban Poor”, 2005, 105 Colum. L. 
Rev. 503. 
1330
 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 1969, online: 
















international obligation under the customary international law to respect and protect right to 
freedom of internal movement. 
 
2. Examining the Legality of the Chinese Hukou System under International Law on 
Freedom of Internal Movement 
The means adopted by the Chinese government to restrict its people’s freedom of internal 
movement is mainly the Hukou system. As stated above, in order to maintain the “scissors 
balance”, to achieve the goal of industrialization which emphasized particularly on its heavy 
industry located in its urban areas, and meanwhile to maintain social stability, hukou system was 
created to block free flow of resources, in particular labor force from rural to urban area.1338 With 
the existence of this institution, there is a de facto intangible wall between the rural and urban 
areas in China.1339 In this part, the writer is going to evaluate the Chinese hukou system in 
accordance with the three permissible restrictions on freedom of internal movement under the 
ICCPR, to see whether the hukou system could satisfy the three tests, and therefore be qualified 
as legitimate restriction on the Chinese people’s freedom of internal movement. 
 
(1) Test One: Provided by Law 
The Chinese hukou system is, prima facie, consistent with this test since it is legalized by the 
1958 “Regulation Regarding the Hukou Registration”. However, as abovementioned, the “law” in 
question has to meet certain qualifications, such as be consistent with the basic principles of rule 
of law:1340 general, accessible to the public, prospective, clear, consistent on the whole, capable 
of being followed, relatively stable, fairly applied, and “there must be procedural rules for law 
making and laws must be made by an entity with the authority to make laws in accordance with 
such rules to be valid”. Take the principle of “consistent on the whole” as an example. At the 
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least, it implies that the “law” shall be consistent with a state’s constitution. Under the current 
Chinese constitution, it states seriously that as long as a person is with the PRC nationality, 
he/she is the citizen of PRC and all citizens of the PRC are equal before the law.1341 In terms of 
the Chinese hukou system which is legalized by 1958 legislation and strengthened and specified 
by a series of rules and regulations, considering that only based on limited reasons such as 
passing college entrance exam, marrying someone with urban origin and joining the army etc., 
could a rural person be allowed to legally reside in urban area for a long term, the freedom of a 
citizen with rural origin to move from rural to urban areas has been seriously blocked.1342 The 
direct impact of such a system is that a pyramid-shaped social caste was created, with the 
majority (around 70 percent)1343 of the Chinese population, viz. the Chinese farmers, being 
bound to the land at the bottom of the Chinese society, whereas the residents from large cities 
such as Shanghai, Beijing at the top.1344 Although the 1958 law has not stipulated directly that it 
only limits the right to freedom of internal movement of the Chinese farmers, given the fact that a 
person registered with urban origin is entitled to various protection from the Chinese social 
welfare system,1345 whereas his/her rural counterparts are entitled to none of them, and given that 
there are actually no restriction at all for an urban Chinese to give up his/her urban household 
registration identity (in other word, converting to be rural Chinese), whereas there are only few 
approaches available1346 for a rural Chinese to become an urban one, the hukou system has 
indeed denied the equality between the urban people and rural ones in China. As such, it is not 
difficulty to conclude the unconstitutionality of the Chinese hukou system.  
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Besides, according to the fourth constitutional amendment in 2004, a sentence -- “the state 
respects and protects human rights” is added into article 33 of the Chinese constitution as its third 
paragraph. As discussed above, freedom of internal movement has been proved as one of the 
most natural and basic human rights protected by both international and regional treaty law as 
well as customary international law.1347 Accordingly, freedom of internal movement as the 
precondition for a person’s liberty and enjoyment of other cultural, political and social rights, is 
surely within the scope of “human rights” stated in the fourth constitutional amendment. 
Realizing that the Chinese hukou system has unreasonably blocked the individual’s right to freely 
move from rural to urban areas, considering that the Human Rights Committee had heavily 
criticized the domestic practices to require individual to apply for permission in advance to 
change their residence or to seek the approval from the local authorities of the place of destination, 
and bearing in mind the Human Rights Committee’s explicit disapproval of a state delegate’s 
suggestion to legitimize the prohibition of the movement from countryside to urban areas where 
an adequate labor supply exists already and housing accommodation is inadequate,1348 the 
unconstitutionality of the Chinese hukou system is beyond doubt, which directly leads to the 
hukou system’s failure to meet the first test -- “provided by law”. 
 
(2) Test Two -- Necessary to Protect National Security, Public Order, Public Health or 
Morals or the Rights and Freedoms of Others 
It might be true that one of the purposes of the Chinese hukou system is to control its internal 
migrant workers, and therefore maintain social stability. In this sense, the purpose might be 
qualified in light of one of test two’s several eligible intentions -- “public order”, whose purpose 
could be for the control of migrant workers as contended by the Human Rights Commission 
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during the drafting period.1349 In spite of that, this test nevertheless requires such a restriction to 
be proportionate to achieve the purpose of maintaining social stability.1350 In other words, 
hukou system should be qualified as the least intrusive instruments among other means available 
to achieve the desired goal.1351  
 
Looking back at the nature of the Chinese hukou system, it has caused the individual’s movement 
from rural to urban area extremely difficult, particularly under the 1958 Regulation Regarding the 
Hukou Registration. In spite of the introduction of some reformative practices, such as the 
adoption of “Certificate of Temporary Residence”1352 and the introduction of blue-stamp hukou 
system,1353 the essence of the Hukou System is never touched.1354 Indeed, it is fair to conclude 
the nature of the hukou system as a system that denies the majority of the Chinese population the 
freedom of internal movement and residence.1355 In addition, it is necessary to note that one of 
the reasons to introduce hukou system is to maintain the dramatically unbalanced development 
status between the rural and urban area caused by the “scissor balance” via controlling 
individual’s freedom of internal movement and residence.1356 Furthermore, it should be mindful 
that a dual social structure with dual welfare system has been created and maintained in China for 
decades mainly because of the hukou system.1357 As such, the hukou system is clearly against the 
principle of proportionality and is by no means the least intrusive method. In fact, there are 
various instruments adopted by different states around the world in managing its people’s internal 
movement and residence, whereas none of them is as strict and unreasonable as the Chinese 
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 For more information, please see text above accompanying note 1296. 
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 For more information, please see text accompanying note 1250 to 1256. 
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 Supra 1183. 
1356
 For more information, please see text accompanying note 1210. 
1357
 For more information, please see text accompanying note 1201. 
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hukou system.1358 Because of this “evil” system, a series of social unfairness1359 has been created, 
among which employment discrimination based on social origin is only the tip of the iceberg. 
 
(3) Test Three -- Consistent with the Other Rights Recognized in the ICCPR 
Understanding that the Chinese hukou system has artificially denied the equality among Chinese 
citizens -- urban hukou holders are entitled to a relatively rich social welfare system’s protection 
while the rural ones are denied by any protection at all, realizing that the Chinese farmer workers 
have been seriously discriminated in terms of employment mainly based on social origin, and 
recognizing that the limited reforms on the hukou system either at the regional level or at the 
central level are far from touching its essential core, the hukou system is inconsistent with other 
rights and principles guaranteed by the ICCPR, such as the right to get equal protection of the law 
without discrimination on any ground and the principle of non-discrimination which 
impenetrates the ICCPR.  
 
Indeed, the Chinese hukou system is not able to satisfy any of the permissible restrictions on 
freedom of internal movement whereas the ICCPR requires that a permissible controlling 
mechanism shall be consistent with the three tests simultaneously; therefore, hukou’s illegality 
under the international law on freedom of internal movement is beyond doubt.  
 
b. Second Principle: Abolishing Dualism  
Designed and strengthened under the circumstances of centrally planned economy, the Chinese 
hukou system was initially introduced to maintain the endangered social stability caused by the 
                                                 
1358
 For more information, please see text accompanying not 1226 to 1234. 
1359
 For example, the existence of hukou has actually denied the right to education of the farmer workers’ 
children in the urban areas when they migrate with their parents to the cities. Indeed, even if they are born 
in the cities, as long as their parents are farmer workers, they are supposed to return to their place of origin 
and studied there and they are not allowed to study in any public primary, senior or junior high school 
located in the cities where they migrate.  
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unequal exchange between the agricultural and the industrial sectors in China back then.1360 
However, with the proliferation of the market economy, the economic and political background 
for the further existence of the hukou system has been challenged dramatically. Today, part of the 
function of hukou system designed to maintain the situation of centrally planned economy has 
become largely irrelevant. As such, it is time to abolish the dual social system based on hukou 
registration. Rather than keeping the artificial division between the urban and the rural hukou 
holders, which has directly caused the existence of the current two-tiered and well-segregated 
labor market in China, the hukou registration shall be universalized without any further division 
as such. Put concretely, the future registration shall be merely based on a Chinese citizen’s place 
of residence instead of hereditary. In other words, the reformed hukou registration shall not be 
once-for-all-fashion, but dynamic -- modifying registration in accordance with the change of 
place of residence.1361 Only with reform as such, could the internal labor market be universalized. 
And thereafter, the farmer workers would no longer be regarded as the second class laborers.  
 
c. Third Principle: De-linking Social-Welfare System and the Hukou  
As the writer mentioned above, today’s hukou system serves a rather comprehensive function. It 
not only records personal information, but also serves as a main basis for distributing social 
interests and resources, including state-subsidized benefits like food supply, medical insurance, 
housing subsidy, minimum living subsidy as well as education opportunity etc. With the 
existence of the linkage as such, the connotation of the hukou system has been changed. It is no 
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 For more information, please see text above accompanying note 1209 to 1211. 
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 On the issue of abolishing dualism in the Chinese hukou system, please also see generally in Zhang 
Xueliang, “Reform of Census Register System and Realization of Civil Equality” (Huji Zhidu Gaige Yu 
Gongmin Pindeng Quan De Shixian), Journal of North-west No. 2 Peoples’ Institute Social Science Edition 
(Xibei Dier Mingzu Xueyuan Xuebao), the fourth issue of 2004; Wu Hang, “Investigation on The Reform of 
Current Chinese Hukou System” (Dangdai Zhongguo Huji Zhidu Gaige De Tansuo), Journal of Population 
(Renkou Xuekan), the second issue of 2002; Shen Weidong, “Three Suggestions on the Reform of Hukou 
System” (Dui Huji Zhidu Gaige De Santiao Jianyi), Journal of Public Security Study (Gongan Yanjiu), the 
first issue of 2003; Zhang Ping & Lin Xin, “The Development of Market Economy and the Reform of 
Hukou System” (Shichang Jingji De Fazhan Yu Woguo Huji Zhidu De Gaige), Journal of Population and 
Economy (Renkou Yu Jingji), the sixth issue of 2000. 
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longer merely a booklet containing personal information and for the Chinese authority to know 
the relevant information of its people, but transformed into a labeling mechanism -- to categorize 
the Chinese citizens into different classes.  
 
As such, the writer hereby proposes to de-link the social welfare system and hukou, i.e., to 
simplify the function of the hukou system – it purely serves as a means to prove people’s identity 
and provide his/her personal information to government. As for the practice of distributing social 
interests based on hukou, it is unfair to deny the national treatment to the Chinese citizens from 
rural areas when the overwhelming majority of them are hardworking taxpayers.1362 In fact, such 
a principle is not only important to the issue of employment discrimination based on social origin, 
but is also meaningful in curbing the child labor problem in China. It shall be pointed out that the 
existence of hukou has actually denied the right to education of the farmer workers’ children 
when they migrate with their parents to the cities. In addition, even if they are born in the cities, 
as long as their parents are with rural origin, they must return to their place of origin and study 
there. In other words, they are not allowed to study in any public primary, secondary or senior 
high school located in the cities where they migrate.1363 Only when the de-linking principle is 
well absorbed by the hukou reform, will the place of education be disconnected with the place of 
hukou registration. In so doing, the second generation of the Chinese migrant workers will be able 
to have a chance to be educated in the public schools located in the cities where their parents 
work rather than being forced to leave their parents and return to their so-called place of origin to 
accept education or to attend certain private schools in the cities especially targeting the second 
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 For more information, please see generally in Ibid.  
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 For more information, please see generally in Xiang Jiquan, Wu Licai & Liu Yiqiang, “Institutional 
Guarantee on the Educational Rights of the Children of Farmer Workers -- Analysis and Suggested Policy 
on the Issue of Education of Farmer Worker’s Children” (Wei Nongmingong Zinv De Jiaoyu Tigong Zhidu 
Baozhang -- Guanyu Nongmingong Zinv Jiaoyu Wenti De Diaocha Fenxi Yu Zhengce Jianyi), online: 
<http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=5005> (date accessed: July 12, 2006); online: 
<http://www.bass.gov.cn/common/EMPdissertation.jsp?id=333> (date accessed: July 12, 2006).  
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generation of farmer workers (Mingong Zidi Xuexiao) usually with unqualified educational 
facilities and teaching staff.1364  
 
d. The Feasibility of the Three Abovementioned Principles  
Some scholars have cast doubt on the suggestions of introducing the abovementioned three 
principles into the reform of the Chinese hukou system.1365 They contend that with the dramatic 
reform as such, a large number of rural residents will swarm into the urban area, which might 
lead to an outbreak of urban illness (congestion, pollution, urban crowdedness, rise of criminal 
rate etc.)1366; in addition, once the freedom of internal movement is realized, after a certain period 
of time, an undesirable phenomenon might happen, viz, the developed eastern part of China will 
become over-crowded while the underdeveloped western part will become even less developed 
with the loss of both skilled intellectual and technical labor through the free movement of such 
laborers towards more favorable economic, geographic or professional area; furthermore, if the 
social welfare system is universalized , part of the Chinese citizens (mainly urbanites) might not 
be able to accept such dramatic changes, which might lead to social instability because most 
urbanites have taken it for granted for years that they are born superior to the rural residents, yet 
suddenly they lose both their privileges and vested interests alike. 1367  
 
                                                 
1364
 Indeed, by doing so, the chances for the second generation of the Chinese farmer workers to become 
child laborers will be lower. For more information, please see generally in online: 
<http://www.njnews.cn/k/ca520803.htm>, <http://www.pep.com.cn/200406/ca460718.htm>, 
<http://pic.people.com.cn/GB/1098/4162291.html> (date accessed: July 12, 2006). 
1365
 Please see generally in Cui Yuanfeng & Feng Hua, “No Rush for the Reform of Hukou System” (Huji 
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“No Rush Abolition of the Chinese Hukou System” (Zhongguo Huji Zhidu Zanshi Buneng Qvxiao), the 
eleventh issue of 2001; Chen Chengwen & Sun Zhongmin, “Dualism Or Monism: Choices of The Models 
on the Reform of Chinese Household Registration System” (Eryuan Haishi Yiyuan: Zhongguo Huji Zhidu 
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 Supra 1365. 
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These concerns, prima facie, have their merits; however, at the most, they are only hypothesis 
without the support by empirical evidence. On the contrary, to date, the empirical evidence 
available appears to be supporting the introduction of a dramatic reform on hukou system as the 
writer proposes above. For example, as discussed, many countries over the world have adopted 
residential registration systems that are apparently different from China’s hukou and the systems 
as such are working well in practice.1368 The critical differences between those systems and the 
Chinese hukou are that: ① their function is relatively simple -- to prove a person’s identity and 
to provide the necessary information to government on its population, rather than serving as an 
important basis in distributing social interests, resources as well as binding the farmers to the land 
with very limited chances to improve their quality of lives; ② the creation of the other 
residential registration systems is not for the purpose of maintaining dual social structure, whilst 
the introduction of hukou not only is responsible for the creation of the dual structure but also 
actively strengthens it for more than five decades.1369 In addition, according to the writer’s 
interview of the forty Chinese farmer workers in Shanghai, she was informed that in their villages, 
as long as people there want to leave their hometown, they have already managed by all means to 
leave and migrated to the cities to work there; as for the rest, they are unwilling to leave their 
hometown to work as farmer workers in the cities even if revolutionary changes on hukou do 
happen.1370 Indeed, to those that are worried to happen have already happened, and to those that 
have yet to happen, the chances for them to occur in the future are rare. As for those who 
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ultimately choose to stay in the rural areas, country life is more attractive than urban one which is 
a symbol of congestion, polluted air, noisy environment and too much competition.1371 In other 
words, the occurrence of an uncontrollable population swarming into the cities from the rural 
areas is not necessary to happen, even if a dramatic reform covering the three principles proposed 
by the writer does happen. This position is further confirmed by the fact as follows: due to some 
governmental policy in Zhejiang Province, residents of some villages are required to give up their 
social status as farmer and become urban hukou holders, however a small amount of them refuse 
to accept such a seemingly nice offer in spite of various benefits awaiting them.1372  
 
Furthermore, as for the concern of the social instability caused by the de-linking process, the 
writer could not stop wondering: could the inequality artificially maintained by the hukou system 
against the Chinese constitutional principle of equality1373 and the rule of customary international 
law on freedom of internal movement1374 really lead to the so called desirable social stability? 
Would that be possible that at the end of the day, the majority of the Chinese population, viz. 
farmers, could no longer bear the dual social structure and its subsequent effects -- such as no 
social security system to protect them and the discriminatory treatment when employed, and 
therefore become the cause of social instability? Once again, the empirical evidence appears to be 
supportive on the writer’s speculation. In the case of Wang binyu (September 4, 2005), having 
failed to receive his overdue wages urgently needed for his father’s operation and seriously being 
humiliated by his foreman, this desperate 25-year-old farmer worker stabbed the foreman and his 
three family members and wounded a co-workers.1375 In the same month, two similar cases 




 Pan Xipan, “Would Chaos Come If Loosening Hukou System” (Fangkai Huji Hui Tianxia Daluan 
Ma), Journal of Opening Policy (Kaifang Daobao), the twelfth issue of 1996.  
1373
 For more information, please see text above accompanying note 1340 to 1346. 
1374
 For more information, please see text above accompanying note 1317 to 1338. 
1375
  Please see generally in Wang Zhenghua, “Convicted migrant worker killer waits for final verdict”, 
online: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/21/content_479492.htm> (date accessed: 
April 3, 2006); For Wang Binyu Case, please see generally in online: 
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caused by the issue of wage arrears happened in Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang Province. 
One was about Hu Xingying, a Hubei farmer worker who chose to burn himself and his foreman 
together to death, after failing to collect his overdue payment of 4,000 yuan RMB;1376 the other 
was about the case of Cao Qing, which happened three days after Hu Xingying’s death. In this 
case, in a fit of anger over no hope to collect more than 100 thousand yuan RMB that belongs to 
his co-workers and himself, he committed suicide by burning himself.1377 Have these tragedies 
happened in the same month implied a sign of social instability? Have the tragedies brought about 
the unharmonious sound to the establishment of a harmonious society advocated by the CCP 
itself? Indeed, the high criminal rate of farmer workers happening in the cities also drops a hint 
on the possibility of social instability caused by the social inequality as such. For instance, 
official statistics have shown that more than 60 percent criminal cases happening in Beijing in 
recent years are committed by farmer workers, and in the case of Shanghai and Guangzhou, this 
number ascend to more than 70 percent and 69 percent respectively.1378  From a perspective of 
civil equality, the improvement of the urbanites’ living standards shall not be built on the sacrifice 
of the Chinese farmers which constitute over 70 percent of the Chinese population. The costs and 
benefits of economic development and industrialization shall be evenly shared by every Chinese 
citizen, rather than merely benefiting the minority, whilst sacrificing the interests of the majority. 
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Of course, it is understandable that dramatic reform as such takes time; however, no matter how 
long it takes, it is high time for the Chinese government to set up its mind and take substantial 
actions from now on.  
 
ii. Independent Trade Union -- A Means of Self-Relief 
As discussed above, ACFTU’s excluding policy is partly responsible for the employment 
discrimination against the Chinese farmer workers. As a vulnerable social group -- leaving 
hometown and families and migrating to the unknown cities, farmer workers rarely have chances 
to get organizational protection. Yet, even after the amendment of ACFTU’s excluding policy, 
the efficacy of the organizational protection provided by ACFTU is nevertheless limited.  
 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, the writer has criticized the phenomenon of trade union monopoly and 
cast doubts on the feasibility of the dual and mutual conflicting function of the trade union in 
China.1379 It is likely that the Chinese trade union has become the “eye and ear” of the state 
inside every SOE, or the “eye and ear” of the employers inside every private-owned 
enterprise.1380 Accordingly, on one hand, even if the ACFTU’s announcement of year 2003 did 
work, chances for it to improve the treatment on the Chinese farmer workers in terms of 
employment are non the less slight. On the other hand, an efficient organizational protection on 
farmer workers can be provided by an independent trade union so that the dilemma of ACFTU’s 
representative crisis can be effectively avoided. Actually, certain independent trade unions 
organized by the Chinese farmer workers themselves have emerged in spite of no authoritative 
recognition. For instance, it is reported that an independent trade union organized by farmer 
workers established in 2004 had successfully help its members sort out the wage arrear problem, 
i.e., the overdue payment of RMB 350,000 yuan has been returned to those hard working 
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 For more information, please see text above part 3.2 (A) --“Brief Introduction to the Law and Practice 
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members’ pockets.1381 With the development of these autonomously organized farmer workers’ 
own unions, this vulnerable social group finally has a means to save themselves out of unfair 
treatment, especially when the legislative protection on them is proved to be far from 
adequate.1382  Considering that in Chapter 3 the writer has provided a relatively thorough 
discussion on the legality and value of an independent trade union in China, in particular, its 
advantages compared with the trade unions under the ACFTU system, the writer is not going to 
reiterate it again in this part.1383  
 
iii. Farmer Worker’s Protection Law -- A Comprehensive Legal Protection 
a. The Necessities of Such Legislation 
In the above text, the writer has justified that although in theory, the Chinese farmer workers 
might be argued to belong to the Chinese working class, in practice, they are excluded because of 
their obscure social identity, i.e., they are registered as “farmer” in the household registration 
booklet whilst migrating to the urban areas and establishing the de facto labor-employment 
relationship with their employers, rather than engaging into agricultural production in the 
countryside.1384 Various discriminative treatments against them existing for decades, including 
but not limited to endless nightmares of wage arrears, no protection from social security system, 
discriminatory local legislation, high rate of working injury as well as same contribution but 
different payment, have strongly implied that the current Chinese labor legislation has failed to 
provide enough legal protection on farmer workers. 
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Besides, a number of social investigations conducted either by some local governments or by the 
writer herself have reflected that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese farmer workers feel 
that they have been treated as if they were second class citizens in China when they are working 
in the cities,1385 which implies that in the minds of most Chinese urban dwellers and urban 
governmental officials, farmer workers are not regarded as the real members of the Chinese 
working class, let alone enjoying the same labor rights. Accordingly, a special legal protection is 
necessary for protecting the interests and rights of a vulnerable social group as such. Considering 
that China has enacted specific and comprehensive legislation to target the interests and rights of 
its children and women alike -- the “Woman Rights and Interests Protection Law” and “Minor 
Protection Law”,1386 a special legislation under the name of “Farmer Worker Protection Law” is 
surely with the feasibility. 
 
Admittedly, some scholars have cast doubt on the necessities to enact a special legislation to 
protect farmer workers.1387 They argue that merely through certain amendment on the current 
Chinese labor legislation, in particular, clarifying that farmer workers belong to the Chinese 
working class, the discriminatory treatment in terms of employment against them shall be able to 
disappear gradually as time goes on.1388 In addition, some contend that as long as the radical 
reform on hukou system could happen, the dual social structure will collapse accordingly, and 
therefore the same treatment in terms of employment could finally come to farmer workers in the 
long run. In this sense, there is no need to waste the costs of legislation to enact a specific 
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legislation as such. Put aside the issue as to whether these positions have their merits or not,1389 
the critical point here is that both plans proposed above take a relatively long time to work.  
 
In the case of the proposal to amend the existing labor law -- to clarify that the definition of 
“worker” includes farmer worker, it not only intends to clarify the legal definition of “worker”, 
but also expects a quantum shift in urbanites’ and urban governments’ attitude towards farmer 
workers via a legislative amendment as such. Indeed, only when the stereotype of “farmer 
worker” is changed, could the urban employers start to understand that farmer workers are under 
the same legal protection of the relevant labor law and could have a second thought before they 
deny the application of labor law on farmer workers. Considering that it takes decades to 
constitute the stereotype in their minds that farmer workers are the de facto second class citizens 
in the cities and are not protected by the relevant labor law, it shall not be easy to alter it in a short 
term logically.  
 
In the case of the proposal of a dramatic reform on hukou, it does provide a solution to eradicate 
the root cause of the discriminatory treatment in terms of employment; however, as stated in the 
above text, the fundamental and profound change as such on the Chinese residential registration 
system takes a relatively long time to happen as the reform shall absorb the abovementioned three 
principles -- (1) principle of freedom of internal movement, (2) principle of abolishing the 
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practice of dualism, and (3) principle of de-linking social welfare system and hukou.1390 Given 
that the rights and interests of the Chinese farmer workers were violated and are still being 
violated everyday, and there is an urgent need to stop the discriminatory treatment as such, a 
specific law especially targeting the interests and rights of farmer workers appears to be necessary 
to satisfy such an urgent need.1391 
 
b. Law Enactment Proposals on “Farmer Worker Protection Law”1392 
The purpose of this part is to propose certain indispensable aspects to be covered in the “Farmer 
Worker Protection Law”, in particular targeting the present prevailing discriminatory treatment in 
terms of employment. 
 
1. General Principles of “Farmer Worker Protection Law” 
In the part of “General Provision” of this legislation, it is necessary to emphasize that (1) farmer 
workers -- the Chinese citizens with rural origin reflected in the household registration booklet 
but engaged in non-agricultural industries located in the urban areas -- belong to the Chinese 
working class and no discriminatory treatment based on social origin in terms of employment is 
allowed; and (2) they are entitled to be employed on an equal basis, i.e., having the same rights as 
their urban counterparts do in choosing occupations, obtaining remuneration, taking rests, having 
holidays and leaves, receiving labor safety and sanitation protection, getting training in 
professional skills, enjoying social insurance protection and welfare treatment and submitting 
applications for settlement of labor disputes, and other labor rights stipulated by this law and 
other relevant labor legislation in China. 
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2. Wage Security 
Considering the wage arrear on the Chinese farmer workers is one of the most serious problems 
facing farmer workers today, the part of “wage security” is surely at the priority of this 
legislation.  
 
Distribution of wages shall follow the principle of distribution in accordance with work load and 
principle of equal pay for equal work. The law shall provide explicitly that farmer workers are 
entitled to be paid the same as their urban counterparts and any wage difference solely based on 
social origin shall be explicitly prohibited. In addition, the wage paid to farmer workers shall be 
in the form of currency and on a monthly basis. No wages payable to farmer workers are allowed 
to be deducted or delayed without legitimate reasons. Furthermore, since farmer workers are 
lawful residents in the cities, they shall be protected by the local minimum wage system. 
Therefore, the employer shall pay their wages not less than the local minimum standards. Any 
violation of such provisions shall be punished accordingly. Indeed, from the writer’s view, the 
punishment on the violation of this aspect shall be more seriously vis-à-vis the violation of the 
other urban workers’ rights since farmer workers are groundless, seasonal residents in the cities 
who usually have no savings, acquaintance and stable domicile.  
 
3. Labor safety and Sanitation 
As mentioned above, farmer workers are often engaged in the dirtiest and the most dangerous 
works, such as construction work. As such, employers shall be obliged to establish a necessary 
system for farmer workers’ safety and sanitation that is consistent with the rules and standards 
provided by relevant authorities. Besides, before a farmer worker is assigned to any special 
operation, relevant professional training shall be provided and necessary qualification shall be 
obtained in advance. In addition, employers are under the obligation to carry out regular health 
examination for farmer workers who are exposed to hazardous working conditions. Last but not 
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the least, a special reporting system in relation to the working injuries and deaths of farmer 
workers shall be established so that it would be much easier for governmental agencies to monitor 
the progress in practice or the lack thereof.  
 
4. Working Hours, Leaves and Public Holidays 
Through writer’s interview of forty Chinese farmer workers mainly reflected in Table 6 above, it 
is typical that farmer workers are required to work about 12 hours per day with neither overtime 
working payment nor a single day off per week. Aiming at the serious violation of farmer 
workers’ labor rights as such, the law in question shall emphasize that the daily working hours for 
farmer workers are eight and employers are under the obligation to provide farmer workers with 
at least one day off per week. Besides, the law shall entitle farmer workers the right to rest during 
public holidays. Any overtime working shall be paid extra remuneration accordingly. And the 
prolonged working time could not exceed 36 hours in total per month, which could find an echo 
in the relevant provision under the present Chinese Labor Law.1393 As for the amount of overtime 
working payment, relevant Labor Law provision shall be borrowed directly in order to emphasize 
this aspect.1394 In terms of annual leave, farmer workers shall be entitled to annual leave with 
payment just as their urban counterparts are entitled to if they have worked for the same employer 
continuously for more than one year. 
 
5. Social Security System 
At present, the overwhelming majority of the farmer workers are excluded from the social 
security system. Through the birth of this law, a social insurance system covering not only urban 
dwellers but farmer workers as well shall be built so that farmer workers are able to receive 
                                                 
1393
 Please refer to Labor Law of PRC, art. 41. 
1394
 Please refer to Labor Law of PRC, art. 44. 
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necessary help and compensation when they grow old, get occupational diseases or work-related 
injuries, or become jobless etc. 
 
6. Dispute Settlement 
The general procedure for labor dispute settlement under the relevant Chinese labor legislation at 
present could be divided into four steps. The first step is consultation, i.e., when a labor dispute 
takes place, the parties involved shall seek a settlement through consultation.1395 If the dispute 
could not be settled via consultation, or either party refuses to attend the consultation, the second 
step -- mediation is applicable. At this stage, the parties involved could apply to the labor dispute 
mediation committee set up inside the enterprise for mediation.1396 If the mediation fails, either 
party is allowed to apply for the third step, viz., labor arbitration. Either party that is unsatisfied 
with the arbitration result is able to bring the case to the court.1397 And the labor arbitration is the 
precondition for court procedure.1398 In practice, system as such might work relatively well when 
the disputes mainly involve urban workers; however, its practicability is questionable when being 
applied to farmer workers. 
 
For example, as for the second step -- mediation, the said mediation committee shall be composed 
of representatives from workers, employers and trade union respectively, and the chairman of 
such a committee shall be a representative from trade union.1399 A practical dilemma for the 
procedure as such is that the overwhelming majority of farmer workers are not union members as 
they are mainly employed by the privately owned enterprises where the union coverage rate is 
                                                 
1395







 Labor Law of PRC, art. 79 & Regulation on Labor Dispute Settlement in Enterprises of PRC, art. 6. 
1399
 Labor Law of PRC, art. 80 (1). 
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low -- less than 10 percent.1400 Of course, when there is no union inside a work place, the 
chairman of such a mediation committee is expected to be decided through negotiation between 
workers and employers. 1401  Considering the existing severe labor-capital conflict awaiting 
mediation, such a negotiation to find an impartial chairman who could be trusted by both sides is 
surely a tough job. Therefore, the composition of a mediation committee inside the work place 
has become a mission virtually impossible. Worse still, the time needed for finalizing a labor 
dispute is unnecessarily long.1402  Even without taking the days spent on the first step -- 
consultation which has no clear time limit provided by the law, the time needed for fulfilling the 
rest steps is at least 12 months without taking into consideration any legitimate extension:1403 one 
month for mediation, two months for labor arbitration and nine months for court procedure.1404 
As such, it is hard to image that as a de facto passing traveler of the cities, farmer workers will be 
able to afford to wait in the cities for more than one year till the final conclusion of the dispute. In 
fact, one year is considered as an optimistic estimation. A host of cases have shown that the time 
needed in general for the conclusion of a labor dispute will be often more than two years.1405 For 
example, in a labor dispute between a railway station and its employees occurred in Zhelimupeng, 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, more than two years time had passed after it was finalized 
                                                 
1400
 For more information, please see text above accompanying note 407, 409 & 412. Please also see Wu 
Jixue, “The Major Contradiction of Contemporary China Is Labor Capital Relationship” (Dangdai 
Zhongguo Jinji Shehui Zhong De Zhuyao Maodun Shi Laozi Guanxi), online: 
<http://www.economics.com.cn/writing/review/ChinaZYMD.htm> (date accessed: April 10, 2006).  
1401
 Supra 1395, art. 9. 
1402
 Actually, the design for such labor dispute settlement procedure is unreasonable. For example, 
arbitration is supposed to be based on the principle of free will, however, in the Chinese labor law context, 
it becomes a compulsory procedure. For more information, please see Mao Weiting, “Analysis on the 
Defects of Compulsory Arbitration as A Precondition for Court Procedure and Its Solution” (Laodong 
Zhengyi Chuli Zhongcai Qianzhi Chengxu De Quexian Fenxi Jiqi Duice), online: 
<http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=5565> (date accessed: April 10, 2006). 
1403
 The time limit for labor arbitration shall be 60 days, however, it is allowed to be prolonged for another 
30 days if the case is complex; the time limit for the trial court to make a decision is six months and the 
legitimate extension could be six months.  
1404
 Ibid., art.10 & 32; Civil Procedural Law of PRC, 2003, art. 135 & 159. 
1405
 Supra 1402. 
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by the court.1406 Ironically, the court decision is exactly the same as the decision of labor 
arbitration.1407  
 
As discussed above, considering that the major disputes between farmer workers and their 
employers lie in wage arrear, the writer could not stop wondering how these farmer workers 
could afford their daily expenses in cities as well as the subsequent arbitration fee and litigious 
cost without getting their wages in the first place. In this sense, the cost that farmer workers have 
to pay for such a labor dispute settlement system is simply too much for them to bear. An official 
social investigation report -- “Investigation Report on the Cost Paid by Chinese Farmer Workers 
for Defending Their Rights” (Zhongguo Nongmingong Weiquan Chengben Diaocha Baogao) 
covering eight provinces of China finished in 2005 had further confirmed the writer’s 
argument.1408 According to this report, based on a conservative estimation, the comprehensive 
cost1409 for a farmer worker to get back his wage of RMB 1000 yuan is at least RMB 3000 
yuan. 1410  For some cases, the comprehensive cost could reach RMB 10,000 yuan. 1411 
Accordingly, it is beyond doubt that there is a practical need for a relatively tidy labor dispute 
settlement system especially targeting the disputes between farmer workers and their employers 
on wage issue. A feasible suggestion might be to skip the first two steps and to make the third and 
fourth step mutually exclusive, i.e., if both parties agree to apply for the labor arbitration, the 
decision of arbitration commission is final and with binding force; otherwise, either part has the 
right to launch a lawsuit directly.  
 






 For more information, please see generally in online: 
<http://society.people.com.cn/GB/41158/3485993.html>; 
<http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2005/06/200506231016.shtml> (date accessed: April 10, 2006). 
1409
 Comprehensive cost includes financial cost, time cost, legal service cost and cost to government. For 






7. The Legal Hierarchy of “Farmer Worker Protection Law” 
From the writer’s position, the legal hierarchy of the legislation in question shall be law (in its 
narrow sense), i.e., its legal authority is equal to the Chinese Labor Law and is only subjected to 
Constitution.1412 The reasons for the above suggestion can be understood as follows: ① As a 
vulnerable social group with more than 130 million population,1413 the Chinese farmer workers 
shall deserve the same level of legal protection as is provided to other vulnerable social groups in 
China, such as women, children and the disabled1414; ② as yet, the administrative documents, 
notices promulgated by the Chinese central government to target certain aspects of discriminatory 
treatment against farmer workers failed to make a substantial progress on the employment 
situation of farmer workers. As such, to categorize the legal authority of “Farmer Worker 
Protection Law” as law (in its narrow sense) shall be much easier to arouse people’s serious 
attention than to label its legal hierarchy as rule, regulation or administrative decision.1415  
 
D. Concluding Remarks 
In this part, the writer provides a relatively comprehensive case study on the Chinese farmer 
workers, including its definition, the jobs that they are usually engaged in and the discriminatory 
treatments faced by them when they are employed in the cities, such as same job same 
contribution with different payment, serious wage arrears, chances for employment being limited 
to certain types of jobs often with dirty and hazardous working conditions, being denied labor 
rights to rest and overtime working payment as well as no coverage by social security system. 
Through the writer’s analysis, the root cause behind such employment discrimination is the 
household registration system with Chinese characteristics. With the introduction of a residential 
                                                 
1412
 For more information on the Chinese Legal Hierarchy, please see part 2.3 (A) (ii) -- “Lawmaking in 
China”. 
1413
 For more information on the exact population of Chinese farmer workers, please see text above 
accompanying note 1267 to 1269. 
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 The Disabled Protection Law of People’s Republic of China (Canjiren Baozhang Fa), 1990. 
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 For more information on the status of administrative decision, please see above note 1273. 
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registration system as such, the Chinese rural citizens’ basic human right to freedom of internal 
movement has been seriously denied. Moreover, the Chinese hukou system is not only controlling 
the Chinese citizens’ freedom to migrate internally but serving a relatively comprehensive 
function in practice as well -- a person registered with urban origin under the hukou booklet is 
entitled to governmentally subsidized social welfare system, meanwhile his/her rural counterpart 
is locked to the land to take care of his/her own subsistence and consumption without any access 
to the said social benefits. Indeed, there is a de facto intangible wall with institutional support 
between the urban and the rural areas in today’s China. Logically, a sense of urban superiority is 
easily formed under such circumstances. Admittedly, both central and local governments have 
adopted certain policies to loosen such an overly rigid hukou control; yet from the writer’s 
position, these policies are inconstant, piecemeal-based and superficial in nature without touching 
the core of hukou -- artificially denying the equality among its own citizens. Of course, some 
other causes such as ACFTU’s excluding policies as well as a lack of comprehensive legislative 
protection on farmer workers also have played a role in worsening such employment 
discrimination based on social origin.  
 
Aiming at the causes abovementioned, the writer hereby proposes certain legal solutions as 
follows. First and foremost, a reform of the present hukou system is critical. Three guiding 
principles on how to reform today’s Chinese hukou system are proposed: ① incorporating 
freedom of internal movement into the hukou system, ② abolishing dualism to universalize the 
current two-tiered, well-segregated labor market, ③ de-linking social-welfare system and hukou 
to realize national treatment to every Chinese citizen. In fact, the writer not only proposes the 
reform, but also justifies the feasibility of such a dramatic reform on hukou. The second solution 
is to establish independent trade unions so that this vulnerable social group can finally receive 
some organizational protection especially when necessary legal protection is far from enough. 
320 
Last but not the least, considering that there is an urgent need to stop the serious discriminatory 
treatment on Chinese farmer workers, whereas the former two proposals shall take a relatively 
long time to work, as a relatively quick and handy solution, a specific law especially to target the 
current discriminatory treatment faced by farmer workers appears to be desirable. It is believed 
that only when the three abovementioned proposals work together, could the employment 
discrimination against the Chinese farmer workers disappear in the near future. 
 
In fact, employment discrimination based on social origin in China is not solely happened to the 
Chinese farmer workers, but sometimes to citizens even they are with urban origin. For example, 
in 1998, when the Chinese Supreme People’s court planned to recruit ten senior judges from 
experienced legal professionals, one of the pre-conditions was that the applicant should be a 
Beijing hukou holder.1416 In other words, even a Chinese citizen is an urban hukou holder (as 
long as not Beijing hukou holder), he/she is nevertheless disqualified to apply for this job. 
However, such phenomenon is not common and has not happened on a large scale compared with 
what had happened to the Chinese farmer workers. Besides, from the writer’s position, if a 
dramatic hukou reform proposed above can be adopted so that the hukou system is finally 
transformed into a registration purely to prove personal identity and their place of residence with 
no other additional functions, phenomenon as such is expected to vanish as time goes on. As such, 
the writer is not going to pay too much attention on this issue in her thesis. 
 
6.4 Conclusion on Chapter Six 
After introducing ILO’s fundamental convention No. 100 and No.111 on prohibition against 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation and China’s relevant labor legislation 
alike, the writer finds out that the general Chinese legislation against employment discrimination 
is competent; however, the Chinese law keeps silent on the issue of employment discrimination 
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based on social origin, which is indeed the most serious aspect of employment discrimination in 
China, which covers more than 130 million Chinese citizens. With a relatively thorough research 
coupled with the empirical evidence collected during the writer’s field study in Shanghai, China, 
a comprehensive case study on employment discrimination against the Chinese farmer workers is 
accomplished, which covers: ① how farmer workers are discriminated when they are employed 
in the cities, ② why they are discriminated, and ③ how to reform the contemporary Chinese 
legal system to eradicate such discrimination.  
 
Admittedly, in practice, the basis for discrimination in respect of employment and occupation in 
China is not limited to social origin only. To be precise, employment discrimination also happens 
on the basis of gender though there are plenty of domestic legislation not only guaranteeing 
women’s equal rights with man when being employed, but also taking care of women workers’ 
special needs. Accordingly, the problem is not located in legislation per se, but in the 














Chapter 7: Conclusion: Summary, Problems and Suggestions 
 
7.1 Thesis in Summary 
As China is undergoing rapid economic and social transformations, there are increasing concerns 
in terms of the costs to its people. When moving from a socialist state to one that embraces 
capitalist concepts, China’s legal system, especially those deal with labor rights, needs to adapt to 
the profound changes. In this context, urgent need arises for China to re-examine its labor law and 
underlying institutions with a view of reforming them. Even if the political need to deal with the 
issue has increased, questions remain on the approach that China should take. By mainly adopting 
a utilitarian approach to the international core labor standards, this thesis provides an original 
argument for the introduction of certain substantial legislative reform with feasibility in the 
current Chinese context, which covers four fundamental aspects of labor rights.  
 
Considered as a further concretization of the relevant general principles of human rights, the 
international core labor standards that are crystallized by eight ILO fundamental conventions and 
covering four fundamental aspects of labor rights do provide internationally recognized labor 
standards to guide China’s legislative reform and its leaders’ decision-making procedures. It is 
observed that “respect for freedom of association reinforces popular participation and buttresses 
democratic institutions that can address an uneven distribution of the gains from economic 
growth”, and therefore promote social justice;1417 it is observed as well that “countries that have 
eliminated forced labor and the worst forms of child labor and have made important inroad 
against discrimination in employment and occupation are thriving economically.”1418 Although 
ILO fundamental conventions never force a signatory member to obey their standards, its 
                                                 
1417
 Supra 47. 
1418
 Supra 10. 
323 
influential power is beyond doubt. Once China ratifies the remaining four fundamental 
conventions, a repeated circle of interaction, interpretation and internalization is expected to be 
created. As time goes on, institutional habits of leading nations into default pattern of compliance 
of the fundamental conventions are to be cultivated accordingly. As such, the international core 
labor standards acquire its “stickiness”, and domestic decision-making structure will become 
“enmeshed” with international core labor standards. Subsequently, China is likely to “obey” the 
core conventions out of perceived self-interests. In this thesis, the writer conducts a 
comprehensive study on the Chinese labor legislation from the perspective of eight ILO 
fundamental conventions, to find out the gap between them and provide feasible gap-filling 
solutions.  
 
7.2 Problems Discovered 
First, with the transfer from centrally planned economy to market economy, with the dissolution 
of state’s paternalistic function, with the reform of labor related institutions, it is observed that the 
interests of Chinese government, especially local governments, and its working class are no 
longer as consistent as before. When Chinese workers “feel economically disadvantaged, socially 
disenfranchised and politically excluded”1419, whereas state has shown its unwillingness to look 
after them, Chinese trade union’s monopoly situation as well as its dual function practice have 
met unprecedented challenges. 
 
Second, in terms of the right to collective bargaining, the relevant Chinese legislation is, prima 
facie, competent. However, its efficacy is questionable. Research has indicated that most of the 
so-called collective contracts are merely products of an administrative process between the 
ACFTU and management rather than the real fruit of collective bargaining. As far as the content 
of the contract is concerned, the lack of substantial provisions to guarantee worker’s rights is the 
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common feature. The issue as to “how to improve the efficacy of the collective bargaining system 
in China” is worthy to be studied. 
 
Third, this study categorizes the forced labor situation in China into three types based on the 
subjects involved: ① the subjects of the first type are normal citizens, ② the second type is 
laogai system whose subjects are prisoners, and ③ the third type is RTL system whose subjects 
are non-criminal law breakers. Although Chinese laogai system is always the target heatedly 
criticized by many human rights NGOs and countries, after a comparative study between ILO 
Convention No. 29, No. 105 and the domestic legislation on the laogai system, this system is 
argued to be qualified as a permissible exception under the core labor standards. It is undeniable 
that certain present practices and some previous policies in relation to the laogai system are 
conflicting with the criteria provided by the Core. In addition, some of the products made by 
inmates do end up with entering into foreign markets. However, no evidence shows that practice 
as such is systematic and with institutional support at present. The existence of certain illegal 
practices does not necessarily justify the denial of the value of the Chinese Convicted Labor 
Reform System as a whole. Indeed, the problem mainly lies in the first and the third type of 
forced labor. For the first type of forced labor, it is observed that within recent years, with the 
rapid economic development, forced labor as such started spreading. The recent illegal brick kilns 
scandal in Shanxi Province once again highlights the severity of the problem. As for the Chinese 
RTL system, a study between the related ILO fundamental conventions and the relevant domestic 
legislation shows that the Chinese RTL system is a de facto institutionalized forced labor system. 
 
Fourth, a historical review on the child labor problem inside China has indicated that in spite of 
the substantially increased living standards, this social illness, rather than disappearing 
thoroughly, started reemerging. The comparative study between the ILO fundamental 
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conventions against child labor and the relevant Chinese domestic law has pointed out that the 
Chinese legislation is generally competent. In addition, from the writer’s observation, the root 
cause of the resurface of this social evil in China is neither poverty, nor legislative flaw but the 
absence of publicly accepted set of moral values to define proper behavior which directly caused 
a spiritual crisis inside China. After years of disastrous socialist policies and revolutions, there is 
a disillusioned reaction to social injustice in the Chinese society. A new pragmatic and utilitarian 
attitude that moves away from the former concern with communal well being but only focuses on 
personal interests has come into being. As the great rush for improving living standards 
accelerates, values that emphasize exploitation in the event of child labor as inevitable even 
necessary start gaining ground. When China is experiencing perhaps the rapidest economic 
development in its history, its public ethics are falling quickly at the same time. 
 
Fifth, the rapid development of market economy has caused an unprecedented pace of 
urbanization in China. Farmers, whose social origin is registered as rural citizen, swarmed into 
cities for working. By the end of year 2005, the number of farmers migrating from rural area to 
cities had reached 200 million. In this context, a special social group -- farmer workers -- is 
created. During the busy farming season, they are likely to return to their hometown to work in 
the field, whereas after that they will fly back to the cities to work. Literature review together 
with empirical study has shown that most of them will end up with “3D” jobs and discriminative 
treatment in terms of employment is common. As such, it is fair to conclude that they are the de 
facto second class citizens in the urban areas of China.  
 
7.3 Suggestions 
Based on the problems summarized as above, the writer proposes solutions as follows: 
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First, in order to better represent and guard the Chinese working class during the transitional 
period, the Chinese trade union’s role must be reoriented. ACFTU’s heavily politicized nature 
that overemphasizes a union’s productive role as a government assistant, whereas unduly neglects 
its guardianship role needs substantial reform. An ideal model -- independent trade union system 
is proposed to sort out the said problems. Justified under the ILO fundamental convention No. 87, 
the value of the an independent trade union system is outlined as follows: ① fulfilling China’s 
obligation under the treaty law; ② avoiding ACFTU’s representative crisis; ③ creating a 
virtuous competing environment for both ACFTU controlled union and independent union; ④ 
increasing social stability; ⑤ raising productivity in workplace; and ⑥ benefiting the workers 
involved in the non-public economy. In spite of various advantages of an independent trade union 
system, it is observed that its feasibility in contemporary China is not optimistic. The writer 
therefore proposes a milder solution with more feasibility (a realistic model), which in nature is a 
bottom up reform inside the current ACFTU system. Such reform includes three aspects, which 
are ① direct democratic election in grass root trade union, ② reform of the financial system in 
the grass root union, and ③ taking grass root union leaders’ rights seriously. Admittedly, this 
realistic model might not be able to solve all the problems faced by today’s Chinese trade union 
system, because it is a relatively small step within the ACFTU system without touching certain 
essential defects -- such as its double function dilemma. However, it is believed that this milder 
yet doable model that creates a chance to bring about gradual improvement inside ACFTU might 
be the only positive compromise available at the moment.  
 
Second, as for how to deal with the inefficacy problem of the collective bargaining system in 
China, the writer tries to sort out the issue from three aspects. The independence of the Chinese 
trade union is proved to be critical to the establishment of an efficient collective bargaining 
system. In the absence of a trade union in a work place, especially in the non-public sector, an 
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effective solution is proposed --“independent union system”. Admittedly, the feasibility of such a 
model is seriously blocked due to CCP’s sensitivity on the establishment of an independent 
organization in China. A backup plan is hereby proposed. A specific model law promulgated by 
the ACFTU solely targeting union in non-public sector and especially designed to accord with its 
features is suggested. Meanwhile, a “simultaneous approach” is proposed in order to borrow 
governmental power to assist the establishment of a trade union in a private enterprise. Finally, 
right to strike is argued to be critical to the success of a collective bargaining system. A 
legislative review shows that due to the fact that right to strike is both mis-linked to revolutionary 
ideas and misunderstood as a method for class struggle only belonging to the capitalist world by 
the Chinese authority, the de facto domestic statutory attitude towards this right is “unsupportive”. 
In fact, the rise of private economy, the freedom granted to SOEs, together with the introduction 
of the labor contract system in China have already transformed the former leading class into a 
vulnerable social group. In order to balance the disproportionate bargaining power between the 
Chinese working class and their employers so that an environment conducive to a healthy 
collective bargaining system can be built, the writer proposes three steps based on some other 
countries’ legislative experience on strike to regulate the right to strike in China, which includes 
① properly define right to strike, ② carefully confine right to strike, and ③ reasonably protect 
a lawful strike. 
 
Third, to curb the spreading of the first type of forced labor, the focus is to improve the 
implementation of the Chinese legislation against forced labor. Admittedly, to have a better 
implementation of law is a complicated long term task. The issues of judicial independence, 
judges’ professionalization as well as corruption are discussed for a better legislative 
implementation system in China. As for the Chinese RTL system, a complete abolition of such 
system is suggested. The justification of such an approach is outlined as follows: ① RTL system 
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is argued to be an institutionalized forced labor system that partly serves as a means for punishing 
people for their mere expression of political or ideological opinion, which is incompatible with 
China’s obligation under the CIL; ② RTL is inconsistent with certain basic principles of ROL in 
that its legislation is lack of legitimacy and its punishment is unreasonably harsh compared with 
the offence and other principal punishments under the Chinese penal code; ③ the lack of 
effective monitoring mechanism of RTL’s investigation, approval and administrative appeal may 
bring about power abuses that can endanger Chinese citizens’ basic rights; and ④ some rules 
and regulations of RTL are highlighted as conflicting against each other. In addition, the deep 
reason for China to maintain RTL as it is has been discussed in this paper as well. It is discovered 
that no matter how big the gap between RTL system and the basic ROL principles, and the gap 
between RTL system and the core labor standards against forced labor, the efficiency and 
non-judicial nature of the RTL that can lead to a quick restoration of social and political stability 
and the maintenance of CCP’s one party control, as well as its help to immune CCP from or 
reduce the chances for it being exposed to criticism for human rights abuses are too cherished to 
be given up easily.  
 
Fourth, as a complex legal and social issue, child labor needs a comprehensive solution. Although 
the domestic legislation still leaves something to be desired, generally speaking, it is competent 
and consistent with the ILO fundamental conventions No. 138 and No. 182. Based on the 
characteristics of child labor phenomena in China, the writer proposes certain suggestions beyond 
legislative reform to curb the reemergence of child labor. These suggestions are as follows: ① 
proper governmental role: after all, government has the greatest responsibility for eliminating 
child labor as well as the broadest resources for addressing this social problem. Building correct 
understanding on the root cause of child labor, de-linking the ideas of poverty and child labor, 
guiding public morality towards a positive direction to reach common good and establishing a 
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competent educational system are four crucial aspects for the Chinese government to take into 
consideration to curb child labor; ② critically evaluating the link between child labor social 
clause and trade sanction: the writer reviews trade sanction’s self-punishment nature, limited 
scope and effect, questionable jurisprudential origin, potential risk of causing trade protectionism 
as well as the humanitarian crises that sanction might bring about. It is submitted that a 
speculative analysis on trade sanction’s effect on a targeted country like China needs to be 
studied carefully before the coercive trade tool is emotionally proposed to impose; and ③ COC 
movement and social labeling program: both literature review and empirical study have shown 
that their effects to curb child labor are only marginal in the current Chinese context. 
 
Fifth, a comparative study between the Chinese legislation with regard to discrimination in 
respective of employment and occupation and ILO fundamental Convention No. 100 and No. 111 
has shown that the Chinese labor law keeps silent on the issue of discrimination with regard to 
color, political opinion and social origin. According to the writer’s research, employment 
discrimination based on social origin is the most serious aspect of discrimination with regard to 
employment in China, which involves at least more than one tenth of the Chinese population. An 
all-round case study on the Chinese farmer workers has pointed out that they are the de facto 
second class citizen in the urban areas of China. The root cause of such discrimination is argued 
to be the Chinese hukou system, which is directly responsible for building an intangible wall with 
institutional support between the urban and the rural areas of China. In order to equally share the 
fruits of economic and social development, three guiding principles on how to reform the hukou 
system are proposed. They are principles of: ① incorporating freedom of internal movement 
into the hukou system, ②  abolishing dualism to universalize the current two-tiered, 
well-segregated labor market, and ③ de-linking social-welfare system and hukou to realize 
national treatment to every Chinese citizen. In addition, the value of an independent trade union 
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in protecting farmer workers from being discriminated is discussed. Considering that the 
abovementioned reforms take a relatively long time to happen, whereas the rights and interests of 
the farmer workers are being violated everyday, there is an urgent need to stop such serious 
discrimination. Therefore, a specific law -- “Farmer Worker Protection Law” especially targeting 
the interests and rights of farmer workers are proposed. Certain important aspects of this law are 
discussed. They are: ① the general principles of the law, ② wage security, ③ labor safety 
and sanitation, ④ working hours, leaves and public holidays, ⑤ social security system, ⑥ 
dispute settlement and ⑦ the legal hierarchy of the said law. 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
To be honest, the legislative reforms proposed in this thesis are not able to sort out all the 
problems highlighted. After all, legislation per se is not panacea. Indeed, the general construction 
of ROL, the improvement of public awareness, the development of market economy, the 
establishment of democracy, the cooperation between the Chinese government and international 
organizations such as ILO should all work together to help China fill the gap between 
international core labor standards and the Chinese labor law so that the costs to its people during 
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